A Humean Theory of Property Rights. by Lindsay, Ira K.
  
A HUMEAN THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
by 
Ira K. Lindsay 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Philosophy) 
in the University of Michigan 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee:  
 
Professor Peter A. Railton, Chair  
Professor Elizabeth S. Anderson  
Professor Allan F. Gibbard  
Professor Scott A. Hershovitz 
  
 
 
 
 
 
© Ira K. Lindsay 2014  
 
  ii 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
For R. Kenneth and Sylvia Lindsay 
 
parents and teachers 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
I came to Michigan in 2004 to study philosophy.  I had a keen interest in ethics, but little 
background in the subject, much less philosophical views on it.  Peter Railton, Elizabeth 
Anderson, and Allan Gibbard provided a wonderful education in moral psychology, metaethics, 
political philosophy normative ethics and much else.  After several years devoted to legal 
education and training, I returned to Ann Arbor in 2011 because of them.  To my great good 
fortune, Scott Hershovitz had joined Michigan Law School while I was away.  This work is 
influenced not only by their advice as members of my committee, but also by my studies with 
each of them, sometimes in subtle or unexpected ways.  I am also thankful for support, 
encouragement and guidance from numerous other members (past and present) of Michigan’s 
philosophy department including Sarah Buss, Victor Caston, Steve Darwall, Matt Evans, Jim 
Joyce, Michelle Kosch, Louis Loeb, Ishani Maitra, Gabe Mendlow, Scott Shapiro, Jamie 
Tappenden, and Rich Thomason.  Chloe Armstrong, Paul Boswell, Annette Bryson, Dmitri 
Gallow, Nils Hennes-Stear, Jeremy Lent, Chip Sebens, Jon Shaheen, Patrick Shirreff, Will 
Thomas, and Robin Zheng commented on large parts of this work. 
Special thanks are due to two philosophers without whom this work would not have been 
written.  Hans Oberdiek first introduced me to political philosophy as a freshman at Swarthmore 
College and has provided encouragement ever since.  Jules Coleman guided my circuitous path 
from graduate school, through law school, two jobs as a lawyer and back to graduate school.  It 
was Jules who first encouraged me to work on Hume’s theory of property, although it took me 
several years to fully appreciate the wisdom of this advice. 
Finally and most importantly, Irina Trenbach has continuously encouraged my studies 
despite the hardships they entail for the rest of our family.  Over the course of ten years, six 
moves, three degrees, and two additions to our family, her enthusiasm has never flagged.  
Whatever has been accomplished here is truly a team effort. 
  iv 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... v 
CHAPTER I - HUMEAN PROPERTY THEORY: A DEFENSE ...................................................... 1 
CHAPTER II - PROPERTY AS GOVERNANCE AND WEALTH.................................................. 71 
CHAPTER III - PROPERTY RIGHTS, TAX OBLIGATIONS..................................................... 132 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 181 
 
  v 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation defends a Humean theory of property rights against its neo-Lockean and 
‘resource egalitarian’ rivals. Humean property rights are conventional and not grounded in pre-
institutional moral entitlements. Nevertheless, the importance of property rights for facilitating 
social cooperation between people with differing views about justice gives them normative 
authority even when they do not conform to ideal principles of distributive justice or ‘natural 
right.’ I develop a conceptual architecture of property rights and property interests in order to 
dispel confusion about the relationship between property’s legal form and economic substance. 
Although the structure of property rights constrains the extent to which property ownership can 
be fragmented in the service of egalitarian distributive goals, robust private property rights are 
compatible with extensive social insurance.  This analysis undermines the neo-Lockean position 
that all redistributive taxation is an infringement of property rights and provides an attractive 
middle ground between libertarianism and strong forms of egalitarianism.  Humean theory 
justifies giving normative weight to pre-tax property entitlements when determining tax 
obligations.  I use this insight to rebut Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s argument that 
principles of tax equity are vacuous because pre-tax income has no moral significance.  Viewing 
tax policy exclusively from the perspective of post-tax income effaces the important role of tax 
fairness norms in preventing wasteful tax policy when people disagree about fundamental 
principles of distributive justice. I distinguish my view from Gerald Gaus’ recent critique of 
Murphy and Nagel.  Whereas Gaus is skeptical of redistributive taxation, my theory of tax 
fairness is compatible both with classical liberalism and with a more robust social welfare state. 
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CHAPTER I 
HUMEAN PROPERTY THEORY: A DEFENSE 
 
Discussions of property rights in political philosophy usually take John Locke as the 
central figure.1  Lockean property rights are central to an important strand of classical liberal and 
libertarian traditions and are often the target of criticism from those with views further to the 
left.2  Neo-Lockean views, such as Robert Nozick’s, are, however, a minority position.  In the 
wake of the paradigm setting work of John Rawls, property rights are most often analyzed in 
light of more abstract principles of distributive justice.  Under this approach, rules fixing 
property entitlements are an output of a theory of justice and not, as Lockeans would have it, an 
independent constraint on state action.  I will call theories that evaluate property rights in light of 
abstract principles of distributive justice founded on some conception of equality ‘resource 
egalitarian’.3  Discussions of property in political philosophy are often structured as a debate                                                         
1 E.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).  Despite Waldron’s 
longstanding interest in Lockean property, he has recently written, “I think it would be a good idea if 
[Hume’s] theory were as widely studied, or as widely used as a template for the study of property, as the 
Lockean theory presently is.” Jeremy Waldron, “‘To Bestow Stability upon Possession’: Hume’s 
Alternative to Locke” in Philosophical Foundations of Property Law, James E. Penner & Henry E. Smith, 
eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12. 
2 E.g., Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia; Eric Mack, “The Natural Right of Property,” Social 
Philosophy & Policy 27 (Winter 2010): 53-78; Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral 
Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
3 Resource egalitarianism is most strongly associated with the work of John Rawls, which is largely 
responsible for framing the resource egalitarian research agenda.  However, Ronald Dworkin might be a 
better example of an archetypal resource egalitarian since his theory of distributive justice follows more 
directly from a conception of moral equality.  See Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality 
of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 4. (Autumn, 1981): 283-345. 
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between resource egalitarians and neo-Lockeans.  There is, however, a third alternative.  
Humean theories of property rights provide an ideological middle ground between neo-Lockean 
and resource egalitarian theories.  Humeans join resource egalitarians in rejecting natural rights 
as a source of property entitlements.  But they join Lockeans in believing that private property 
rights are a constraint on state action independent of abstract principles of distributive justice.  
Although somewhat neglected in mainstream political philosophy,4 Hume’s theory of property 
was an important forerunner of game theoretic analysis of norms and conventions and Humean 
property theory is more closely connected with the social sciences than either of its rivals.5 
In this chapter, I defend a Humean approach to property rights.  Hume’s treatment of 
property rights in the Treatise is innovative, but far from comprehensive and so any Humean 
theory must fill in important details.  My approach is Humean in that it embraces most of the 
elements of Hume’s theory, but is not exactly the same as Hume’s.  I aim to show that Humean 
property theory is a compelling alternative to neo-Lockean and ‘resource egalitarian’ theories 
and will explore how it can ground a broader neo-Humean political theory.  First, I will introduce 
the two main rivals to Humean property theory.  Second, I briefly explain Hume’s account of 
property rights and artificial virtue in A Treatise of Human Nature.  Third, I describe the 
advantages of Humean theory over neo-Lockean and resource egalitarian alternatives.  Finally, I 
                                                        
4 Exceptions include Jerry Gaus, Jeremy Waldron and Brian Barry. See Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public 
Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Jeremy Waldron, “The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of 
Property,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994): 85–123; Brian Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice, 
Volume I: Theories of Justice (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989). 
5 E.g., Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and Welfare (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2004); Ken Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol I: Playing Fair (Cambridge: 
MA: MIT Press, 1994); Ken Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol II: Just Playing 
(Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 1998); Herbert Gintis, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the 
Unification of the Behavioral Sciences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Nicolas 
Baumard, Jean-Baptiste Andre & Dan Sperber, “A Mutualistic Approach to Morality: the Evolution of 
Fairness by Partner Choice,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (2013): 59-78. 
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respond to several common objections to Humean property theory and sketch several lines of 
argument that will be developed in more detail in subsequent chapters.  
1. TWO THEORIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Humean theories of property represent a minority position in political philosophy that is 
often ignored in favor of its two main rivals.  Since it is easier to explain what is distinctive about 
Humean theories of property in contrast to their main rivals, I will start by describing the neo-
Lockean and resource egalitarian approaches.6  My account will focus on the broad 
commonalities shared by each family of views without exploring their numerous permutations. 
Neo-Lockean property rights are “natural” rather than conventional and relatively 
invariant across different social contexts.  They reflect pre-institutional moral entitlements 
justified by desert or first appropriation.  The justification of neo-Lockean property entitlements 
depends on their historical pedigree, but does not (except in extreme cases) depend on the overall 
distribution of property rights.  A neo-Lockean theory of property has several elements.  First, 
there must be rules that license first appropriation.  Second, various rules allow property owners 
to modify or transfer their holdings by consent.  These rules should be quite permissive since the 
ability to trade is an important part of human freedom.  Third, there are rules specifying 
compensation in the case that a person’s property is taken or damaged.  Property entitlements are 
justified insofar as their provenance conforms to these rules of justice.  Entitlements are, in this 
sense, path dependent.  They are also non-systemic in that property that is justly acquired is a 
full-blooded moral entitlement regardless of the broader distribution of property rights.  Finally, 
property rules are relatively inflexible.  Like property entitlements, the rules of just acquisition,                                                         
6 Although it is standard to call views such as Nozick’s neo-Lockean, I feel a bit queasy about this 
terminology.  The proper interpretation of Locke’s defense of private property is controversial and it may 
be that Locke’s commitments are rather different than those of representative “neo-Lockeans” such as 
Nozick. 
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contract and tort do not depend on contextual facts about the broader distribution of property.  
Instead, they are a matter of “natural right.”  The particular theological views underlying Locke’s 
position are not an essential part of Lockean property theory.  All that is required is some 
universal deontological set of moral rules.  These might be justified in terms of some moral 
theory other than the one Locke actually appeals to. 
Most neo-Lockean theory appeals to moral desert, personal freedom or a combination of 
the two in order to justify strong property entitlements.  Appropriation by “mixing labor” might 
justify ownership in virtue of a moral entitlement to the products created through one’s own 
labor.7  Alternatively, first appropriation might be justified by the desirability of allowing people 
to control certain resources exclusively so that they can pursue their personal projects.8  Finally, 
first appropriation might be justified as a Pareto improvement in cases in which it makes the new 
owner better off and nobody else worse off.9  Once property has been legitimately acquired, neo-
Lockeans support strong property rights and extensive freedom of contract.  Again, there are a 
variety of possible justifications for this stance.  Freedom of contract might be thought necessary 
to allow people to receive the full benefit of their efforts and talents.  Alternately, one might 
argue that consenting adults should be free to form agreements to do anything that does not 
directly harm third parties on the grounds that people should enjoy the maximal freedom from                                                         
7 See Eric R. Claeys, “Productive Use in Acquisition, Accession, and Labour Theory” in Philosophical 
Foundations of Property Law, James E. Penner & Henry E. Smith, eds., 13-45 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
8 E.g., Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community; Mack, “The Natural Right of Property,” 53-
78. 
9 “Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since 
there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use.  So that, in effect, 
there was never the less left for others because of his inclosure for himself:  for he that leaves as much as 
another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.” John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 
Peter Laslett, ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Treatise II, Chap. V, Para. 33.  This 
passage raises the suspicion that what Locke presents as “natural right” actually has a rule 
consequentialist justification.  If so, one might question whether “neo-Lockean” theories such as Nozick’s 
are truly Lockean. 
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restraint compatible with equal freedom for others.  Obviously, these two lines of argument may 
be mutually supporting to some extent.  
The scope of legitimate state action is substantially constrained by neo-Lockean property 
rights.  Neo-Lockeans sometimes embrace an actual (rather than hypothetical) consent standard 
for political legitimacy.10  According to such theories, property may be legitimately acquired in 
the “state of nature” and property owners should have their rights respected whether or not they 
choose to join a state.  The bounds of governmental authority are determined by consent by the 
governed.  On any version of neo-Lockean theory, property owners have broad rights against 
unwanted incursions by the state unless they choose to alienate their property rights.  Such 
unwanted incursions include regulation of what property owners may do with their property 
beyond the minimum level of restriction necessary for maximal equal freedom for all property 
owners as well as taxation that goes beyond what is necessary to support the minimal state.  Neo-
Lockean theories are minimally (at most) concerned with egalitarian distribution of property.  
Because people have a natural right to the means necessary to sustain life, Locke held that people 
have a right to some minimal level of support if they are too poor to feed and cloth themselves.11  
Neo-Lockans likewise tend to accept some minimal level of welfare rights.  However, so long as 
there are arrangements to assure citizens of some minimal level of welfare, many neo-Lockeans 
argue that the state is not justified in engaging in any further redistributive projects.                                                          
10 Notably, Robert Nozick begins Anarchy, State, and Utopia with the question of whether there should be 
a state at all. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 3.   
11 “And therefore no man could ever have a just power over the life of another by right of property in land 
or possessions; since it would always be a sin in any man of estate, to let his brother perish for want of 
affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest 
industry, and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him; so charity gives every man a title to 
so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist 
otherwise: and a man can no more justly make use of another’s necessity to force him to become his 
vassal, by with-holding that relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his brother, than he that has 
more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his obedience, and with a dagger at his throat, offer 
his death or slavery.” Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Treatise I, Chap. I, Para. 42. 
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The most popular alternative to neo-Lockeanism is what I will call ‘resource 
egalitarianism.’  Resource egalitarian theories evaluate property rights in light of egalitarian 
principles of distributive justice.  Resource egalitarians deny that pre-institutional moral 
entitlements to property such as Lockean natural rights constrain legitimate state action.  Instead, 
the distribution of property rights should be based on principles governing political institutions 
that would be endorsed by free and equal people.  There are many candidates for the principle 
governing distribution: Rawls’ difference principle, equal opportunity for welfare,12 an ‘envy 
free’ division of resources,13 and so on.  Although resource egalitarians are sharply divided on 
the principles that should determine property rights holdings, they share a common view of the 
sort of question at issue.  John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and G. A. Cohen are representative 
resource egalitarians.  
Jeremy Waldron, whose tripartite division of property theories I am indebted to, 
categorizes theories of property that I am calling ‘resource egalitarian” as “neo-Rousseauian.”14  
I use different terminology for several reasons.  First, although Rousseau may have held views 
somewhat similar to those of contemporary resource egalitarians, the logic of his position is quite 
different.  Rousseau is mainly concerned with material inequality because it is a threat to 
political equality and good government.  The modern conception of distributive justice dates to 
the late eighteenth century, slightly postdating Rousseau.15  Although resource egalitarians 
typically share Rousseau’s concern that material inequality corrupts the political process, their 
main reason for favoring egalitarian distributive outcomes is typically that they believe that they                                                         
12 Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56, no. 1 
(1989): 77-93. 
13 Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 10, 
no. 4. (Autumn, 1981): 283-345. 
14 Waldron, “The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property,” 85. 
15 See Samuel Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 
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are required by principles of equal moral status or worth.16  Moreover, there are certain theories 
that arguably count as neo-Rousseauian by virtue of their emphasis on the importance of 
justifiability to free and equal people that do not favor egalitarian distributive principles.  For 
example, Gerald Gaus explicitly cites Rousseau as the inspiration for his theory of justification 
but uses this theory to argue for a form of classical liberalism that significantly limits 
redistributive policies.17  Although neo-Rousseauian approaches to property are often treated as a 
species of Kantian political theory, Kant’s theory of property is similar to Hume’s in its focus on 
the advantages of a stable system of property rights rather than the fairness of particular 
distributions of property. 18 
Resource egalitarianism theories have a number of distinctive characteristics.  First, they 
are typically ideal theories in the sense that they tend to abstract from questions of motivation 
and stability by assuming some sort of ongoing political community regulated by principles of 
justice.  Some resource egalitarians even abstract from the question of whether people will 
comply with just principles on the grounds that justice is a matter of what people ought to do 
rather than a set of policies designed based on predictions about what people actually will do 
when faced with various possible sets of rules.19  Other theorists take stability into account in a 
fairly restricted way.  Rawls allows the parties in the original position to consider the extent to                                                         
16 E.g., “In Part I of this essay we considered the claims of equality of welfare as an interpretation of 
treating people as equals. In Part 2 we shall consider the competing claims of equality of resources.”  
Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” 283.  
17 Gaus’ views will be discussed at length in Chapter Three. 
18 Kant argued that property rights were necessary for people to live in a “relation of right” because they 
define a sphere of free action for each individual.  He also endorsed a variation of the Lockean claim that 
the poor were entitled, as a matter of right, to a minimal level of resources sufficient to preserve life and 
health, but denied they are were entitled to equal shares of material resources.  See Immanuel Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor, trans., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Arthur 
Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 267-299. 
19 E.g., G. A. Cohen, “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 26, no. 1 (Winter, 1997): 3-30. 
  8 
which rules selected in the original position will contribute to social stability.20  But since Rawls 
assumes a society in which people are motivated by suitably chosen principles of justice, it is 
difficult to know how much this matters.21  In any case, there is a strong tendency for resource 
egalitarians to downplay questions of social stability and moral motivation.  This feature of 
resource egalitarian is problematic since it abstracts from one of the problems that property rights 
are meant to solve. 
Second, resource egalitarian theories appeal to a conception of justice based on equal 
moral status.  Brian Barry divides theories of justice into those based on mutual advantage and 
those based on impartiality.22  Theories of justice as mutual advantage conceive of justice as 
adherence to rules that facilitate the long run interests of all members of a community by 
restricting various kinds of negative sum activities.  On this understanding, rules of justice are a 
bit like hypothetical contracts between self-interested actors.  Justice as impartiality conceives of 
justice as a body of rules that regulate people’s conduct with one another on grounds that do not 
unfairly advantage any party.  When all parties begin in a similar position with respect to initial 
endowments and abilities, considerations of mutual advantage and impartiality will tend to yield 
similar rules.  However, when the parties are differently situated, justice as impartiality tends to 
rule out certain ways of exploiting superior bargaining power that may be unobjectionable under 
theories of justice as mutual advantage.  Barry claims to find elements of both theories in the 
work of Hume and Rawls.23  But on the whole, justice as mutual advantage predominates in 
Hume and justice as impartiality predominates in Rawls.  Likewise, justice as mutual advantage                                                         
20 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 119. 
21 “The other limitation on our discussion is that for the most part I examine the principles of justice that 
would regulate a well-ordered society.  Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding 
just institutions.”  Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 7-8. 
22 Brian Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume I: Theories of Justice (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1989). 
23 Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume I: Theories of Justice, 148-152. 
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is characteristic of Humean theories of property whereas justice as impartiality is characteristic 
of resource egalitarian theories.  Ronald Dworkin, for example, is quite explicit in arguing that 
egalitarian principles of distributive justice follow directly from a deep moral obligation to treat 
people as equals.24  Humean theories of justice, by contrast, are entirely compatible with 
wholesale skepticism about the moral value of equality25 as well as with forms of egalitarianism 
that respect existing property claims.26  Instead, they are centrally concerned with ensuring 
stability by appealing to the interests of all members of the community. 
A third feature of resource egalitarian theories is that they take a systemic view of 
justification.  In order to know whether a distributive scheme is fair in the sense of respecting 
equal status, one must know its effect on all parties.  Any particular property entitlement must be 
evaluated against the background of, at the very least, the entire distribution of property rights 
and quite possibly all of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. For Rawlsians, the 
appropriate unit of analysis is the “basic structure” of society.  This includes property 
entitlements, social insurance, and laws concerning contracts, torts, inheritance, taxation and 
employment among other matters.  Systemic theories of justification have obvious appeal insofar 
as property rules are part of a larger web of rights and duties such that advantages in one instance 
may be balanced by burdens in another.  In complex economies, it is very difficult to make 
judgments about property entitlements in isolation.  The Rawlsian solution is to ask whether the 
basic structure as a whole is justified.  Wages and other entitlements fixed under the rules of a 
just basic structure are just; those that follow from an unjust basic structure are not.  Although 
                                                        
24 Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” 283-345. 
25 Despite the recent influence of egalitarianism, there are prominent skeptics about the value and 
significance of equality as a substantive rather than merely formal principle.  E.g., Joseph Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 217-244; Peter Westen, “The Empty Idea 
of Equality,” Harvard Law Review 95, no. 3 (Jan. 1982): 537-596. 
26 Chapters Two and Three will develop this position in greater detail. 
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this methodology has considerable appeal insofar as it can yield relatively determinate results 
while attending to the full range of normatively relevant considerations, it has the disadvantage 
that normative consensus about anything seems to require normative consensus about everything.  
Recognition of this problem may have been part of the motivation for Rawls’ focus on 
“overlapping consensus” in Political Liberalism.27  In contrast to the “top-down” resource 
egalitarian approach, neo-Lockean and Humean theories take a “bottom-up” approach.  Both 
theories begin with the justification of property rights and then use these to help build a more 
fully specified political order.  This has the advantage of allowing localized assessment of 
property entitlements without evaluation of all aspects of the basic structure. 
A forth feature of resource egalitarian theories is that they are flexible with respect to the 
rules that implement distributive principles.  Since justice is a matter of generating the right 
distributive outcomes, it is plausible that different rules of private law will be appropriate in 
different circumstances.  For example, private ownership might be appropriate for resources that 
are not scarce in nature (e.g. uncleared land in some societies) but inappropriate when such a 
rules would generate objectionable inequalities (e.g. oil and gas resources in a complex industrial 
economy).  There is a vigorous debate over the wisdom of using private law rather than tax and 
transfer programs to achieve distributive aims.28  For resource egalitarians, however, the question 
of whether to use rules of contract and tort to achieve egalitarian ends or to rely exclusively on 
tax and transfer schemes is basically a technical one to be made on grounds of economic 
efficiency, political feasibility or ease of administration.                                                             
27 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
 
28 E.g., Anthony T. Kronman, “Contract Law and Distributive Justice,” Yale Law Journal 89, no. 3 (Jan., 
1980): 472-511; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); Christine Jolls, “Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,” 
Vanderbilt Law Review 51 (1998): 1653-1677; Chris W. Sanchirico, “Taxes versus Legal Rules as 
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View,” Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 797-820. 
  11 
Finally, resource egalitarian theories are ahistorical.  Distributive patterns that violate 
egalitarian principles cannot be justified by virtue of having the right history; distributive 
patterns that are sanctioned by such principles cannot be undermined because they lack the 
“right” historical origins.  Justice for resource egalitarians is not path dependent.  Particular 
property entitlements may be justified by their history only insofar as this history takes place 
against a background of a just basic structure.  Resource egalitarians have a place for pure 
procedural justice.  But it is not one that has application outside a system of rules structured by 
principles of distributive justice. 
2. HUME’S THEORY OF PROPERTY 
Hume first analyzed property rights in the context of his discussion of justice as an 
artificial virtue in A Treatise of Human Nature.  Although the basic outlines of Hume’s theory 
remains the same in the Enquiry, his presentation in that work is less interesting insofar as it puts 
greater emphasis on public utility and less on convention as the central organizing principle.  For 
that reason, I will focus on the argument presented in the Treatise.  Hume’s use of the word 
“justice” in the Treatise is somewhat idiosyncratic.  Justice, as Hume uses the term, picks out 
roughly the domain of normative relations regulated by private law.  Contemporary use of the 
term is, obviously, quite a bit broader and includes, at minimum, distributive justice and 
procedural fairness in additional to the substantive doctrine of private law.29  In this section, I’ll 
follow Hume in using ‘justice’ to refer to rules governing property rights, the transfer of property 
and promises.  Hume argues that justice is an artificial virtue in that it does not spring directly 
from the natural moral sentiments of mankind, but instead is based upon artifice – what we                                                         
29 It is worth noting, however, that Kant and Hegel both treat something like private law as a distinctive 
normative category.  See Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Ernest Weinrib, “Right and Advantage in Private 
Law,” Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 1 (1989).  So it is probably the case that Hume’s approach is less 
idiosyncratic than it appears from the perspective of the twenty-first century.   
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might today call “social practice.”  Rules of justice respond to certain features of the human 
condition: limited benevolence, scarcity of resources and the tendency of people to pursue 
immediate gratification even to the detriment of their long-run interests.  And so, although justice 
is not natural in the sense that just acts do not generally elicit moral approval independent of a 
social practice, the ubiquity of the circumstances of justice means that rules of justice are 
necessary for all complex societies.30 
Hume’s discussion of justice is intended both to bolster the account of human psychology 
advanced in the rest of the Treatise and to provide a deflationary account of property rights, 
promissory obligation and political authority that shows how rules in these domains emerge from 
social practice rather than from abstract reason or natural law.  This distinguishes his view from 
Locke and other natural law theorists.  Unlike his fellow natural law skeptic, Thomas Hobbes, 
Hume argued that rules of justice do not require an authoritative lawgiver for either their creation 
or their operation.  Instead, conventional rules of justice may emerge spontaneously without the 
type of central authority that Hobbes believed was essential for social order. 
The insight that property rights arise from convention rather than by natural right or by 
governmental fiat is Hume’s most important contribution to property theory.  “Justice establishes 
itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest suppos’d to be common                                                         
30 This is Hume’s position in the Treatise.  In that work, Hume treats property as emerging before the 
state and governments as being created once a system of property rights is already in place.  By the time 
he wrote his histories, however, Hume concedes that primitive political organization in the form of trial 
chieftains arose among the Anglo-Saxons and other Germanic tribes before property in land.  Ownership 
of land was granted by such chieftains as a sort of pay for military service.  This suggests that “primitive” 
Europeans had social structures based on tribal allegiance rather than private property. See Andrew Sabl, 
Hume’s Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2012), 97-100; Annette C. Baier, The Cautious Jealous Virtue: Hume on Justice (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), 95-96. This later view seems to be the more realistic one: although all 
societies must devise ways to manage resources, a network of personal obligations and relations of 
authority may substitute for impersonal property rights in performing this function.  Private property 
rights have a number of advantages over rule by tribal chieftains or village elders, but they are probably 
more fragile than Hume seemed to believe at the time he wrote the Treatise. 
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to all, and where every single act is perform’d in expectation that others are to perform the 
like.”31  In the absence of any social practice regulating property rights, there is no natural 
propensity to disapprove of one person taking the possessions of another.  However, social order 
may emerge spontaneously from tacit agreements to respect one another’s property, so that the 
resulting system of norms might have the appearance of an implicit contract without any formal 
agreement ever having been made.  Because property is not, at its core, a matter of formal 
agreements, laws, or universal moral rules, but instead a complex set of behavioral dispositions, 
property rights are at once both robust and fragile.  They are robust because once a community of 
people has internalized the relevant dispositions, property conventions can often be maintained 
without external enforcement.  But property rights are fragile because when circumstances 
undermine expectations about the behavior of others, property conventions may unravel quickly. 
Hume’s theory is a form of indirect consequentialism: justice consists in adherence to 
conventional rules that promote the public interest.  Because just action is a matter of conforming 
to the rules of justice, just acts do not have desirable (let alone optimal) consequences in every 
instance.  In all but exceptional cases, the value of supporting the conventions of property, 
contract, and promise outweighs any ill effects of following the rules in individual cases.32  In 
extreme cases, rules of justice may be disregarded on the grounds of public necessity.  For 
example, during a famine the public may open granaries and distribute grain without consent of 
                                                        
31 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886), 
Book 3, Part 2, Section 3.  Further citations will be to the Selby-Bigge edition of the Treatise. 
32 “As the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, which require mutual 
abstinence from property, in order to preserve peace among mankind; it is evident, that, when the 
execution of justice would be attended with very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, 
and give place to public utility, in such extraordinary and such pressing emergencies.  The maxim, fiat 
Justitia & ruat Coelum, let justice be performed, though the universe be destroyed, is apparently false, and 
by sacrificing the end to the means, shews a preposterous idea of the subordination of duties.” David 
Hume, “Of passive obedience” in David Hume, Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen, ed., (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 202. 
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their owners.33  Hume’s position is not that justice permits such acts, but rather that in cases of 
extreme urgency, the principles of justice are either suspended or supplanted by rules of equity.  
As Samuel Fleischacker points out, this position is consistent with traditional natural law 
doctrine as found in Aquinas and Grotius and so is not a Humean innovation.34   
The three fundamental rules of justice are “the stability of possession, its transference by 
consent, and the performance of promises.”35  Hume discusses property rights first.  In some 
ways this is the most fundamental aspect of justice because rights over property must be defined 
before property can be transferred by consent or be the object of promises.36  Hume’s account of 
property rights explains both how they emerge and why they are socially useful.  In the natural 
course of affairs, people come to gain control over various objects. People are naturally 
acquisitive and, all else equal, prefer to obtain more possessions.37  Before the emergence of 
property rights, therefore, they are inclined to take what they can when they can.  But mere 
possession in the absence of any socially recognized right to one’s possessions is insecure.  
Moreover, conflict over possessions is costly and dangerous.  Given the advantages of secure 
                                                        
33 “Where the society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from 
violence and injustice; and every man may provide for himself by all the means which prudence can 
dictate, or humanity permit.  The public, even in less urgent necessities, opens granaries, without the 
consent of the proprietors; as justly supposing, that the authority of magistracy may, consistent with 
equity, extend so far.” Hume, David, Enquiries Concerning the Humean Understanding and Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), Section 3, Part 1, p. 
186. 
34 Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice, 31-34. 
35 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 4, p. 526; David Hume, A Treatise 
of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 11, p. 567. 
36 Promises, of course, do not necessarily depend on property rights since one may make promises 
regarding future actions that have nothing to do with external objects. 
37 E.g., “For as it is evident, that every man loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally 
impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as possible; and nothing can restrain him in this propensity, 
but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence, and the total 
dissolution of society, which must ensue from it.  His original inclination, therefore, or instinct, is here 
checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation.” David Hume, “Of the original 
contract” in David Hume, Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen, ed., (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 196. 
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possession and the dangers of fighting over resource, people are usually willing to abstain from 
trying to take the possessions of others if others do likewise.  This willingness to respect others’ 
possessions is conditional: I may be willing to refrain from trying to take your possessions, but 
only if you refrain from taking mine.  In the absence of property conventions, there is no sense in 
sacrificing one’s own interests by respecting the possessions of others.  Respect for other’s 
possessions and a free-for-all in which people seize whatever they are able to take are each 
potentially stable equilibria.  Moving from one to the other is no simple matter. 
Stable property conventions require both mutual expectation of compliance and the belief 
that general compliance with the convention is in the long run interest of all.  Property rights are 
better for all than a free-for-all, but they require that people mostly refrain from exploiting the 
trust of others by violating property rights when they can get away with it.  In an environment in 
which most people respect property rights, the threat of punishment may be enough to keep most 
of the rest in line.  But punishment is impractical when people are constantly violating the rules.   
Voluntary compliance and coercive enforcement are compliments since the more people follow 
the rules, the easier it is to detect and punish violations.  Even complex legal systems usually rely 
on widespread willingness to follow property rules for their own sake and not because of the risk 
of being punished. 
Rules of justice emerge slowly as people experiment with different patterns of behavior 
and come to recognize the advantages of coordinating on property rules.  The initial conventions 
may arise through a sort of trial and error.38  Neighbors refrain from taking each other’s 
possessions.  At first, this may be indistinguishable from prudent avoidance of direct conflict.  
Over time, however, the neighbors may develop expectations that each will act non-aggressively.                                                          
38 One possibility which Hume does not appear to consider, but that seems Humean in spirit, is that 
humans, like many other animals, are hardwired with a sense of territoriality and that this makes property 
conventions – hawk-dove strategies – especially salient.   
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They may begin to rely on each other’s continued good behavior, perhaps by leaving their 
possessions unguarded from time to time.  If these expectations are satisfied, the obvious 
advantages of peaceable behavior may encourage others to emulate it.  Over time, respect for 
others’ possessions may evolve from a collection of bilateral conventions between neighbors to a 
more general convention between members of the community as a whole.39  This convention 
ratifies present distributions of goods (whether they came about by means fair or foul) and 
establishes rules for appropriation of new property. 
Hume is often credited as being an important forerunner of game theoretic analysis of 
social norms.40  Although Hume influenced David Lewis’ classic modern exposition of 
convention, the property conventions discussed by Hume differ importantly from Lewis’ 
conventions.41  Lewis’ conventions are solutions to pure coordination problems in which people                                                         
39 This discussion follows Hume in supposing that property conventions initially arise between members 
of a community.  In reality, it is likely that members of some close-knit groups, such as small hunter-
gatherer bands or extended family groups, have little difficulty establishing a system of property rights for 
personal property.  For such groups other forms of close cooperation (e.g. hunting and sharing food) 
probably preexist private property rights.   In some contexts it might be more realistic to apply Hume’s 
analysis to relations between small collectives (extended families, hunter-gatherer bands, small tribes) 
that may otherwise be inclined to seize land, livestock and other valuables from each other in the absence 
of any convention to the contrary.  The structure of the explanation is the same whether individuals or 
extended families are the unit of analysis. 
40 E.g., “The account I have given of the evolution of conventions is, I believe, essentially the same as 
Hume’s account of the origin of justice – fleshed out with more details and formulated in game-theoretic 
terms.”  Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and Welfare, 150. 
41 Lewis defines a convention as:  
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent 
situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in 
almost any instance of S among members of P,  
(1) almost everyone conforms to R; 
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone to conform to R; 
(3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible 
combinations of actions; 
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on condition that almost 
everyone conform to R; 
(5) almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to R’ on condition that 
almost everyone conform to R’,  
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most prefer that their behavior is coordinated with others and it is of only secondary importance 
which behavior is the object of coordination.  In other words, all people prefer to follow some 
rule, R1, if others follow R1 and follow some other rule, R2,, if others follow R2.  In this case, 
‘everyone follows R1’ and ‘everyone follows R2’ are each a Nash Equilibrium.42   
Property conventions are not Lewis conventions because regulation of access to scarce 
resources is not a pure coordination game.  In Lewis’ examples of pure coordination games – 
conventions determining who calls back when a telephone conversation is cut off or what side of 
the road to drive on – the parties are more or less indifferent as to which rules is adopted so long 
as everyone follows it.  Unlike the coordinating conventions that Lewis explores, management of 
material resources presents an impure coordination problem in which people have interests that 
are partially overlapping and partially conflicting.  Everyone has an interest in avoiding a 
destructive free-for-all, but each would also prefer that they control more resources at the 
expense of others.  Coordination is important because each person’s ability to use material 
resources depends on the behavior of others.  This holds for any resource that is what economists 
call a rival good – a good for which one person’s use of the good diminishes the ability of others’ 
to enjoy it.  The vast majority of physical objects are rival.  Exceptions such as air for breathing 
and the waters of the open ocean tend not to be the object of property rights because excluding 
others from their use serves no purpose.43  Intellectual property, by contrast, is usually non-rival.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
where R’ is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of P in S, such that almost no one 
in almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R’ and to R. 
David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 
78. 
42 A Nash Equilibrium is a state of the world in which each person has no incentive alter their strategy 
given the strategies of the others.  Any set of strategies that is not a Nash Equilibrium is inherently 
unstable because at least one person will do better by changing their behavior. 
43 It should be noted that these claims only hold for certain types of usage.  One person’s breathing does 
not diminish the ability of others to breath air.  Use of air to soak up pollutants, however, is quite another 
matter.  In this case, the obstacle to treating air as private property is not that use is non-rival but that the 
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One person’s use of a patent or of copyrighted material does not impinge on the ability of others 
to do so.44  The reasons for recognizing intellectual property have more to do with providing 
incentives for innovation than with coordination.  For this reason, the discussion in this chapter 
will follow Hume in discussing property rights in land or chattels but not intellectual property. 
When people who are not close friends or relatives share in an environment with rival 
goods, they typically will have differing preferences regarding their use.  For example, Ann 
might most prefer that she take whatever goods she wants and that Beth yield control over 
whatever Ann expresses interest in.  Beth’s first preference and Ann’s least favored result is the 
inverse of this.   The worst possible outcome for both Ann and Beth is a protracted fight over 
resources that will result in more expected harm to each than the resources are worth.  An 
intermediate result is one in which Ann and Beth each refrain from taking goods that the other 
has possession of and thus avoid destructive conflict.  This game can be represented as follows 
with the numbers representing Ann’s and Beth’s preference rankings, [Ann,Beth], so that 1,3 
indicates Ann’s most preferred outcome and Beth’s third most preferred outcome. 
Table 1.1 
          Beth 
 
       Ann 
 
 
A game with this structure is usually referred to as a hawk-dove game.  Hawk-Dove games 
present a classic situation in which property rights solve an impure coordination problem.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
resource is non-divisible since pollution emitted in one place affects air quality to some extent 
everywhere else on the planet. 
44 Trademarks are a somewhat different matter.  Although use of a trademark is non-rival if considered as 
a purely physical activity, the trademark is useful because it symbolically represents a brand.  The use of 
brand symbols is rival since Coca Cola’s ability to exploit its brand would compromised by Ace Cola’s 
marketing of its product using symbols associated with Coca Cola.  
 Hawk Dove 
Hawk [4,4] [1,3] 
Dove [3,1] [2,2] 
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Maynard-Smith and Price originally used the game to explain territorial behavior among 
animals.45  Unlike coordinating conventions, the parties here have partially overlapping and 
partially opposing interests.  They both have good reason to avoid Hawk/Hawk outcomes, but if 
one party plays Dove, the other is able to gain by playing Hawk.  Because populations with 
many Hawks will be subject to destructive conflict and populations with many Doves are 
vulnerable to infiltration by Hawks, neither Hawk nor Dove is an evolutionarily stable strategy 
(“ESS”). Unlike ‘play Hawk’ and ‘play Dove’, the rule ‘play Hawk if threat to my possession, 
play Dove with respect to others’ possessions’ is a Nash equilibrium and an ESS.  This 
Hawk/Dove mixed strategy creates a system of proto-property rights in which all keep their 
present possessions.  It also tends to spread the gains from cooperation because different agents 
are permitted to control resources depending on who initially has possession. 
Abstract discussion of Hawk-Dove strategies may make coordination over the use of 
material resources seem more simple than it actually is.  For one thing, some resource 
management problems are better modeled by a prisoner’s dilemma, which differs from the 
Hawk-Dove game in that parties always have incentive to adopt the non-cooperative strategy 
regardless of the strategies of others.  Property conventions are also often vulnerable to people 
who adopt opportunistic strategies.  If property rights can sometimes be violated without anyone 
noticing, people may feign compliance while stealing when they think that they can get away 
with it.  Many of the benefits of property conventions are lost if everyone must constantly guard 
their possessions for fear of others taking them while nobody is looking.  Third, even if people 
make good faith efforts to respect the rights of others, conflict may nonetheless arise if rights are 
vague or difficult to interpret.  Some ambiguous cases are inevitable; the danger for conventional 
                                                        
45 J. Maynard-Smith & G.R. Price, “The Logic of Animal Conflict,” Nature 246 (1973): 15-18. 
  20 
property rights is that conventions can unwind if people attribute bad faith to each other in cases 
of sincere disagreement between reasonable people. 
The conventional nature of property implies that there is a trade off between optimality 
and stability for property rules.  In order to settle distributive questions authoritatively, property 
rules must be usually be followed even in cases where they require substantively undesirable 
outcomes.  Justice sometimes requires that property be given to the rich and prodigal when it 
would be of greater benefit to the poor and thrifty because stability of possession cannot be 
achieved except by respecting rules that are abstract and generally applicable.46 For similar 
reasons, Hume denies that property rights arise via a fittingness relationship between a person 
and her property.47  Property rules thus function as a kind of a second best solution to distributive 
questions.  The best solution would put property in the hands of those who would benefit most, 
but this requires a sort of situation specific judgment would make property entitlements uncertain 
and encourage partiality.  
The overriding advantages of a system of stable entitlements mean that there is a range of 
possible rules that could be adopted as property conventions.  Being in a place where others 
follow a certain rule can give one sufficient reason to follow it even if some other rule could play 
the same role in stabilizing expectations (and even if the other rule might be more desirable).                                                          
46 “A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest; and were it to stand alone, without 
being follow’d by other acts, may, in itself, be very prejudicial to society. . . But however single acts of 
justice may be contrary, either to public or private interest, ‘tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is 
highly conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, and to the well-being of 
every individual.  ‘Tis impossible to separate the good from the ill.  Property must be stable, and must be 
fix’d by general rules.  Tho’ in one stance the public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply 
compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order which it establishes in 
society.”  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2, p. 497. 
47 “However useful, or even necessary, the stability of possession may be to human society, ‘tis attended 
with very considerable inconveniences.  The relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into 
consideration, in distributing the properties of mankind; but we must govern ourselves by rules, which are 
more general in their application, and more free from doubt and uncertainty.” David Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 4, p. 514. 
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Morally arbitrary conventions can serve the morally vital purpose of preventing wasteful conflict 
over resources.  Although certain property conventions might arise ‘naturally’, in the sense of 
spontaneously, because of their utility in solving coordination problems, there is no unique 
‘natural’ set of property rules that all spontaneously arising conventions must converge on.48  
Considerations of stability count strongly in favor of choosing rules that are simple, 
psychologically salient or grounded in existing custom even if some different rule, if followed 
regularly, might bring about slightly better results.  The particular contours of property rules may 
depend on historical accident.49  They also depend on facts about human psychology.  Rules are 
more likely to be stable if they pick out features of a situation that are especially psychologically 
salient.50  For example, Hume suggests that the doctrine of accession is grounded in associative 
psychology.  It is intuitive to associate an apple with the apple tree from which it fell and a calf 
with its mother.  This psychological propensity leads people to coordinate on the rule that the 
owner of an apple tree is the owner of tree’s apples and the rule that the owner of a cow is the 
owner of her calf.51  Psychological salience also helps to explain the enormous significance of 
possession for property and property law and, if Hume is right, various of the legal doctrines that                                                         
48 Obviously, it is possible for such patterns of behavior to be biologically hardwired rather than 
conventional.  Some animal species mark their territory with scent.  And others instinctively defer to 
resources occupied or possessed by members of the same species.  Humans’ ability to assign conventional 
meanings to arbitrarily selected symbols gives them the ability to employ a much more varied and much 
more complex conventions to solve coordination problems related to the use of various resources. 
49 This seems a clear implication of the Humean approach, although Hume does not stress the significance 
of path dependence in his discussion of property in the Treatise.   
50 Hume seems to have anticipated Thomas Schelling and David Lewis by two centuries in his emphasis 
on the importance of psychological salience.  See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study. 
51 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 3.  More provocatively, Hume 
suggests that the same analysis applies to labor as a source of ownership. Labor on an unowned object 
often gives rise to ownership not because of one’s natural right to the value of one’s labor but because the 
salience of labor makes it a good candidate for a convention of first appropriation.  This claim is, 
however, stronger than necessary: particular property conventions may be explained by factors other than 
psychological salience.  Humean property theory is consistent with the notion that people may sometimes 
converge on certain property conventions because of their shared moral intuitions or because these 
conventions are clearly more efficient. 
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regulate acquisition of unowned objects.  “Everyone gets to keep what they possess” is a salient 
rule for restricting wasteful competition over resources that is often justifiable in light of the 
great advantages of stable property entitlements even when the resulting distribution of property 
is suboptimal. 
Hume’s discussion of the content of the rules of justice is substantially clearer than his 
account of the moral psychology of artificial virtue.  Hume’s moral psychology steered a middle 
course between predecessors such as Mandeville and Hobbes on the one hand who saw people as 
motivated largely by self-interest and Shaftesberry and Hutcheson on the other who believed that 
natural benevolence plays a more important role.52  Hume argued that people are characterized 
by genuine but limited concern for the well-being of others.53  Though the welfare of others can 
be intrinsically motivating, our sympathy for those who are not close associates is sharply 
limited and tends to decline with social and physical distance.54  Justice is necessary for human 
society in part because people cannot be sufficiently motivated by the welfare of strangers.55  
Even when people act out of altruistic impulses, their preference for friends and relatives lead                                                         
52 Michael L. Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth 
Century and Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 66; Michael Gill, “Hume’s Progressive 
View of Human Nature,” Hume Studies XXVI, no. 1 (April, 2000), 87-88.  David Millar concurs, 
comparing Hume with slightly different figures: “We began with his conception of human nature, about 
which he held a view midway between the pessimism of, say, Hobbes, and the optimism of, say, 
Rousseau or Godwin.  Men were on the whole neither egoists nor altruists, but tended to be partially 
benevolent—benevolent towards those in their immediate social vicinity.”  David Miller, Philosophy and 
Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 191-192.  
53 “So far from thinking, that men have no affection for any thing beyond themselves, I am of opinion, 
that tho’ it be rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than himself; yet ’tis as rare to 
meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over-balance all the selfish.”  David 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2, p. 487. 
54 “But tho’ this generosity must be acknowledg’d to the honour of human nature, we may at the same 
time remark, that so noble an affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to 
them, as the most narrow selfishness.  For while each person loves himself better than any other single 
person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affectation to his relations and acquaintance, this must 
necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which cannot but 
be dangerous to the new-establish’d union.”  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, 
Section 2, p. 487. 
55 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2, p. 487-489. 
  23 
them into conflict just as self-interest does.  Altruism combined with partially toward one’s 
friends and relations can be even more socially disruptive than unbridled pursuit of narrow self-
interest since it facilitates cooperation among members of a family, clan or tribe in order to 
aggress against outsiders.56 
Hume distinguishes the original motive for justice from the moral motivation that rules of 
justice provide once the relevant conventions are established. Although observance of 
conventional property rights is very much in the public interest, the initial adoption of rules of 
justice is motivated by self-interest not public spiritedness.57  Each person has an interest in the 
stability of possessions not only because this allows each to enjoy his own possessions but also 
because general observance of property rights leads to a more peaceful and prosperous society. 
People come to perceive that they will do better in the long run by conforming to rules of justice 
than they would by grabbing whatever they can in the moment.  And this leads them to form a 
conditional intention to respect property rights so long as others do so as well.  Because they are 
initially motivated by considerations of self-interest, property conventions may arise 
spontaneously even in communities of largely self-regarding actors.  Hume insists that 
dispositions to act justly cannot arise from either public benevolence (concern for the interest of 
the public as a whole) or private benevolence (concern for the interests of particular people).  
The former is excluded because people who are disposed to act out of public benevolence would 
                                                        
56 The recent history of persistent clan warfare in the Scottish highlands and British border areas probably 
made this point more salient to eighteenth century Scots than it is to most contemporary westerners. 
57 “[I]f men had been endow’d with such a strong regard for public good, they wou’d never have 
restrain’d themselves by these rules; so that the laws of justice arise from natural principles in a manner 
still more oblique and artificial.  ‘Tis self-love which is their real origin; and as the self-love of one person 
is naturally contrary to that of another, these several interested passions are oblig’d to adjust themselves 
after such a manner as to concur in some system of conduct and behavior.  This system, therefore, 
comprehending the interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public; tho’ it be not 
intended for that purpose by the inventors.” David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, 
Section 6, p. 529. 
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have no need of rules of justice to regulate their affairs with others.  Each person would be 
independently motivated to pursue the public interest regardless of what others do.58  The latter is 
excluded because rules of justice sometimes require actions that do not follow from concern for 
the interests of those directly affected such as when property must be given to a rich and 
profligate rightful owner rather than a poor and thrifty unlawful claimant.59 
In the Treatise, Hume often suggests that although justice is usually the best policy from 
the perspective of long run self-interest, people have difficulty of following rules of justice 
partially due to temporally inconsistent preferences.60  He argues that threats of punishment are 
required primarily because people have difficulty foregoing some immediate gratification in 
favor of some distant future benefit and thus are apt to violate property conventions even when 
this is harmful to their own interests in the long run.61  When both the benefits of violating the 
rules and the harms are in the distant future, a person may believe that the harms outweigh the 
benefits and judge that following the rules of justice is in her self-interest.  However, when an 
opportunity to violate the rules for short term gain presents itself, she may reverse her judgment 
as the appeal of the near term gain outweighs the aversion to the more distant long term cost.  
Rules of justice may help solve this problem in two ways.  First, the threat of punishment may                                                         
58 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 3, p. 481. 
59 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 3. 
60 This observation was not original to Hume.  Robert Frank notes that predecessors such as Descartes, 
Hobbes and Locke all expressed similar very ideas. Robert Frank, Passions Within Reason: the Strategic 
Role of the Emotions (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1988), 85.  Hume’s particularly strong embrace 
of this position may in part reflect his difficulty in explaining altruistic acts of artificial virtue within the 
framework of his theory. 
61 “All men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and order; and all men are sensible of 
the necessity of peace and order for the maintenance of society.  Yet, notwithstanding this strong and 
obvious necessity, such is the frailty or perverseness of our nature! It is impossible to keep men, faithfully 
and unerringly, in the paths of justice.  Some extraordinary circumstances may happen, in which a man 
finds his interests to be more promoted by fraud or rapine, than hurt by the breach which his injustice 
makes in the social union.  But much more frequently, he is seduced from his great and important but 
distant interests, by the allurement of present, though very often frivolous temptations.  This great 
weakness is incurable in human nature.” David Hume, “Of the origin of government” in David Hume, 
Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen, ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20. 
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cause people who otherwise would act unjustly in the heat of the moment to refrain from doing 
so out of fear of punishment.  Second, moral emotions may have a similar function insofar as 
feelings of guilt or shame provide an immediate sanction for acting unjustly.62   
As tentative expectations crystallize into social norms, people become inclined to count 
transgressions as marks of bad character.  They come to sympathize with the victims of these 
transgressions and to condemn acts of injustice without consideration of their own personal 
interest.  Acts that were once considered matters of prudence become questions of morals. 
Although self-interest is the original motive for justice, new forms of motivation are possible 
when property rules are moralized.  As people gain experience with the favorable social 
consequences of just acts, they associate justice with peace, prosperity and harmonious social 
relations.  Once this connection is established, approbation of just acts is supported by 
“sympathy with the public interest.”63  It is further reinforced by the “artifice of politicians” as 
well as by the efforts of parents and teachers to inculcate artificial virtue in the next generation.64  
One interpretation of Hume’s view is that although people are not capable in their “natural” 
condition of being intrinsically motivated by justice, their dispositions can change as a result of 
the “progress of sentiments” so that in a civilized condition they may be motivated by 
considerations of justice quite apart from self-interest.65   
Many commentators believe that Hume is unable to reconcile his account of justice as an 
artificial virtue with his theory of the relationship between moral motivation and moral                                                         
62 See Robert Frank, Passions Within Reason: the Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., 1988).  George Ainslie has a similar theory of the sense of fairness as constraining 
intertemporal irrationality.  See George Ainslie, “Intertemporal Bargaining Predicts Moral Behavior Even 
in Anonymous One-Shot Economic Games,” Brain and Behavioral Sciences 36, no. 1 (2013): 78-79. 
63 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2, p. 499-500. 
64 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2, p. 500. 
65 Michael Gill, “Hume’s Progressive View of Human Nature,” Hume Studies XXVI, no. 1 (April, 2000), 
98-100.  Jacqueline Taylor advances a similar view.  Jacqueline Taylor, “Justice and the Foundations of 
Social Morality in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies XXIV, No. 1 (April, 1998), 5-30. 
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judgment.66  Hume argues that moral judgment involves approbation of the virtuous motive of an 
action where motive is construed very broadly to include character traits, dispositions and 
emotions as well as the ordinary meaning of the term.67  For example, moral approbation of a 
generous act involves a favorable appraisal of the benevolent impulse that motivated the act.  
This sentiment may be triggered by sympathy for the person who benefits from a generous act.  
The motive for action must be, at its root, non-moral in nature.  Since being moral means being 
such that others are disposed to respond with moral approval, a moral act with no further motive 
other than acting morally would appear to involve an infinite regress.  This presents a puzzle for 
artificial virtues since Hume argues at some length that the sort of benevolent impulses that 
motivate acts of natural virtue are insufficient to account for justice and other artificial virtues.68  
Although Hume appears strongly committed to the view that moral approbation requires a 
favorable assessment of some non-moral motive in order to avoid a vicious circularity, he seems 
to explicitly reject all possible non-moral motives for just acts including self-interest, private 
benevolence and public benevolence.69 
There are various proposals for resolving this apparent inconsistency.  Haakonssen and 
Gauthier conclude that just acts involves a sort of self-deception about one’s actual motives.70 
Once people internalize the rules of justice, they see compliance with them as reflecting a 
virtuous motive although there is in fact no such thing because the self-interest that is the original                                                         
66 Don Garrett, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared,” Hume Studies 33, no. 2 
(November 2007), 257-258. Hume’s discussion of the “sensible knave” in the Enquiry may stem from a 
later judgment that his treatment of this issue in the Treatise was unsatisfactory.  See Frazer, The 
Enlightenment of Sympathy, 76-77. 
67 Garrett, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared,” 257-258. 
68 Garrett, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared,” 257-258. 
69 Id. 
70 Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam 
Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Gauthier, "Artificial Virtues and the 
Sensible Knave," Hume Studies XVIII (1992): 401-427.  Their view is discussed in Stephen Darwall, 
“Motive and Obligation in Hume’s Ethics,” Noûs 29, no. 4 (Dec. 1993),  439-440. 
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motive of justice is not apt for moral approval.  This reading of Hume puts him closer to Hobbes 
than is commonly thought.  Marcia Baron argues that Hume believes that people internalize rules 
of justice as a result of successful political propaganda notwithstanding his apparent 
disagreement with Mandeville in his discussion of the “artifice of politicians”.71  Both of these 
approaches downplay the extent to which artificial virtues involve distinctive forms of moral 
motivation.   
Stephen Darwall takes the opposite approach. He suggests that Hume ends up being 
committed to the position that moral rules can be intrinsically motivating despite Hume’s 
protestations to the contrary.72  Although self-interest motivates the initial adoption of 
conventions of justice, once these conventions are in place, people take rules of justice as having 
independent normative force and appraise others favorably for acting out of a sense of obligation 
to follow the rules of justice.73  Darwall’s reading requires a substantial deviation from Hume’s 
official theory of the will, which is that action is motivated by approbation of the consequences 
of one’s action.  Instead, people have to capacity to act out of principle in the sense of acting so                                                         
71 See Marcia Baron, “Hume’s Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 12 (1982): 539-555.   
72 Darwall, “Motive and Obligation in Hume’s Ethics,” 415-448. Brian Barry takes this point even farther 
by suggesting that Hume eventually allowed that people might have an intrinsic desire to act in ways that 
can be justified to others in impersonal terms: “In the end, I think that Hume was forced to abandon his 
official theory and allow that the desire to behave in a way that can be justified in impersonal terms must 
be admitted as an irreducible motive.” Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume I: Theories of Justice, 
148-152. 
73 A variation of Darwall’s strategy turns on the distinction between the original motive for justice and the 
disposition that is the object of moral approbation once the relevant conventions have been established.  
Richard Garrett argues that Hume believes that once rules of justice regulate social life, people are 
motivated to adopt a policy of complying with them out of a sense of enlightened self-interest. According 
to Garrett, the original motive to justice is a fairly direct calculation of the benefits of respecting the 
possessions of others on the condition that they do the same whereas the continuing motive is a sense of 
the advantages of adopting a policy of acting justly.  At this stage, one’s motivation is no longer 
contingent on the dispositions of others but takes rules of justice to be more than merely conditional 
preferences.  Once these non-conditional dispositions are in place, people may favorably appraise actions 
taken due to a policy of acting justly even though having a policy of acting justice may be entirely 
consistent with self-interest.  Garrett, “The First Motive to Justice: Hume’s Circle Argument Squared,” 
271-272. 
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as to conform to certain authoritative rules rather than to secure some good consequence or to 
avoid a bad one.74 
As this is a work of political philosophy, not Hume exegesis, I will not attempt to resolve 
the tensions in Hume’s position or argue for a particular reading of Hume’ moral psychology.  I 
will return to the question of what sort of moral psychology is implied by Hume’s theory of 
justice and discuss how various ways of clarifying Hume’s position might suggest different 
avenues for developing Humean political theory.   But first, now that my exposition of Hume’s 
theory of justice is complete, I will explore how Humean property theory differs from its main 
competitors. 
3. HUMEAN PROPERTY THEORY 
Neo-Humean (henceforth I’ll use ‘Humean’ for simplicity’s sake) theories of property 
rights occupy an intermediate position between neo-Lockean and resource egalitarian views.75  
Humean theories appeal to the systemic benefits of stable property entitlements as justifying 
strong, but context sensitive property rights.  They have several distinctive elements. First, 
property rights are conventional.  Rules of property emerge from conventions between persons 
who have partially overlapping and partially conflicting interests.  They tend to be adopted out of 
a sense of long-run self-interest as people come to realize that they are best served by respecting 
each other’s possessions.  When property conventions are in place, however, they serve the 
public interest generally because everyone benefits from an environment in which possessions 
are respected, resource conflicts are not resolved by force and people can engage in commerce, 
philanthropy and other activities that are only possible when possessions are secure.  Property 
rights do not depend, therefore, upon legitimate political authority, universal moral impulses, or                                                         
74 Darwall, “Motive and Obligation in Hume’s Ethics,” 440. 
75 Just as neo-Lockean theories are inspired by Locke’s work but arguably depart from it in certain 
respects, neo-Humean theories do not perfectly match Hume’s actual theory. 
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explicit consent.  Convention is both necessary and sufficient.76  The content of property rules 
are shaped by the twin requirements of common interest and mutual expectation.  Rules that do 
not tend toward the public interest will not be stable because people will not have conditional 
preferences to follow them on the condition that others do.77  And rules that are excessively 
complex, opaque, or are not psychologically salient will not be adopted because they are unlikely 
to be the object of mutual expectation. 
The advantages of property rights as a basis for social cooperation may justify property 
entitlements that are entirely morally arbitrary outside of the context of the particular social 
conventions that support them.  This is an important point of contrast with neo-Lockean theories 
and other natural rights views.  Lockean rules of first appropriation might be the object of 
Humean property conventions.  But it is not necessarily an injustice if they are not.  For a 
Humean, even if the initial distribution of possessions is determined by a mix of luck, thuggery 
and fraud, the emergence of property conventions converts mere possession into full-blooded 
property.  Indeed, the evolution from bandits to barons should be commended as social progress.  
Resource egalitarians usually agree with Humeans that property entitlements are based on 
conventional rules rather than on “natural rights” and so in this respect the two approaches are 
opposed to neo-Lockeanism. 
                                                        
76 Furthermore, according to Hume, legitimate political authority is also a matter of convention, so even 
insofar as property rights might be created or modified by a government, this does not vitiate the 
conventional roots of property rights. 
77 Obviously, once governments are in the picture, it becomes possible to impose property rights by force.  
However, enforcement of property rights becomes challenging in cases in which most people are 
disinclined to respect them because no government has the capacity to monitor and punish constant 
violations of property rights.  For this reason, highly inegalitarian societies are likely to adopt hierarchical 
social structures in which the high status property owners are delegated power to enforce property rights 
against the masses.  In such societies, property conventions might effectively operate only within 
particular estates (i.e. peasants respect each other’s use rights but have little intrinsic motivation to respect 
the property rights of the landlord; the landlords respect each other’s landholdings but do not regard 
peasants as having standing to complain about the incursions of a neighboring landlord).  
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Where the Humean and resource egalitarian theories come apart is on the conditions 
necessary for property rights to be justified.  According to Humean theory, existing property 
entitlements have normative significance that is independent from their contribution to some 
larger distributive scheme.  Property conventions are valuable because they address a crucial 
problem for cooperative social life.  The regulation of access to scarce resources presents a 
coordination problem that must be solved in any complex social order.  A system of property 
rights solves this coordination problem by assigning rights to regulate access.  Assignment of 
property rights provides a framework for future decision making by dividing spheres of 
decisional authority.  In order for property rules to serve this function, certain questions must be 
considered settled so that people do not have to solve their coordination problem from scratch 
each time a new question arises.  Just as being an effective agent might require treating one’s 
intentions as having at least provisionally settled certain questions, treating certain questions 
concerning access to resources as settled by property conventions might be necessary for 
complex forms of social cooperation.78 Because the persistence of conventions requires 
continued compliance by most people most of the time, conventional property rights are to some 
extent fragile.  Any property convention that manages to solve the coordination problem arising 
from resource scarcity ought to receive at least some weight in normative deliberation.  Existing 
property conventions therefore have moral significance even when they are not based on 
Lockean natural rights and do not meet resource egalitarian standards for public justification in 
light of some conception of equality.  Instead, Humean theory subjects property conventions to 
the much weaker standard of serving the public interest relative to a free-for-all.  This means that 
                                                        
78 This analogy draws on Michael Bratman’s work on intentions.  See Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, 
and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
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Humean theory tends to be much less exacting in its standards for justification than resource 
egalitarian theories and much more sensitive to local history and culture.  
From this perspective, the problem with both neo-Lockean and resource egalitarian 
approaches is that they invite moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions.79  
Existing property conventions, whether or not they are congruous with natural property rights, 
may require a sort of deference to existing rules that fits uneasily with the resource egalitarian 
approach.  Simply because property convention Z would bring about a more equitable 
distribution of property than the existing convention A does not mean that one is justified in 
disregarding A in favor of Z.  Resource egalitarians typically agree that people should not feel 
free simply to disregard property laws that they find non-optimal.  Instead, it is the state that 
should respond to considerations of distributive justice by moving to Z from A, perhaps with 
some transition policy.  This move does not, by itself, adequately address Humean concerns.  
Property rights are meant, in part, to authoritatively settle distributive questions in order to 
prevent wasteful conflict over resources.  If, instead of being settled by property law, political 
authorities are allowed to determine property entitlements without any real constraints, this 
simply displaces the danger of wasteful resource conflict into the public sphere.  Under non-ideal 
conditions, redistribution in light of some abstract philosophical account of equality is 
problematic unless it treats existing property rights has having independent normative 
significance weight because it threatens to undermine the conventional foundations of political 
order.80   
                                                        
79 My claim here has similarities to Scott Shapiro’s recent argument that Dworkinian jurisprudential 
methodology threatens to destabilize the legal system by allowing the substantive moral views of the 
interpreters of legal texts to upset established legal conventions.  See Scott Shaprio, Legality (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
80 Chapters Two and Three will be centrally concerned with how to integrate Humean property rights and 
redistributive governmental policies. 
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Humean theories rely on a “realist” moral psychology in the sense that they assume that 
people have limited sympathy for those who are not close friends or family and that social 
institutions must therefore appeal, at least to some extent, to the self-interest of their participants 
in order to provide a basis for stable cooperation.  People are sensitive to the division of gains 
from cooperation and likely to resist arrangements in which these accrue almost entirely to 
others.  They are also unlikely to cooperate if they doubt that others will follow the rules when it 
might be personally costly.  Although Humean emphasis on justice as mutual advantage rather 
than justice as impartiality runs against the main currents of recent political philosophy, it is 
congruent with much social scientific work on fairness norms.81  One need not be a hardened 
cynic to think that in dealings among strangers, it is safer to appeal to interest than sympathy.  In 
matters such as property, which require constant cooperation with strangers, the natural human 
impulse to rejoice at the happiness of one’s friends and relations is far from sufficient for stable 
cooperation. 
As we have already seen, there is some ambiguity in Hume’s account of the moral 
psychology of artificial virtue.  Humean property theory is consistent with several distinct 
accounts of moral motivation each of which has at least some affinities with Hume’s argument in 
the Treatise.  One possibility is that compliance with property conventions is motivated by 
individual long run self interest.  Ken Binmore is the leading proponent of this sort of neo-
Humean political theory.82  He credits Hume with explaining cooperation in terms of reciprocal 
                                                        
81 E.g., “Ultimately, the mutualistic approach considers that all moral decisions should be grounded in 
consideration of mutual advantage.”  Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste Andre & Dan Sperber, “A 
Mutualistic Approach to Morality: the Evolution of Fairness by Partner Choice,” Brain and Behavioral 
Sciences 36, (2013), 109.  
82 E.g., Ken Binmore, “Why do People Cooperate?” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12, no. 2, (Feb. 
2006): 81-95. 
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altruism (an insight rediscovered by game theorists and biologists in the twentieth century).83  
Binmore argues that social contracts – the set of norms governing the social behavior of 
members of a society84 - specify rules of action that form Nash equilibria.  Any set of rules not at 
equilibrium is unstable and will be replaced by one that is.85  Rules of justice tend to evolve 
toward Pareto efficiency (at least insofar as it is consistent with stability) because rules that are 
not Pareto efficient forego potential gains that could be divided in a mutually advantageous 
way.86  Changing conditions may disrupt a social contract that is at equilibrium by changing the 
payoffs for various strategies.  When this occurs, social norms must be adjusted to reach a new 
Nash equilibrium.  Fairness intuitions play a crucial role in helping people to coordinate their 
behavior so as to settle on a new stable equilibrium.87  Binmore argues that “fairness norms 
evolved because they allow groups who employ them to coordinate quickly on Pareto-improving                                                         
83 Ken Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol II: Just Playing (Cambridge: MA: MIT 
Press, 1998), 265.  The key passage is found in the Treatise: “I learn to do service to another, without 
bearing him any real kindness, because I foresee, that he will return my service in expectation of another 
of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me and others.  
And accordingly, after I have serv’d him and he is in possession of the advantage arising from my action, 
he is induc’d to perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal.” David Hume, A Treatise 
of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 3, p. 521.   
84 It is important to note that Binmore’s social contract is emphatically not a set of basic laws regarding 
political institutions.  The social contract specifies, among other things, rules for complying with or 
ignoring governmental authorities as well as for punishing those who do not play by the rules.  
Governments and formal laws are therefore the products of social contracts that state that people should 
cooperate with them, at least in some circumstances, and specify sanctions for those who do not do so.  
Laws may become part of the social contract if they are actually followed.  But as a good Humean, 
Binmore believes that fundamental conventions are constitutive of social order and prior to any formal 
state institution.  
85 “A fair social contract is simply an equilibrium in the game of life that calls for the use of strategies 
which, if used in the game of morals, would leave no player in the game of morals with an incentive to 
appeal to the device of the original position.”  Ken Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol I: 
Playing Fair (Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 1994), 41. 
86 Societies with massively inefficient social contracts also are at risk of being conquered or having their 
members recruited away by societies that are more efficient. 
87 “Homo economicus would perhaps have no need to join homo sapiens in his capacity for sentimentality 
if one could always count on equilibria being unique.   But multiple equilibria have to be confronted, and 
societies of homo economicus therefore require coordinating conventions that incorporate common 
understandings about which of the available equilibria should be selected.” Binmore, Game Theory and 
the Social Contract, Vol I: Playing Fair, 57. 
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equilibria as they become available, and hence to outperform groups that remain stuck at the old 
equilibrium.”88  Although people are naturally inclined to learn and apply fairness norms to 
structure their cooperation with others, they are not disposed to follow norms harmful to their 
long-run interests.  Fairness norms, therefore, generally specify a division of the gains from 
cooperation that gives all parties benefits commensurate with their bargaining position.89  
Although this may sound rather inegalitarian, stable bargains often involve minimizing the 
concession of the party that gives up the most relative to their most favored result.  Those 
relatively disfavored by the social contract, e.g., low wage workers, may require compensation 
above market rates in order to secure their support. 
Binmore unapologetically favors a rational choice neo-Hobbesian interpretation of moral 
psychology.90  He complains that experimental economics results that suggest deviations from 
standard rational choice models tend to dissipate when people are given more time to learn about 
the novel conditions they are confronted with in the experiments or when greater sums of money 
are at stake.91  People rely on norms, strategies and heuristics that they have picked up elsewhere 
when confronted with unfamiliar circumstances, but given sufficient time and sufficient 
incentives, they will tend to change their behavior so as to maximize their expected payoffs 
given their particular utility function even if this requires overriding the impulsive response that 
has been inculcated by experiences in their normal (i.e. non-experimental) environment.   
Binmore’s hardline rational choice moral psychology requires that much seemingly 
altruistic behavior be explained away.  In contrast to some rational choice theorists, however, 
                                                        
88 Ken Binmore, Natural Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 171. 
89 This is, needless to say, an oversimplification.  I have omitted Binmore’s interesting theory of how 
people evaluate trade-offs between the preferences of different people.  This plays a key role in his 
argument, but is not necessary for understanding Binmore’s account of the moral psychology of justice. 
90 Binmore, “Why do People Cooperate?,” 81-95. 
91 Binmore, Natural Justice, 171. 
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Binmore is not skeptical about the importance of social norms and moral emotions in explaining 
behavior.92  Binmore believes that some actions that might seem to violate the predictions of 
rational choice models, such as turning down non-zero offers in the ultimatum game, reflect an 
emotional response to the violation of social norms.  This explanation only makes sense within 
his framework if, as seems likely, people are disposed to internalize fairness norms and apply 
them in ways that sometimes preempt calculation of expected payoffs.  This inclination might 
reflect a sort of higher order rationality given well-known cognitive limitations that make 
effortful deliberation costly and the advantages of conforming to others’ expectations.  
Binmore’s theory is therefore compatible with a psychology that allows both moral emotions and 
moral rules to be proximately motivating.  Where it differs from other versions of neo-Humean 
moral psychology is on the question of whether the public interest or intrinsic concern with 
interests of others ultimately motivates compliance with moral norms.93  Given enough time and 
incentive, people will “unlearn” moral norms that do not further their aims in life. 
A second possible source of Humean moral motivation is sympathy with the public 
interest.  In the Treatise, Hume argues that, “self-interest is the original motive to the 
establishment of justice; but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral 
approbation, which attends that virtue.”94  Hume’s observation relates to the source of moral 
approbation of just acts, but it is consistent with the notion that people might also be motivated to 
act out of sympathy with the public interest.  The crux of this second theory of moral motivation 
is that compliance with the rules of justice can been seen as a contribution to a public good.  A 
person may follow widely accepted property rules out of a sense of common interest in                                                         
92 Binmore, Natural Justice, 83-84. 
93 Binmore’s position, like Hume’s, is compatible with intrinsic concern for the welfare of others 
motivating a great range of generous or benevolent acts.  What Binmore denies is that this is sufficient to 
explain property rights and other rules of justice. 
94 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Sec. 2, p. 499-500. 
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upholding these rules even in cases in which it is individually advantageous to violate them.  On 
this account, people are conditional cooperators who usually follow property conventions 
regardless of their expected gains or losses so long as they (a) believe that others will mostly 
obey the rules, (b) believe that general observance of the rules is in the public interest and (c) 
expect to share in the benefits of the flow from general observance of these rules.  This is not to 
say that conditional cooperators are insensitive to the costs and benefits of just acts: people will 
usually act justly when this requires only small personal sacrifices and are more likely to act 
unjustly when they can secure some great gain for themselves.  Sugden, while acknowledging 
that Hume appears to argue to the contrary, expresses skepticism that sympathy with the public 
interest can be sufficiently motivating.95  There is something somewhat incongruous here with 
Hume’s skepticism about the motivating power of sympathy with those distant from ourselves: if 
rules of justice are apt for situations in which natural sympathy is insufficient to assure good 
behavior, it seems peculiar to argue that sympathy with an abstract collective largely made up of 
such people will do the trick.  Perhaps “self-love” combined with identification of oneself as a 
member of a collective that shares certain interests can go some way to resolving this apparent 
contradiction.  But in cases concerning large collectives – and rules of justice mostly concern 
such situations – it seems a stretch to argue that people usually weigh their interest in upholding 
the rules of justice qua member of the public as outweighing the potential benefits of being a rule 
breaker.   
One potential response to this difficulty is to identify sympathy with the public interest 
not as directly motivating just acts but instead as providing a motive to treat the rules of justice 
as authoritative.  As discussed previously, this is what Darwall argues is the most attractive 
                                                        
95 Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and Welfare, 175-76.   
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interpretation of Hume’s position.96  Darwall’s interpretation of Hume’s moral psychology of 
artificial virtue might go some way to explaining how a sense of common interest can be 
motivating.  Conforming one’s actions to the rules of justice is a contribution to a public good, 
namely the conventions that make harmonious life in complex societies possible.97  Like many 
public goods, this is a collective project.  Since the point of conventions is to coordinate one’s 
behavior with others, there is no sense in following rules that one does not expect others to 
follow.  But if others are disposed to follow the rules, then to treat the rules of justice as binding 
on oneself is to do one’s part in a common project.   Once a person has decided to treat the rules 
of justice as authoritative, she does not typically weigh sympathy with the public interest against 
her particular ends.  Instead, justice preempts other considerations.  If this account is correct, it 
would explain why people treat the rules of justice as being authoritative on the condition that 
their neighbors also comply with these rules.   
A third possible motivation for compliance with rules of justice is strong reciprocity.   
Strong reciprocity is “a predisposition to cooperate with others, and to punish those who violate 
the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs 
will be repaid.”98   Strong reciprocity is distinct from generic altruism in that it involves intrinsic 
motivation to help those who help oneself rather than some more general motivation to help 
others.   It is distinct from enlightened self-interest in that it motivates genuinely self-sacrificing                                                         
96 Darwall, “Motive and Obligation in Hume’s Ethics,” 415-448. 
97 Conventional rules of justice are not quite a pure public good.  Public goods in the technical sense of 
the term are goods that are non-rival and non-excludable.  Conventions of property, promise, and contract 
are non-rival since one person’s benefits from participation in the conventional practice do not threaten 
another’s person’s ability to benefit.  To the contrary, one person’s participation tends to facilitate the 
participation of others by enlarging the scope of the conventional practice.  However, conventions 
practices of justice may be partially excludable since one might deny certain people the benefits of being 
a property owner or a promisee.  Such people might still indirectly benefit from the existence of property 
rights for others, so conventions of justice seem to be a partially excludable good. 
98 Herbert Gintis, “Behavioral Ethics Meets Natural Justice,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12, no. 2, 
(Feb. 2006), 17. 
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behavior in cases where an agent knows that she will receive no future benefit.   For example, 
one might care for a dying friend who has been helpful in the past even when there is no prospect 
that this final act of kindness will be reciprocated.  There is a plausible functional explanation for 
strong altruism as a psychological trait.  In order to secure favors from others, it is best to appear 
to be the sort of person who will reciprocate favors in the future.  But sometimes returning a 
favor is costly and sometimes there is no prospect for any future advantage.  People will want to 
help others who are disposed to return a favor even when they will get nothing further out of the 
deal.  Given that people are always on the lookout to see who can be trusted in cooperative 
ventures and who cannot, it would be useful to be able to signal that one will return favors.  And 
the surest way to do this is to actually be such a person.  Proponents of strong reciprocity 
sometimes suggest that this form of motivation may be hardwired into human psychology.99  But 
regardless of whether strong reciprocity has biological underpinnings, there is abundant 
anthropological evidence that reciprocity norms are ubiquitous. 
Strong reciprocity differs from “sympathy with the public interest” in that it postulates 
that people have a very general intrinsic motivation to reciprocate favors that goes far beyond 
contributions to common projects.  Strong reciprocity can motivate compliance with property 
rules even among people who are relatively agnostic about the utility of these rules.  People who 
are intrinsically motivated to reciprocate favors may respect the property rights of others not 
because they judge that this serves an important public purpose but because they think that they 
owe this to those who respect their own property.  Given the complexity of determining which 
property rules serve the public interest (and the disinclination of many people to engage in such                                                         
99 Whether this functional explanation also is a plausible evolutionary explanation is more complicated.  
Under some circumstances (it is very controversial just how wide such circumstances are), natural 
selection might select for those who are intrinsically motivated to return favors to fellow cooperators 
regardless of their personal pay-off. 
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abstract speculation), strong reciprocity could lead to more stable compliance than either 
enlightened self-interest or sympathy with the public interest.  For example, strong reciprocity 
can provide a motive to respect property rights even for those ideologically opposed to private 
property. 
The three candidates theories of moral motivation have somewhat different implications 
for Humean property theory.  The enlightened self-interest theory and strong reciprocity theory 
lend themselves to development of Humean theory in a contractarian direction since they posit 
that people are more sensitive to individual outcomes than social outcomes.  The “sympathy with 
the public interest” interpretation is more congenial to utilitarianism since it builds in some 
concern with social outcomes.  However, all three versions of the moral psychology of Humean 
justice are united in seeing people as conditional cooperators whose willingness to follow 
conventional rules of justice depends on expectations about others’ willingness to follow and 
enforce them.100 Because property conventions rely on voluntary compliance, they are fragile 
and can be destabilized if people’s expectations about each other’s behavior shifts quickly or if 
compliance with property conventions becomes disadvantageous for a significant fraction of the 
population. All three theories are therefore similar in the way in which they make stability a 
threshold condition for a successful theory of justice. 
4. HUME CONTRA LOCKE 
Humean and Lockean theories of property are sometimes lumped together under the 
banner of classical liberalism.  This obscures as much as it reveals.  Although Humean property                                                         
100 This is approaching conventional wisdom in social scientific and philosophical literature on social 
norms.  For example, Christina Bicchieri writes, “There is plenty of evidence that most people are 
conditional cooperators.  They cooperate when they expect others to cooperate and defect otherwise.  In 
other words, most people are neither pure altruists nor selfish brutes.  They rather tend to condition their 
choices on what they expect other choosers to do, and, in cases in which such choices have a cost, they 
also take into account what others expect them to do.” Christina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 140-41. 
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theory might be consistent with neo-Lockean policy preferences, they are more versatile.101  The 
Humean approach has several advantages over neo-Lockean theory.  First, neo-Lockean theory 
has notorious trouble with situations that require constraining property owners rather than 
empowering them.  Problem spots include eminent domain, activities that pose risks to one’s 
neighbors (i.e. torts), and environmental regulations.  Insofar as the function of the state is to 
protect property rights and the function of property rights is to protect the freedom of choice of 
property owners, it is not clear how various involuntary restrictions on the rights of property 
owners can be justified.  The tort problem is probably the most straightforward.  The issue here 
is that one property owner’s action might risk damage to the property of another.  If property 
rights demarcate boundaries that must not be crossed without consent, then risky activities with 
an extremely low probability of causing damage or a high probability of causing very minor 
damage would seem to be either chilled in the first case or prohibited in the second case.  For 
example, air pollution involves physical invasion of particles emitted by one landowner onto the 
property of many neighbors.  Soot and other pollutants make air less pleasant to breathe, reduce 
lung capacity and cause other harms.  Occasionally, they cause cancer (although it is only 
possible to establish probable causality in the case of large polluters and their nearby neighbors). 
The torts problem is not, I believe, fatal to neo-Lockean property theory.  It might be fatal 
to attempts to derive a complete system of property rights from a principle of self-ownership.102  
But this is probably not a promising enterprise for other reasons as well: intuitions about the 
implications of self-ownership are simply too indeterminate when it comes to control over 
resources external to the body.  With respect to property theory, however, it is possible for a                                                         
101 Humean property theory is also consistent with decidedly non-Lockean policy preferences as well. 
102 See Peter Railton, “Locke, Stock, and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk” in Facts, 
Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003); David Sobel, “Backing Away from Libertarian Self-Ownership,” Ethics 123, no. 1 (October 
2012): 32-60.   
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Lockean to concede that risky activities, incompatible land uses and the like raise a line drawing 
problem.  In some such cases, it may be necessary to stipulate the contours of property rights on 
grounds that are not determined by Lockean principles.  If this is the case, Lockean natural rights 
are not a complete theory of property.  But this would not undermine the entire Lockean project: 
a theory of property does not have to explain everything in order to count as correct.  Neo-
Lockeans could be right about what grounds property entitlements and whether redistributive 
taxation is justified even if their theory leaves open questions such as the proper way to regulate 
incompatible land uses. 
More problematic for neo-Lockeans are domains in which the interests of property 
owners are compromised in order to provide benefits that are widely dispersed.  The difficulty in 
such cases is that the freedom of choice or the material interests of property owners are sacrificed 
for some general public benefit that accrues only in small part to the property owner.  Even if a 
property owner does not wish to sell their property at whatever is considered fair market value at 
a particular moment, the government may take it for public use via eminent domain.  This seems 
both a violation of the freedom of property owners to determine how to use (or not use) their 
property and an expropriation of part of the value of the property (the difference between fair 
market value and value to the government), which would ordinarily be realized through 
bargaining over the sale price.103  Although difficult to justify in a neo-Lockean “natural rights” 
                                                        
103 Eminent domain only requires compensation at fair market value rather than at a price that 
approximates the outcome of bargaining between a seller, who would have already sold the property if 
she valued it at less than fair market value, and a purchaser who values the property at more than fair 
market value because of its contribution to some larger project (i.e. the government’s intended use of the 
property).  For this reason, most legal scholars believe that eminent domain undercompensates property 
owners.  Various proposals have been advanced to provide a formula for compensation above fair market 
value.  However, this view is not universal and Brian Lee has recently argued that eminent domain should 
generally not compensate for subjective valuations above fair market value.  See Brian A. Lee, “Just 
Undercompensation: the Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain,” Columbia Law Review 113 (April 
2013): 593-655. 
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framework, eminent domain is of great practical importance.  It is hard to see how one could 
accomplish major infrastructure projects without it.  Likewise, although some environmental 
regulation is meant to prevent relatively concrete harms to neighboring property owners, a fair 
amount of it is aimed at some systemic social benefit such as the preservation of scarce natural 
resources.  Endangered species protection, for example, does not seek to protect the rights of 
other property owners since nobody in particular could possibly have a right to have a particular 
species of wild animal wonder across their property.  Wetlands regulation has a similar structure 
in that it restricts the activities of property owners in order to secure systemic and defuse 
benefits.  It is unclear how such regulations are to be squared with a theory of property that holds 
that natural property rights serve as a trump to protect owners’ freedom of choice.   
Humean property theory is not committed to the proposition that property owners should 
be given maximal degree of freedom consistent with equal freedom for others.  Instead, 
restrictions on freedom of action and forced exchanges of property might be acceptable if all 
property owners tend to benefit from such restrictions on property rights.  Eminent domain 
serves the ex ante interests of the vast majority of property owners in an effectual and efficient 
public sector.  The requirement that the state compensate property owners at fair market value 
mitigates property owners’ loses ex post so that the costs of common projects are not 
concentrated on a small number of individuals.  Compensation for takings thus prevents (or at 
least substantially constrains) parties from using the public law to aggress against their neighbors 
by appropriating their property.104  Because property rights should reflect stable, mutual 
                                                        
104 Richard Epstein has argued that the takings rule should be fundamental to the constitutional order and 
apply well beyond eminent domain.  Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of 
Eminent Domain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).  Although Epstein frames his 
position in Lockean terms, I think that it is perhaps more Humean in spirit.  This comes out most clearly 
when Epstein explains how the takings principle improves on Nozick’s neo-Lockean framework by 
providing an attractive theory of when the state may impose forced exchanges.  Epstein, Takings, 336-37. 
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advantageous relations between typical property owners, eminent domain is permissible even if 
some property owners, for whatever reason, prefer greater control over their property to the 
benefits of eminent domain.105  In cases where uniform rules are necessary, the interests of those 
with highly idiosyncratic preferences must sometimes give way to the majority.  Eminent domain 
is such a case; endangered species protection is another.  Property conventions that do not permit 
property owners to eliminate endangered species on their property might be in the ex ante 
interest of property owners as a whole even though this represents a restriction on freedom of 
choice for all and does not increase the scope of free action for anyone.  Because it is not 
possible for regulation to reflect the preferences of both those who support and those who oppose 
endangered species protection, a uniform policy must be imposed on all. 
Neo-Lockeans often support some form of eminent domain.  Some of them also support 
limiting property rights in the name of environmental protection.  How this is consistent with the 
normative foundations of neo-Lockean theory is less clear.  Notably, when Robert Nozick 
addresses issues such as pollution in which restrictions of the rights of property owners seem 
necessary, he quickly concedes that “it is difficult to imagine a principled way in which the 
natural-rights tradition can draw the line to fix which probabilities impose unacceptably great 
risks upon others” and suggests that pollution regulation should be set according to net costs and 
benefits.106  The logic of this position is much more clear if one jettisons the Lockean 
foundations in favor of a Humean analysis of both property entitlements and the scope of 
property rights because Humeans derive property rights from mutually advantageous                                                         
105 There are proposals to customize eminent domain protections in various ways so as to mitigate the 
vulnerability of property owners to unwelcome uses of eminent domain.  E.g., Christopher Serkin, “Local 
Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection,” Columbia Law Review 107, no. 4 (May, 
2007): 883-948; Lee Anne Fennell, “Taking Eminent Domain Apart”, Michigan State Law Review 2004, 
no. 4 (2004): 957-1004.  Allowing property owners to opt out of eminent domain altogether, however, 
would defeat its purpose. 
106 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 75, 79-81. 
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conventions regardless of whether such conventions augment the freedom of choice of property 
owners. 
The source of property entitlements presents an even greater difficulty for neo-Lockeans 
than their scope does.  If one looks closely, the historical provenance of many property claims is 
rather dubious.  Examine the chain of title for any given plot of land closely enough and it is 
likely to begin with some disreputable act of thievery or fraud. The original occupier of a piece 
of land is, more often than not, someone who took it by force.  And when this is not the case, the 
original title often reflects a grant from a government that dispossessed the prior owner in some 
morally dubious manner.  Lockeans are thus faced with a quandary.  If they take a hard line 
against dubious property claims, Lockean theory will tend to undermine the claims of present 
possessors in ways that seem worrisome.  At first blush, a theory such as Nozick’s seems to call 
a huge range of property claims into question.  Intellectual property of various kinds may be 
relatively unproblematic because patents, copyrights and trademarks usually are of recent 
vintage.  But almost any kind of land claims and some chattels would be under a cloud.  
Commerce does not help matters here.  The usual rule is that a seller who does not possess good 
title cannot transmit good title to a buyer – otherwise thieves could easily profit from their ill-
deeds by selling property to clear title.  Lockeans might argue that title could be “cleansed” by 
improvements that require significant labor on the part of the new owner.  This seems plausible 
in some cases.  Homesteaders in the west might be thought to acquire moral rights to their farms 
through labor even if the government’s claim to have the right to grant the land in the first place 
was questionable.  This sort of theory works well when (as in nineteenth century America) land 
is very plentiful relative to labor.  But in other cases, it seems more questionable.  When natural 
resources are scarce enough to have economic value, income reflects returns to both capital and 
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labor.  Returns to capital tend to average around five percent in the modern era.107  Even without 
any special investment skill, ill-gotten gains can easily grow over time rather than diminish.  
Natural resources sometimes appreciate in value for reasons that have nothing to do with labor or 
investment.  For example, land in Manhattan is fantastically valuable with or without 
“improvements.”  Finally, the labor theory of ownership creates numerous line-drawing 
problems.  Can an absentee landlord gain a moral right to property through improvements made 
by their tenants?  Does construction of residential buildings count as an improvement that gives 
rise to a valid claim to the land underneath it?  Does ordinary upkeep of a house require enough 
labor for Lockean principles to apply?  Once we set aside the Lockean fiction that natural 
resources have little economic value, many cases raise hard questions.  The uncertainty of these 
questions suggests that Lockean labor theory of value is poorly suited to underwrite property 
rights in a complex economy. 
One possible solution to the uncertainty of property entitlements is to adopt a strong 
principle of adverse possession.  Adverse possession is the legal doctrine that allows an occupier 
of land to gain legal title after some period of continuous and conspicuous occupation despite 
lacking of any preexisting right to the land.  Adverse possession rules, however, do not follow 
neo-Lockean logic.  They are not much concerned with how much work the adverse possessor 
puts into improving the land but rather with whether possession is “open and notorious” (i.e. 
whether the adverse possessor acts in a way that gives notice to others).  In many jurisdictions, 
the adverse possessor does not even have to be acting in good faith!108  The apparent policy 
motive is to promote clear title, not to reward the industrious.  Of course, one could make                                                         
107 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Arthur Goldhammer, trans., (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 206-209. 
108 Henry Smith & Thomas Merrill, Property: Principles and Policies (New York: Foundation Press, 
2007), 207. 
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adverse possession doctrine more Lockean by requiring significant investment or improvement 
and, perhaps, good faith.  But there are good reasons to be cautious about such an approach.  
“Improvement” is a much more nebulous standard than possession.  To the extent that 
improvement is read narrowly to include only actions that greatly increase a plot’s market value, 
many titles will be unclear.  Moreover, possessors might have undue incentive to “improve” land 
merely to establish title even at the cost of long-term environmental damage.  The environmental 
effects of encouraging slash and burn agriculture on the property of others would be deleterious 
to say the least.  To the extent that improvement is read broadly so that minimal investments are 
sufficient for title, adverse possession will still reward the ‘undeserving.’  In this case, the 
Humean amendment threatens to swallow the Lockean system as claims of present possession 
supersede claims of natural right. 
Although Humean theories and Lockean theories have deeply opposing stances on the 
grounds of property entitlements, Humean theory can assimilate many aspects of Lockean 
theory.  For example, considerations of moral desert are compatible with Humean theory so long 
as they supplement fundamental property conventions rather than replace them.  The problem 
with Lockean claims, according to Humeans, is that property rights ultimately rest on 
fundamental conventions of respect for others’ possessions.  And these cannot be stable if they 
require widespread moral agreement about who deserves what.  Once such fundamental 
conventions are in place, considerations of moral desert may be helpful in filling in the more 
detailed rules about how to acquire unowned goods.  Widely shared moral intuitions about 
certain relations between people and objects might be particularly good candidates for certain 
such conventions.  But to think that non-conventional moral rules can replace the fundamental 
convention is to put the cart before the horse.   
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5. HUMEAN THEORY AND RESOURCE EGALITARIANISM 
Humean theory is a straightforward competitor to Lockean theory.  Humean theory aims 
to displace Lockean theory by showing that Lockean property rights either can be explained in 
Humean terms as the object of conventions or are not justified because they yield undesirable 
results.  The relationship between Humean property theory and resource egalitarianism is more 
complex.  Unlike Humean and neo-Lockean theory, Humean property theory and resource 
egalitarian theories have somewhat different purposes.  Whereas Humean theory is primarily 
about the form and origin of property entitlements and only secondarily about their distribution, 
resource egalitarianism is primarily concerned with the distribution of property rights and only 
secondarily (if at all) with their form and origin.  The two types of theories tend to conflict, 
however, in that Humean theories usually endorse the existing pattern of property rights so long 
as it meets certain minimum conditions whereas resource egalitarian theories almost invariably 
suggest that the existing order should be reformed.  Humean property theory is robustly non-
ideal and does not tend to deal in universal prescriptions whereas resource egalitarianism faces a 
serious problem of determining how ideal principles interact with non-ideal circumstances. 
 Resource egalitarians tend to take the following approach.  First, they seek to establish 
fairly abstract principles of distributive justice such as John Rawls’ difference principle.  Second, 
they use these principles to evaluate rules of property, taxation, and so forth.  The problem here 
is that justification is rather fragile.  Agreement on property rights, tax rules and so forth requires 
agreement on the underlying principles of justice.  But these principles are extremely 
controversial: there are almost as many resource egalitarian theories as there are resource 
egalitarians.  And although there may be fairly broad consensus among resource egalitarians that, 
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for example, there should be some form of progressive taxation, there are stark differences about 
the extent to which differences in wealth holdings are permissible. 
John Rawls’ response to this problem in Political Liberalism is to argue that principles of 
justice can be the object of an overlapping consensus between people who endorse various 
“reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”109  In other words, all citizens can endorse common 
principles of justice even though they each may do so for slightly different reasons.  Justification 
of basic civil liberties seems a better fit for this methodology.  Matters of distributive justice are 
more divisive – even stable western democracies with wide public consensus on civil liberties 
feature rather significant disagreements about, e.g. progressivity in taxation, social insurance, 
welfare, economic regulation and property rights.  This is not surprising: although the interest of 
most supporters of mainstream parties in “advanced democracies” is relatively symmetric when 
it comes to freedom of speech, material interests concerning distributive justice diverge quite 
plainly.  And these differences often cut across other lines – for example, people who consider 
their identify as Catholic to be central to their political views embrace an extremely wide range 
of views on economic policy.   
Given disagreements about fundamental principles of distributive justice, resource 
egalitarian theories tend to undermine the conventional basis of political authority.110  According 
to Hume, political authority is at root conventional.111 People obey governments (to the extent 
that they do) in part because they expect others to do so.  Effective government, like a system of 
property rights, is a public good that requires compliance from a large part of the population in 
order to be realized.  A government that does not command its subject allegiance cannot perform                                                         
109 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 140-154. 
110 As will be argued below, extremely inegalitarian property distributions also might have this tendency 
if the result is that many citizens do not believe that they benefit very much from public order.   So the 
point may cut against neo-Lockean views as well. 
111 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 7. 
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its essential functions and therefore may be ignored.  By contrast, even a morally compromised 
government is worth listening to if the alternative is anarchy.  Part of the reason for expecting 
others to obey the government is that they believe that the government will not rewrite the 
“social contract” through wholesale revision of existing property rights.  Obedience (or at least 
acquiescence) to government relies on informal understandings about the relative powers of state 
and citizens.  In a stable polity, certain actions are considered permissible by the state and 
citizens will usually not resist even when they disagree with them.  However, even when these 
are very much tipped in favor of the state, transgressions against established prerogatives of the 
common people may cause revolt.112  So long as the state acts within its conventionally 
determined limits, people expect their fellow citizens to mostly follow its directives.  When it 
ceases to do so, all bets are off. 
The relationship between redistributive policies and political legitimacy is complex.  A 
polity with well-entrenched conventions of deference to political authority may be able to pursue 
a more aggressively redistributive policy without undermining political order.  Political orders in 
which there are public recognized limits (which might be matters of law, but are just as likely to 
be informal norms or shared understandings) on property redistribution are likely to have an 
easier time securing compliance with governmental directives since citizens will have less cause 
to worry that giving an inch will result in the state taking a yard.  Redistributive measures in such 
polities are also less likely to degenerate into transfers to supporters of a political dominant 
faction.  Stable property conventions and stable political conventions are likely to go together.  
And the converse is true for political and property instability.  A government that violates 
existing property conventions risks political disorder; political instability increases the risks that 
one faction or faction will try to use its moment in power to redistribute property from its                                                         
112 Numerous peasant revolts and serf rebellions in medieval Europe fit this description. 
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enemies to its friends.  As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have argued, much of recent 
Latin American history has been characterized by cycles of populist redistributive regimes and 
authoritarian right-wing regimes in which rival political factions have waged a protracted, 
economically destructive battle for political and economic supremacy.113  Successful political 
systems in North America and Western Europe, on the other hand, created democratic 
institutions that ensured that the benefits of economic growth would be shared with workers 
while giving property owners greater long-term security.  This created a virtuous cycle of 
stability and shared prosperity.  The larger point here is that respect for the claims of existing 
property holders may be crucial even when these claims do not meet resource egalitarian 
standards.  Aggressively redistributive policies might undermine the conventions of political 
authority and political accommodation that enable effective government.  Incorporating existing 
property claims into resource egalitarian analysis by calculating the efficiency losses from 
expropriation is not sufficient to account for the relationship between political order and respect 
for property rights. 
This is not to say that it is impossible to integrate resource egalitarian concerns into a 
Humean framework.  Resource egalitarian theories and Humean theories of property purport to 
be about the same subject – “justice” – but, properly understood, they play different roles.  These 
roles are not necessarily incompatible, but most plausible synthesis of these theories will adopt a 
Humean view of property rights while analyzing other aspects of policy according to resource 
egalitarian standards.  Humean property theory explains and justifies the normative authority of                                                         
113 See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, The Economics Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  North, Wallis, and Weingast present a slightly different 
analysis of the same phenomenon.  They emphasize the fundamental distinction between “open access 
orders” characterized by the rule of law and economic freedom and “limited access orders” in which the 
state maintains order by buying loyalty with a system of special privileges.  See Douglass North, John 
Wallis & Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting 
Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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existing property rules and property entitlements in minimally decent and functional political 
orders.  It also provides guidance as to how such rules can be revised under conditions 
characterized by limited altruism and moral disagreement.   
Ideal theories of justice have a different function.  Rather than explaining the nature and 
scope of our obligation to comply with existing property rules, they provide a framework to 
evaluate reform proposals.  For example, if I am deciding whether to support a ballot measure 
increasing the minimum wage, I might decide how to vote by asking myself whether it increases 
the primary goods available to the least advantaged or whether it would increase aggregate 
utility.  Once in the voting booth, I need not coordinate my activities with others, nor, given the 
small bore nature of the proposal, worry much about destabilizing norms of cooperation between 
people with differing moral views.  Voting is my very limited opportunity to act as a dictator 
rather than a cooperator.  If, on the other hand, I am trying to decide whether it is just to comply 
with the actually prevailing property conventions, ideal theory may give misleading advice.   
This analysis suggests the following division of labor between the two types of theories.  
Humean theories address the justifiability of conventional norms such as those regulating basic 
property entitlements and political authority.  Ideal theories of distributive justice may then be 
used to evaluate more fine-grained (but none-the-less crucially important) questions of policy 
that are decided against the background of these conventional norms in contexts in which a 
single actor (usually the government) can simply impose its preferred rules on the populace.114  
                                                        
114 Ken Binmore puts this point colorfully: “In arguing that current versions of the notion of an a priori 
common good get only lip service from most people in modern societies, and that there is no reason why 
newly invented versions should command any greater respect, I am not saying that welfare economists 
might as well pack their bags and go home to mother.  On the contrary, their approach is clearly very 
relevant when some person or institution can impose its will on others – just as a mother may insist on 
certain house rules being obeyed for what she sees as the common good of the family.  It will certainly 
help things along if people can be persuaded to respect the common good in such circumstances, but 
disaster will not ensue if attempts at persuasion fail, since respect can be enforced if necessary.” Binmore, 
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For this reason, the versions of resource egalitarianism that are most appealing for Humeans are 
those that yield metrics that score reform proposals as better or worse rather than determinate 
principles such as Rawls’ difference principle that govern the basic structure as a whole.  The 
latter includes utilitarianism115 as well as Sen’s capabilities metrics.116 
6. OBJECTIONS TO HUMEAN THEORY 
Humean theories of property are not especially popular among moral and political 
philosophers.117  Hume’s theory of justice is often seen as too thin to justify strong moral 
entitlements as well as unduly conservative in its implications.  My account of Humean property 
theory provides resources to reply to both claims.  Humean theories of property are morally thin 
in that they trace the obligation to respect property rights to contingent social practices rather 
than to some deeper theory of respect for persons, natural rights, or human equality.  The moral                                                                                                                                                                                   
Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol I: Playing Fair, 137. 
115 How to categorize utilitarianism is an interesting question.  There is a sense in which analysis of 
property rights in terms of welfare maximization is a resource egalitarian view that takes the normatively 
relevant sense of equality to be the equal moral significance of each person’s welfare.  A variant of 
Rawls’ position that replaces the difference principle with distribution according to welfare maximization 
would seem to count as a resource egalitarian view.  On the other hand, utilitarian analysis that takes into 
account considerations of political stability might well embrace of Humean theory of property rights 
under rule utilitarian logic.  Jeremy Bentham, for example, supported strong property rights on broadly 
Humean grounds.  
116 See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
117 E.g. Waldron, “The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property,” 85–123; Barry, A 
Treatise on Social Justice, Volume I: Theories of Justice.  The Humean approach is rather more popular 
among legal theorists and game theoretically minded economists.  E.g. Binmore, Game Theory and the 
Social Contract, Vol I: Playing Fair; Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol II: Just 
Playing; Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and Welfare; Herbert Gintis, The Bounds of 
Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009); James E. Krier. “Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights,” 
Cornell Law Review 95 (2009): 139-159.  There are a few exceptions.  Political philosopher Peter 
Vanderschraaf has explicitly defended a neo-Humean approach to justice as mutual advantage.  E.g. Peter 
Vanderschraaf, “Justice as Mutual Advantage and the Vulnerable,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 10 
(May 2010): 119-147.  David Gauthier claimed Hume as an early contractarian. David Gauthier, “David 
Hume, Contractarian,” The Philosophical Review 88 (Jan. 1979): 3-38.  And there appears to be a small 
revival of interest in Hume among political theorists.  E.g., Russell Hardin, David Hume: Moral and 
Political Theorist (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Frazier, The Enlightenment of Sympathy: 
Justice and Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Andrew Sabl, Hume’s Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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parsimony of Hume’s approach is an advantage for property theory because Humean theory 
squarely confronts the problem of cooperation between people who have fundamental moral 
disagreements.  Rather than appealing to controversial notions of moral desert or freedom (as 
neo-Lockean theories do) or equality (as resource egalitarian theories do), Humean theories 
identify the source of obligations to follow property rules in our common interest in coordinating 
our use of resources with others so as to prevent overexploitation and conflict.  This is a motive 
that may be shared by those who subscribe to differing ideal theories.   
Some critics, however, doubt that Humean theory can explain how property rights are 
full-bloodedly moral rights.  Jeremy Waldron asserts that Humean theory is unable to account 
for extremely common intuitions about the importance of justice.118  He argues: 
The Humean model is supposed to explain not only the emergence of a stable set of 
holdings, but also the emergence of property rights, and with a sense of rights a sense 
also of fairness and justice.  But it is not at all clear that it can do that.  No doubt some 
sense of an immutable balance of power might emerge from Humean negotiation, similar 
to the sense that characterizes international diplomacy.  But why should we expect 
heavily moralized standards like justice and fairness – standards that connote the idea of 
the rightfulness of the proportion of one person’s holding to another’s – to emerge from 
the essentially amoral process that Humean and Buchanan describe?119   
This is a significant challenge for Humeans.  The first point in defense of the Humean approach 
is that a great variety of moral norms depend on social practice, so that Hume’s account of 
property rights arising from the moralization of conventional social practices is not 
anomalous.120  Many instances of genuine moral outrage depend on conventional social 
practices.  Cheating at a game of cards may be morally outrageous (especially if money is 
involved) even if it is not intended to communicate any personal disrespect and even though 
nobody has a moral right to win at games of chance.  Moreover, once a conventional social 
                                                        
118 Waldron, “The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property,” 85–123.  
119 Waldron, “The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property,” 115. 
120 This is probably not the source of Waldron’s unease.  
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practice is in place, its elements can be used to communicate attitudes that may be virtuous or 
objectionable for unrelated reasons.  Cheating someone or stealing his property might be a way 
of communicating disrespect, contempt or scorn.  This can even be the case even in situations 
where the material losses from cheating or theft are completely trivial. With property 
conventions, the stakes are high, so it should not be surprising that they tend to become 
moralized. 
Waldron’s real objection, however, is not to the roots of Humean property rights in social 
practice but to their origins in stable equilibria that reflect the bargaining power of the various 
parties.  Waldron doubts that “balance of power” reasoning can yield sufficient moral oomph to 
account for property rights.  This criticism understates the power of theories of justice as mutual 
advantage.  Concern with property entitlements can be viewed as one element in a broader set of 
norms of fair cooperation.  Moralizing rules that reflect an approximate balance of power in 
situations fraught with the potential for destructive conflict helps to entrench stable equilibria 
and facilitates cooperation between people who many not agree on conceptions of equality or 
other potential foundations for property rights.  That such norms reflect the “balance of power” 
rather than some abstract notion of human equality is useful for fostering stable relationships 
because it reduces the likelihood that people will violate social norms in hopes of getting a better 
deal with other partners or under a different social contract. 
Neo-Humean theories of fairness, introduced earlier in the context of Ken Binmore’s 
work, analyze distributive fairness norms as tools to divide cooperative surplus in a way that is 
efficient and stable.121  In most contexts there are a huge range of outcomes that are Pareto                                                         
121 The foregoing account is influenced by Ken Binmore, Robert Sugden, Peyton Young and Nicolas 
Baumard.  See Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol I: Playing Fair; Binmore, Game 
Theory and the Social Contract, Vol II: Just Playing; Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation, and 
Welfare; H. Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); 
  55 
efficient so that the Pareto efficiency alone cannot be used to resolve distributive questions.122  
Fairness norms select outcomes that are both Pareto efficient and stable in that nobody has 
incentive to undermine the norms in hopes of getting a better deal in the future or leave the 
cooperative scheme in order to find a better deal elsewhere.  In order to do so, fair solutions must 
reflect the approximate balance of power between cooperators.  In cases in which people are 
symmetrically situated, this usually requires equal division of the gains from cooperation.  But 
when different people make different contributions to the cooperative scheme, this may require 
that some be allocated more of the benefits than others.  Manna from heaven, therefore, should 
be divided into equal shares.  But for goods that are produced through human effort, it might be 
fair to give more to those who make greater contributions whether because of special talents, 
greater efforts or greater contribution of material resources.  Even people who make little 
material contribution, however, may be entitled to share in the gains of cooperation to some 
extent, if their adherence to the social contract allows others to be productive.  The underlying 
idea is that a fair person is a desirable partner in a cooperative scheme.  People who cooperate 
under fair terms will do about as well as they can over the long term so that each will want to 
continue the mutually advantageous relationship.  Fairness norms sometimes produce outcomes 
that maximize utility, but the division of gains necessary to induce parties to maintain a 
cooperative scheme do not necessarily match those that would result for the application of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Baumard, Andre & Sperber, “A Mutualistic Approach to Morality: the Evolution of Fairness by Partner 
Choice,” 59-78. 
122 “In problems of local justice, equity and efficiency often complement each other.  Principles of equity 
are the instruments by which societies resolve distributive problems when efficiency by itself yields 
indeterminate results.” Young, Equity in Theory and Practice, 19. 
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utilitarian principles.  There is some tension, therefore, between evaluation in terms of utility and 
in terms of fairness.123 
This conception of fairness is congruent with many common intuitions about distributive 
questions.  People often view unequal benefits as just if these inequalities reflect different levels 
of contribution to the common enterprise.  Higher pay for those with special talents is therefore 
often considered morally unobjectionable even when these talents are ultimately the product of 
good fortune rather than special effort.124  A reasonable return to capital investment may be 
considered fair for the same reason.  One interpretation of such intuitions is that they reflect in 
some inchoate way the insight that higher wages might be desirable in order to encourage to 
talented to work harder or investors to invest.  Another factor, however, may be that balancing 
contributions and benefits facilitates stable cooperative relations in environments in which 
people may exit the relationship if they are likely to find a better deal elsewhere.  This 
consideration may be important even to those who are unmoved by efficiency arguments because 
they are unconcerned with aggregate utility. 
If this interpretation is correct, then people who violate the rules of stable, mutually 
advantageous cooperative schemes are apt objects of moral resentment.  It makes sense to resent 
people who take more than their just share even if the overall distribution of property rights is 
regrettably lopsided.  People are sensitive to violations of property rules just as they are quick to 
anger at cheaters and those who withhold required contributions to collective projects.  These                                                         
123 The three theories of moral motivation have some implications for how to balance these 
considerations.  Sympathy with the public interest is suggestive of a political theory tilted toward 
utilitarianism.  Theories based on enlightened self-interest or on strong reciprocity, on the other hand, 
suggest a greater role for fairness norms. 
124 The intuition here is that it is fair for Wilt Chamberlain to receive above average pay even though his 
pay is largely a function of winning the genetic lottery (this is particularly obvious in the case of N.B.A. 
centers since well over 99% of the population is disqualified from the job solely on the basis of height).  
This is not to say that particular market outcomes are sacrosanct, particularly since markets are only one 
of many distributive mechanisms that may result in unequal outcomes. 
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impulses are usually not wholly insensitive to the aggregate distribution of property rights.  
Some distributions may be so inequitable that the “have-nots” see no point in voluntarily 
respecting the property rights of the “haves” because their gains from compliance with property 
conventions are so negligible.125  The key is for people to see respect for the “balance of power” 
in present property holdings as being advantageous for rich, poor and those in between.  Once 
mutually beneficial property conventions are in place, however, everyone has an interest in 
maintaining the “balance of power”. 
In practice, concern with fairness as mutual advantage often complements concern with 
fairness as impartiality.  Imagine a group of relatively impoverished workers who revolt against 
the terms of their employment.  The workers might justify their revolt on the grounds that they 
are not treated as equals to owners and managers by the political and economic system.  But they 
also might do so on the grounds that they are denied their fair share of the cooperative surplus 
relative to their contributions.  The two sorts of justifications are mutually supporting.  For a 
given individual, there might not be any clear answer to the question of which kind of 
justification she finds more persuasive.  Social movements often mix these two sorts of claims 
since workers sometimes feel both that the terms of trade are unfairly tilted toward employers 
and that material inequalities reflect inequitable social relations between members of different 
classes.  In any case, it is unclear that ‘justice as mutual advantage’ is at a disadvantage in 
accounting for a range of common intuitions about justice. 
One cautionary point should be emphasized.  The preceding account of fairness is nicely 
congruent with Hume’s account of property and is useful in responding to some of the standard 
objections to Hume’s theory.  However, it is possible to be a Humean about property rights while                                                         
125 Rawls’ difference principle, by contrast, requires that the least advantaged do as well as they possibly 
could.  This goes much further than is required by the logic of mutual advantage. 
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rejecting the larger political theory on offer here.  Jeremy Bentham, for example, incorporated a 
Humean commitment to stable property rights into his larger utilitarian political and moral 
theory.  Conversely, it is possible, although in my view less appealing, to embrace of neo-
Humean account of fairness without endorsing a Humean theory of property rights.  My appeal 
to it here is purely defensive as far as the purpose of this chapter is concerned.  If one does not 
like it, it is entirely possible to embrace Humean property theory while discarding the broader 
political theory. 
Perhaps, though, the real force of Waldron’s criticism is that Hume provides an account 
of how property conventions arise, but not how they become moralized.  So although Hume’s 
account may explain how property norms arise, it does not explain how property rights do so.  
Here, the moral psychology of conditional cooperation can fill in gaps left in Hume’s account.  
When property norms first emerge, they are not moralized.  They first appear as tentative 
expectations and then, as respect for others’ possessions becomes more widespread, as a 
descriptive norm.  At this stage, the logic of hawk-dove strategies may be sufficient to explain 
compliance.  Once a social norm of defending one’s own possessions and respecting those of 
others is in place, it may be rational to defend one’s own property from aggressors while 
refraining from aggressing against others.  At this point, a sense of reciprocity and fair play may 
generate feelings of resentment against those who do not reciprocate respect for others’ property.  
Before observance of property rights becomes generalized, people may follow a policy of 
respecting the possessions of those who respect their possessions on the basis of rational 
calculation that this will further their own ends.  However, once people develop stable 
expectations concerning others’ behavior, respect for property rights becomes the new baseline 
for fair play.  Violations of property rules are judged to be unfair because they involve taking 
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advantage of the benefits of property rules while declining to share the burdens.  This sort of 
blatant free riding is apt to draw moral disapproval from “conditional cooperators” even if 
property norms are not antecedently strongly moralized.  This account of the moralization of 
property norms is sufficient, I think, to address Waldron’s worry.  It requires a somewhat more 
precise moral psychology than that described by Hume.  And it introduces at least some concern 
with distributive considerations into Hume’s theory.  The claim that people are especially 
sensitive to “free riders” who fail to uphold cooperative schemes or reciprocate favors from 
others is both empirically plausible and consistent with what Hume does say about the moral 
psychology of justice.   
A second common criticism of Hume is that his theory of property is little more than 
rationalization of his deeply conservative political predilections or, considered a bit more 
sympathetically, an important intellectual contribution that is limited by ideologically 
prejudice.126  This perception is reinforced when figures such as Hayek claim Hume as a 
important forerunner.127  This is a threat to my defense of Humean property theory because part 
of the appeal of such theories is that they provide guidance in contexts where people disagree 
about principles of distributive justice.  Humean theory promises to provide a framework in 
which both ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ policy proposals can be fairly evaluated.  But if the 
Humean approach is irremediably tilted to “conservative” policy outcomes, then these purported 
advantages are illusory.                                                           
126 E.g., “Thus institutions that reflect relations of power may be criticized as failing to measure up to the 
criteria of justice in the sense that detaches it from mutual advantage.  That Hume did not acknowledge 
and investigate the implications of this possibility simply shows that at this point in the development of 
his theory he proved to be a better conservative than he was a philosopher.” Barry, A Treatise on Social 
Justice, Volume I: Theories of Justice, 164. 
127 E.g., “On these issues which will be my main concern, thought seems to have made little advance 
since David Hume and Immanuel Kant and in several respects it will be at the point at which they left off 
that our analyses will have to resume.”  Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Liberty and Legislation, Volume 1: 
Rules and Order (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 6. 
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Hume’s theory of property may be used as a starting point to devise a more complete 
Humean political theory.128  This requires extending Humean analysis to questions that arise 
once a system of property rights is in place.  Hume provides no analysis of how states might 
modify property rights beyond a fairly vague suggestion that the state sometimes must alter 
existing property rights to fit new circumstances.129  Given that Hume did not write 
systematically on questions of political philosophy and did not address many of the controversies 
of the past several hundred years, it is probably best to call such theories ‘neo-Humean’.  Neo-
Humean theories evaluate not only the institutions of private law, but also the ways in which 
states may or may not reshuffle property entitlements and impose taxes.  They leave room for 
revision of existing property rights so long as such revisions take place according to procedures 
that respect existing property rights and are consistent with the Human framework of justice as 
mutual advantage.  The challenge is to move beyond the sort of picture contemplated by Hume 
in the Treatise in which property rights, once established, are fairly static, and develop a theory 
under which Humean property rights constrain changes in property entitlements while allowing 
some scope for policies that alter property entitlements, impose taxes and establish welfare and 
social insurance programs.  
Neo-Humean political theory takes rules of justice to approximate stable bargains 
between people with limited altruism and differing moral views but a willingness to adhere to 
                                                        
128 This theory is political in the sense that it is meant to be a theory of rules for politics, commerce and 
other spheres in which strangers or mere acquaintances interact at arm’s length, not of morality as a 
whole.  Being a Humean about political theory is consistent with being a utilitarian, a contractualist or a 
virtue theorist about moral theory.  Political morality is suited for situations in which large groups of 
people without close personal ties must act in concert.  Entirely difficult moral rules may apply to people 
in close, mutually sympathetic personal relationships.  Whatever one’s preferred moral theory, it is 
plausible to think that different sorts of norms will be appropriate for these two different kinds of 
situations.  
129 Hume approved, for example, of Henry VII’s breaking of noble entails, a rather large change in 
property law.  See Sabl, Hume’s Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England, 67-69, 235. 
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mutually advantageous rules of fair play.  In this respect, they are similar to Rawls’ model of the 
circumstances of justice – this is no coincidence since Rawls was influenced by Hume.  Where 
Humean theory differs from Rawlsian theory is that it does not abstract away from the personal 
characteristics of the bargainers or their current allotment of possessions.  Because Humean 
theory does not assume motivation to comply with rules of justice in absence of considerations 
of personal advantage, Humean rules of justice must be calculated to appeal to actual persons, 
not their idealized selves striped of purportedly biasing characteristics. Once fundamental 
conventions of property, contract and allegiance to the state are in place, Humean theory 
evaluates further rules against the background of the existing social contract in light of their 
stability, efficiency and utility.130  Because Humean theory takes the existing social contract as 
the starting point for reform,131 considerations of fairness and utility may support different 
reforms in different contexts. 
As I will argue in this and subsequent chapters, Humean political theory is not 
necessarily conservative in the ideological sense of the term, but rather can be developed in both 
                                                        
130 Hume’s frequent appeals to the consequences of rights and duties make him appear a sort of proto-
utilitarian.  Bentham gave this strand of Hume’s thought a more precise formulation.  Neo-Humeans need 
not be Benthamites.  A wide range of other consequentialist metrics can be incorporated into neo-Humean 
political analysis and even the more consequentialist versions of Humean theory are centrally concerned 
with fairness as a tool for social stability.   
131 “It is not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances; where an old engine may be 
rejected, if we can discover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may safely be made, 
even though the success be doubtful.  An established government has an infinite advantage, by that very 
circumstance of its being established; the bulk of mankind being governed by authority, not reason, and 
never attributing authority to any thing that has not the recommendation of antiquity.  To tamper, 
therefore, in this affair, or try experiments merely upon the credit of supposed argument and philosophy, 
can never be the part of a wise magistrate, who will bear a revenence to what carries the marks of age; 
and though he may attempt some improvements for the public good, yet will he adjust his innovations as 
much as possible, to the ancient fabric, and preserve entire the chief pillars and supports of the 
constitution.”  David Hume, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” in David Hume: Political Essays, Knut 
Haakonssen, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 221. 
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“liberal” and “conservative” directions.132  Conservative Humean political thought is concerned 
with the preservation of social order against the twin dangers of anarchy and governmental 
predation.133  It favors a classically liberal political order so as to prevent wasteful conflict over 
resources and secure broad freedoms for property owners to use their property as they see fit.  
Unlike neo-Lockeans, however, Humean conservatives do not see classically liberal property 
rights as protecting the pre-institutional moral entitlements of property owners.  Friedrich Hayek 
and James Buchanan are leading representatives of the conservative Humean tradition.134  They 
each follow Hume in his emphasis on formal rules of justice and his lack of interest in the 
fairness of initial property entitlements.  However, Buchanan and Hayek were not minimal state 
libertarians who believed that government should be the smallest size necessary to maintain 
social order.  They each believed the state justified in providing various non-essential public 
goods as well as some form of social insurance.  Although neither endorsed Rawls’ difference 
principle, Hayek and Buchanan each indicated sympathy for aspects of Rawls’ A Theory of 
Justice.  Hayek believed that Rawls’ emphasis on procedural fairness avoided the dangers posed 
                                                        
132 There is a sense in which Humean theories are unquestionably small “c” conservative: existing 
property conventions are entitled to deference on account of the advantages of stability.  However, this 
point seems to apply equally well to market socialist arrangements as to “nightwatchman state” property 
regimes.  As I argue in this dissertation, this is an advantage of the theory and not something to apologize 
for. 
133 Rawlsian ideal theory avoids confronting these issues by assuming motivation to comply with 
principles of justice. One result of this is that when reading contemporary political theory, it sometimes 
seems that contemporary “liberals” and “conservatives” (who are often classical liberals) are talking past 
one another because they are addressing different questions, with Rawlsian liberals asking what ends our 
political institutions should pursue and “conservatives” asking how our political institutions should be 
designed in light of the less-than-worthy ends that political actors are likely to pursue in practice. 
134 I believe that Richard Epstein is also best categorized as a conservative Humean despite the Lockean 
gloss that he sometimes gives his theories.  Epstein defends classical liberal principles from a 
consequentialist perspective and is sympathetic to conventionalist accounts of the origin of property 
rights.  See Richard A. Epstein, “Possession as the Root of Title,” Georgia Law Review 13 (1978-1979), 
1221-1243; Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
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by most theories of “social justice.”135  Buchanan initially embraced Rawls’ contractarian 
approach, although his enthusiasm seems to have subsided somewhat in the years following 
publication of A Theory of Justice.136  Hayek and Buchanan both seem motivated by broadly 
consequentialist normative views, albeit not of a standard utilitarian sort.137  They argued that 
classical liberalism is justified by the benefits it provides to the population as a whole and not as 
a way of vindicating the pre-institutional entitlements of the talented or highly productive.  This 
lead both Hayek138 and Buchanan139 to reject the moral desert argument for property rights that is 
                                                        
135 In The Mirage of Social Justice, Hayek emphasized the similarities between his view and Rawls 
making clear that Rawls was not a target of his critique: “[A]fter careful consideration, I have come to the 
conclusion that what I might have to say about John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1972) would not assist 
in the pursuit of my immediate object because the differences between us seemed more verbal than 
substantial.  Though first impressions of readers may be different, Rawls’ statement which I quote later in 
this volume (p. 100) seems to me to show that we agree on what is to me the most essential point.” 
Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), xii-xiii. 
136 See James M. Buchanan, “Rawls on Justice as Fairness,” Public Choice 13, no. 1 (Fall 1972): 123-
128; James M. Buchanan, “A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle” in Freedom 
in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1977), 194-211. 
137 Hayek seems to endorse something like an original position or ex ante decision under uncertainty 
criterion similar to that endorsed by Harsanyi and Rawls. “The conclusion to which our considerations 
lead is thus that we should regard as the most desirable order of society one which we would choose if we 
knew that our initial position in it would be decided purely by chance (such as the fact of our being born 
into a particular family).  Since the attraction such chance would possess for any particular adult 
individual would probably be dependent on the particular skills, capacities and tastes he has already 
acquired, a better way of putting this would be to say that the best society would be that in which we 
would prefer to place our children if we knew that their position in it would be determined by lot.” Hayek, 
Law, Legislation and Liberty: Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, 132. 
138 “It is probably a misfortune that, especially in the USA, popular writers like Samuel Smiles and 
Horatio Alger, and later the sociologist W. G. Sumner, have defended free enterprise on the ground that it 
regularly rewards the deserving, and it bodes ill for the future of the market order that this seems to have 
become the only defence of it which is understood by the general public.  That it has largely become the 
basis of the self-esteem of the businessman often gives him an air of self-righteousness which does not 
make him more popular.” Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, 74. 
139 In reviewing Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Buchanan wrote, “I was somewhat disturbed by the 
widespread reception of Robert Nozick’s much-acclaimed book by the intellectual-academic community 
in the United States.  I was concerned lest Nozick should succeed or appear to succeed in tying together a 
libertarian position with an entitlement theory of distributive justice.  This tie-in, should it be 
accomplished, would discredit, and substantially destroy, the moral appeal of the basic libertarian 
position.”  James M. Buchanan, “The Libertarian Legitimacy of the State” in Freedom in Constitutional 
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central to Nozick’s framework in favor of appeal to various systemic benefits of strong 
protection for private property. 
Although conservative Humeans are the best-known representatives of the Humean 
tradition, Humean insights can be developed in directions more congenial to modern liberalism 
as well.  Humean theories of distributive justice are a peculiar creature.   They are neither what 
Nozick calls patterned theories and so count, on Nozick’s account of distributive justice as 
“historical theories.”  Humean theories do not necessarily condemn redistributive schemes. 
Humean theory is indeed hostile to claims that any particular distribution of property rights is 
morally required.  And it requires deference to existing property entitlements.  But this is 
consistent with robust social insurance, progressive taxation and other programs that may have 
the effect of mitigating inequalities of income or consumption.  A liberal Humean theory begins 
with Humean property rights and goes on to show how policies that bring about more egalitarian 
distributions of income can be justified while still respecting these rights.  
There are several ways for liberal Humeans to argue that a Humean framework is 
consistent with, or even requires, significantly redistributive government policies.  First, the 
Humean emphasis on the importance of long-term mutual advantage might constrain the sort of 
inequality that is possible in a stable property regime.  Property conventions that deny some 
people the possibility of benefiting from property ownership while requiring them to obey rules 
of justice will tend not to be self-enforcing because a significant part of the population will not 
see adherence to property rules as in its long-range self-interest.  This may provide reason to 
reject rules that generate huge structural inequalities such that a significant portion of the 
population does not own property, cannot reasonably aspire to acquire any, and earns only                                                                                                                                                                                   
Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist, (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 
1977), 50-51. 
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enough to meet basic survival needs.  And it serves to rule out types of status inequality that are 
incompatible with a sense of common interest in the stability of a property regime.  Such rules 
may be maintained by force.  But by blocking any appeal to natural rights, Humean theory 
provides little reason to think that massive coercion is justified under normal circumstances.140 
Second, in many circumstances, the long-run interests of the powerful are not well-served 
by widespread poverty.  Large impoverished populations are a drag on economic growth.  
Poverty and low productivity form a vicious cycle: unproductive workers are likely to be poor 
and the poor may be unable to make investments that would make them more productive.  High 
productivity workers, by contrast, benefit their fellow citizens through their increased purchasing 
power, ability to support public goods through higher tax payments, and, under some conditions, 
through returns to scale in combining the labor of high productivity workers.  Improving the 
productivity of poor workers both improves their standard of living and may also allow the 
wealthy to increase their consumption (although as the cost of labor increases, their patterns of 
consumption may change as well).141  Moreover, countries with large masses of poor people are 
less pleasant to live in even for the relatively well off.142  Whatever the benefits of being part of a 
small elite in a poor society, it is almost certainly better to be a wealthy person in an affluent                                                         
140 At minimum, when involuntary redistribution would improve the condition of the propertied by 
creating greater security at less cost, such redistributive measures seem justified according to even the 
more conservative versions of neo-Humean theory.  By contrast, hardline neo-Lockeans such as Nozick 
regard any redistribution beyond basic welfare provisions as unjustified. 
141 Adam Smith pointed out that the rise of commercial relations transformed British society from one in 
which feudal elites spent their wealth on a large number of retainers and dependents to one in which 
aristocrats maintained smaller households but spent more money on luxuries that supported numerous 
independent craftsmen. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
Edwin Cannan ed., (London: Methuen, 1904), Book III, Chap. IV, Para. 1-17.  It is likely that he owes 
this observation to Hume’s History of England.  Andrew Sabl collects a number of the relevant passages 
and observes that this transformation had important political as well as economic implications.  See Sabl, 
Hume’s Politics: Coordination and Crisis in the History of England, 66-68. 
142 Since the end of European colonialism, it has been commonplace for elites from the third world to 
move to the more prosperous countries of the first world, but there is little permanent movement in the 
other direction.  It is also the case that even in rich countries affluent people tend to live in neighborhoods 
with similar types of people and are willing to pay a premium to do so.  
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country.  This suggests that there are usually ways to structure such transfers from rich to poor 
that are mutually beneficial at least when considering the interests of the wealthy over the very 
long run to include those of their descendents.  
The requirement of mutual advantage may be in tension with some of the more libertarian 
versions of neo-Lockean theory.  Although Lockean theory suggests that there is a natural right 
to life-sustaining sustenance, conservative neo-Lockeans take this to mean that provision of 
welfare benefits that are enough to sustain life discharge our duties to provide for the poor.  
Humean logic is somewhat different.  For productive (or potentially productive) members of the 
community, it is in everyone’s long term interest that they have enough resources to meet their 
economic potential.  In poorer countries, this may mean that state intervention is justified in 
order to ensure that the poor have enough food to work effectively.143  In wealthier countries, 
support for the economically disadvantaged may include access to free education and training.  A 
fair amount of such support may be justified as public investment rather than in terms of 
distributive fairness.  Insofar as such resource transfers benefit the public generally, the less 
advantaged may be at a baseline considerably above subsistence before consideration of how to 
divide the cooperative surplus.  
Not all Humean considerations cut in favor of more generous assistance, even on a liberal 
Humean theory. Strong reciprocity as a basis for distributive justice has significant implications 
for welfare and social insurance policies. Welfare payments to able-bodied persons uninterested 
in gainful employment are disfavored.144   Because willingness to help others is partially 
conditional on others’ willingness to make contributions when they are able, programs that                                                         
143 For workers engaged in heavy physical labor this goes far beyond the subsistence minimum. 
144 For a discussion of the implications of strong reciprocity for welfare programs, see Amy Wax, 
“Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes and the Political Economy of 
Welfare Reform,” Law & Contemporary Problems 63, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter/Spring 2000): 257-297. 
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appear to transfer money from workers to people who prefer life on the dole to low wage jobs are 
likely to be politically unsustainable over the long haul.145  There seems some danger of falling 
into a situation characterized both by great inequality in property holdings and corresponding 
inequality in economic contributions.  Under such conditions the haves may be resistant to 
redistribution to the have-nots on the grounds that the have-nots make little contribution to the 
common good.  And this may become a self-validating belief if inadequate public investment 
contributes to the creation of a large, unproductive underclass.146  Hectoring workers to support 
social insurance payments for a largely non-working underclass on egalitarian grounds is likely 
to be ineffective no matter how compelling the case is according to various resource egalitarian 
theories.  Bare wealth transfers to those who make marginal social contributions are far less 
palatable than transfers as part of a genuine scheme of mutual insurance or assistance for those 
plainly unable to provide for themselves. 
So far this argument only suggests that there is a strong case for benefits to the poor that 
go well beyond the subsistence minimum.  Once basic property entitlements and welfare rights 
have been established, we are faced with a bargaining problem over the gains from cooperation.  
As will be argued in Chapter Two, existing property entitlements constrain the options at this 
stage, but still leave some scope for redistributive policies.  In particular, respect for property 
rights requires that most of the economic returns from property ownership go to property 
owners.147  However, at this stage of the analysis, justice as mutual advantage may imply 
outcomes that are more egalitarian than those commonly associated with Humean theory.  Ken                                                         
145 Concern that even the poor make social contributions is hardly limited to affluent capitalist countries.  
It is worth noting that Soviet ideology glorified work and condemned “parasitism”, a label that applied 
both to capitalists and rentiers on the one hand and Soviet citizens unwilling to work on the other.   
146 The recent decline of workforce participation among males of working age with lower levels of 
education is particularly worrisome in this respect.   
147 This constraint is less severe than it sounds.  Even under strongly progressive tax rates, returns to 
property held by the non-wealthy will be taxed at significantly below 50%. 
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Binmore has argued that something akin to Rawlsian substantive principles can be defended 
using a neo-Humean game theoretical conception of justice.148  Binmore’s basic insight is that 
bargains between self-interested parties that maximize relative gains to the least advantaged 
party tend to be uniquely stable because such bargains minimize incentives to undermine the 
agreement in hopes of getting a better deal in the future.149  This has two important implications.  
First, there is reason to expect division of gains from cooperation to provide relatively greater 
benefits to the less advantaged.  Such arrangements may systematically deviate from utilitarian 
prescriptions in an egalitarian direction.  Second, over time, successive renegotiations of the 
social contract in response to new circumstances will distribute benefits widely in order to secure 
agreement.  Each movement to a new equilibrium will involve a different division of the gains so 
that people who received less from the last renegotiation might receive more from the next.  
Third, Humean property rights are consistent with robust social insurance.  Social 
insurance, broadly construed, consists in the pooling of risk so as to mitigate the effects of 
various misfortunes that may befall individuals in the course of their lifetime.  These include 
illness, disability, premature death (i.e. losing one’s parents at a young age), poverty of extreme 
old age (i.e. outliving one’s assets), involuntary unemployment, economic bad luck of various 
kinds, and natural disasters among other misfortunes.  Social insurance includes programs 
explicitly structured as such (i.e. social security and unemployment insurance) as well as various 
programs that are primarily directed at other ends but have a social insurance component as well 
(i.e. income taxation, public education).  Social insurance programs are redistributive ex post 
because they collect taxes from all to pay benefits to the unfortunate.  Ex ante, however, they 
might be in the interest of all because each person receives compensation in the form of                                                         
148 See Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol I: Playing Fair, 43-49. 
149 The technical details differ a bit from Rawls’ minimax principle.  Binmore argues that stable bargains 
are those that minimize the maximum concession relative to a party’s best possible outcome. 
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insurance for the payments that they make in taxes.  Because social insurance schemes involve 
an implicit forced purchase of insurance (whether or not the taxpayer wants it), neo-Lockeans 
sometimes find them objectionable.150  From a Humean perspective, pure social insurance is 
unexceptionable.  Just as people are justly required to respect the property rights of others so that 
all can enjoy the systematic benefits of stable property entitlements, all people may be compelled 
to contribute to a social insurance scheme so that all may enjoy its benefits.151  As noted above, 
both Buchanan and Hayek thought social insurance a legitimate function of government.  In 
practice, pure social insurance is usually combined with some degree of redistribution.  Social 
security, for example, provides benefits for low-income workers that are more generous than 
those that the workers would likely be able to finance if they were to save the money that they 
pay in payroll taxes for retirement.  This contributes to the political stability of redistributive 
measures since (a) the downward redistribution function is disguised to some extent by social 
insurance and (b) even those who do not benefit from downward redistribution feel that they 
have a stake in the continuance of the program.  In Chapter Two, I will argue that moderately 
redistributive social insurance is compatible with respect for property rights.  For now I wish 
only to observe that left Humeans may appeal to social insurance as a way to achieve a more 
egalitarian distribution of income without disrupting existing property entitlements. 
The next two chapters will, among other things, suggests ways in which alteration of 
property entitlements, including redistributive taxation, can be accomplished within a Humean 
framework.  I will argue that fundamental property conventions structure social order in several 
ways.  In Chapter Two I will show, first, that they provide a set of default rights for property                                                         
150 The controversy over the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act is only one such example. 
151 Hume makes clear that the creation of public works and other public goods is among the core 
functions of government because of the role government plays in solving the collective action problem 
inherent in the provision of public goods.  See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, 
Section 7, p. 538-39. 
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owners that apply unless modified by law and second, that the existence of property entitlements 
limits the extent to which the state may tax property owners at least insofar as it is bound to 
respect private property rights.  These limits are consistent, however, with quite redistributive 
social welfare policies including progressive taxation and social insurance.  In Chapter Three I 
argue that although progressive taxes up certain levels are consistent with Humean property 
rights, Humean theory suggests that tax law should respect principles of fairness that require that 
citizens with similar property holdings pay similar tax.  And I will argue against an alternative to 
my theory that purports to show that classical liberalism is to be preferred over the social welfare 
state.   
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CHAPTER II 
PROPERTY AS GOVERNANCE AND WEALTH  
 
 
In Chapter One, I defended Humean theories of property rights at a fairly high level of 
abstraction.  This chapter will examine the structure of property rights in more detail.  It aims 
both to make a contribution to the analysis of property rights and to bolster my overarching 
defense of the Humean approach.  I explore the relationship between property rights conceived 
as allocations of decisional authority (governance) and property rights conceived as allocations 
of consumption possibilities (wealth).152  I will show how the contrast between wealth and 
governance can illuminate the structure of property rights and provide a way to map out certain 
arguments about the value and justification of property rights.  Some theorists suggest that the 
concept of ownership might be divided roughly along the lines of wealth and governance in 
order to reconcile private ownership and distributive justice.  I argue that this is a mistake 
because the dual function of property rights limits the extent to which property rights can be 
fragmented to reconcile commitments to private control and strongly egalitarian theories of 
distributive justice.  However, I also argue against the view that all redistributive taxation 
violates private property rights.  Rather than conceiving of taxes as a means of fragmenting 
ownership, it is more fruitful to analyze the relationship between property ownership and                                                         
152 I will use control and governance interchangeably in this paper.  Control is the standard term, although 
I prefer governance since it highlights the importance of decisional authority as opposed to mere physical 
possession.  
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taxation in terms of choices between alternative bundles of property rights and duties to (a) 
support collective goods and (b) contribute to social insurance.  Conceiving of progressive 
taxation as a tool for risk spreading suggests an attractive middle ground between libertarianism 
and strong forms of egalitarianism that is consist with robust private property rights.  All of these 
arguments are consistent with the Humean theory of property rights defended in Chapter One, 
but do not depend on it.   They illustrate one way of defending the claim made in Chapter One 
that Humean property rights constrain policy choices, while being consistent with both 
conservative and liberal policy preferences and thus support the argument made in that chapter.   
My argument unfolds in several stages.  First, I introduce two theories of the nature of 
property rights.  I argue tentatively in favor of the “exclusionary rights” theory as opposed to the 
“bundle” theory and provide a novel analysis of how attributions of property ownership trigger a 
set of default rules concerning the rights and duties of owners.  Second, I introduce two 
perspectives on property rights: governance and wealth. My argument will proceed by 
considering and rejecting two ways of analyzing of the relationship between governance and 
wealth.  I first consider John Christman’s argument that “control ownership” might be separated 
from “income ownership.”153  I show how it goes astray in analyzing governance and wealth as 
types of rights rather than differing perspectives on the same rights.  A strict separation of 
control rights and income rights will typically require the “control owner” to act as the agent of 
the “income owner”.  This undermines the benefits of “control ownership” for the holder of 
control rights.  Full unbundling of governance interests and wealth interests is not possible.   
                                                        
153 John Christman, The Myth of Property, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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Daniel Attas argues for a position at the opposite extreme: taxation is always an 
infringement on private property rights.154  I show that a strong interpretation of Attas’ argument 
leads to the implausible conclusion that taxes that maximize property values violate property 
rights and that on a weaker interpretation, Attas’ theory lacks the resources necessary to identify 
which taxes violate property rights.  I propose a different way of thinking about the relationship 
between property ownership and taxation.  Rather than viewing taxation as a way of fragmenting 
property ownership, one might conceive of tax obligations as duties that are bundled with 
property rights.  This analysis of property and taxation illuminates how modern tax regimes are 
functionally similar to other sorts of social organization, such as feudal duties, that bundle 
property ownership with duties to maintain political loyalty and to contribute to public goods.    
The result, I will claim, is that property rights significantly constrain tax policy (and thus 
distribution of post-tax income), but there is still considerable scope for redistributive policies 
that are consistent with respect for property rights.  This result will redeem the promissory note 
issued in Chapter I regarding the compatibility of Humean property rights with liberal (in the 
contemporary American sense) policy preferences as well as conservative ones. 
1. PROPERTY RIGHTS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Property can be evaluated on any of three levels: property rights, the interests of right-
holders protected by these rights, and the justification of these rights.  Property rights regulate 
access to resources.  Access to resources may be regulated either by laws or by social norms.  
Although the institutional structure (or lack thereof) differs in each case, the functional role of 
property rights is the same in both cases since either social morality or law can coordinate 
behavior and expectations across people with disparate beliefs and aims.  Because property rights                                                         
154 Daniel Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan. 2006): 119–
149. 
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coordinate the actions of all of the people who are potential users of a valuable resources, 
property rights differ from rules that might function as elements of a purely personal moral code 
that may be successfully followed regardless of the behavior of others: e.g., ‘don’t waste one’s 
talents,’ ‘don’t deceive oneself into believing pleasant falsehoods,’ ‘don’t eat meat,’ etc.  
Property rights do not serve their purpose unless they govern the behavior of groups of people.   
At a very general level, a property right protects an owner’s interest in using her property 
by permitting her to determine if and how others may access it.  It is sometimes possible to 
justify a person’s property rights in terms of these interests.  However, this approach fits uneasily 
with property rights for several reasons.  First, the interests at stake may be interests of those 
other than the right-holders (i.e. property rights in trust property protect the interest of the 
beneficiary rather than the trustee).  Second, the justification of a particular property right often 
depends on systemic effects.  For example, privatization as a solution to a tragedy of the 
commons may provide large benefits even to those who do not receive a property interest by 
preserving a common pool resource that would otherwise soon be exhausted.  One might manage 
a fishery by giving certain people tradable rights to catch a certain number of fish.  Here, the 
proprietary right to fish protects a fisherman’s interest in catching fish.  The rationale for 
granting the right, however, may have nothing to do with protecting the interests of the 
individual fishers granted rights (for one thing, depending on a fisherman’s discount rate and 
likely retirement age, a particular fisherman may do better in an unregulated open access 
regime).   Instead, the justification of this sort of right is based on the interest of the public or of 
future fisherman in preserving the fishery for future use.  Whether a particular property right is 
justified depends, at least in part, on whether the set of fully specified property rights to which it 
belongs is justified.  I’ll call a set of property rules, whether found in social morality or law, a 
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property regime.155  Holistic justification of property rights on the level of property rights 
regimes is the dominant approach in twentieth century political philosophy. 
I will turn to the interests protected by property rights in the latter part of this chapter.  
But first I will discuss the nature of property rights themselves.  Legal theorists are divided as to 
whether property is best conceived of as a “bundle of rights”, or as being a normative relation 
characterized by an owner’s right to exclude others from the use of a particular resource.156  
Although the proper analysis of property rights is an analytic question on its face, in practice the 
matter tends to be rather ideologically charged.  The “right to exclude” conception of property is 
historically associated with classical liberalism, although its pedigree is even older than that.157  
Something like this view was probably the dominant one in the Anglophone world until the late 
nineteenth century.158  The core insight that property rights are exclusionary rights is an 
appealing one insofar as it identifies a feature that unifies property relations and distinguishes 
them from other kinds of rights. 
The main rival of this conception portrays property as a “bundle of rights.”  The basic 
idea is that property ownership consists of a collection of discrete rights that may (subject to 
certain limitations) take any number of forms.  A person who owns land in fee simple absolute 
(the most extensive form of land ownership in common law jurisdictions) may grant one person 
the right to extract sub-soil resources, another person the right to walk across her land (an 
                                                        
155 J. W. Harris refers to these as “property institutions.”  See J. W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1996).  I use the term property regime to emphasize that I 
mean merely a collection of norms that may or may not have any formal institutional manifestation.  A 
“primitive” society could have a complex and sophisticated set of property rules without formal legal 
institutions.   
156 Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, “Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to a Property 
Symposium,” Econ Journal Watch 8, no. 3 (2011), 193. 
157 For a history of the debate see Jane Baron, “Rescuing the Bundle of Rights Metaphor in Private Law”, 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 82, no. 82 (2014), 62-67. 
158 Klein & Robinson, “Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to a Property Symposium,” 195.  
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easement) and a third the right to occupy the land for a term of one year (a lease).  Just as the 
owner may give different “sticks” to different people, these “sticks” may be reassembled by, e.g., 
letting the lease expire and buying back the easement and sub-soil rights, so that the owner has 
the full “bundle of sticks” again.  The “bundle” conception is sometimes made more precise by 
appealing to a collection of incidents of ownership.  The classic exposition is Anthony Honoré’s.  
Honoré defines ownership as “the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of 
law recognizes.”159  According to Honoré, the liberal conception of ownership includes the 
following incidents: (1) the right to possess, (2) the right to use, (3) the right to manage, (4) the 
right to income, (5) the right to capital, (6) the right to security, (7) the incident of 
transmissibility, (8) the incident of absence of term, (9) the prohibition of harmful use, (10) 
liability to execution.160  Obviously, this is a rather heterogeneous list that includes duties and 
liabilities as well as rights.  The basic idea behind the bundle theory is that the incidents of 
ownership may be fragmented or combined in various ways.  Some of the individual incidents – 
e.g. the right to use – can be further divided in numerous ways.  Full liberal ownership –
concentration of all incidents in unlimited form in the hands of one party – is relatively unusual.   
Property owners may decide to fragment property rights for various reasons and government 
often restrict various incidents of ownership leaving the property owner with less than the full 
“bundle of sticks.”  The “bundle of rights” conception of property rights was enthusiastically 
embraced by progressives in the twentieth century who wished to diminish the normative 
significance of property so as to finesse the conflict between property rights and the modern 
regulatory state.161  This position is sometimes carried so far as to deny that property has a                                                         
159 A. M. Honoré, “Ownership” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, A. G. Guest, ed., (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 108 
160 Honoré, “Ownership,” 112-124. 
161 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, “Making Coasean Property More Coasean,” Journal of 
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substantive role to play in political philosophy because it lacks any determinant structure.  One 
oft-cited article in this tradition even argued that property has “cease[d] to be an important 
category in legal and political theory.”162 
Although the “bundle of rights” view was dominant for much of twentieth century, the 
legal philosopher James Penner and legal theorists Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have 
rehabilitated “right to exclude” conception of property rights in the past fifteen years.163  Penner 
defines a property right as “the right to determine the use or disposition of a separable thing (i.e. 
a thing whose contingent association with any particular person is essentially impersonal and so 
imports nothing of normative consequence), in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others 
excluding themselves from it, and includes the rights to abandon it, to share it, to license it to 
others (either exclusively or not), and to give it to others in its entirety.”164  There is a lot packed 
into this definition.  The reference to “separable things” is intended to exclude rights to bodily 
integrity and the like from the scope of property rights as “non-separable” rights.165  Although a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Law and Economics 54, no. S4, (2011), S77-S104. These inclinations are not universal.  Some classical 
liberals, such as Richard Epstein, favor the bundle view while some progressives favor the right to 
exclude view.  On Epstein’s view, the bundle model illustrates that any restriction on an owner’s property 
rights are a prima facie taking – not merely physical invasion and other violations of the right to exclude. 
162 Thomas C. Grey, “The Disintegration of Property” in Property, J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., (New York: New York University Press, 1980): 69-86, 81. 
163 James E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Thomas 
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, “What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?” Yale Law Journal 
111, no. 2 (2001), 357-398; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law 
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,” Yale Law Journal 110, no. 1 (2000), 1-70; Thomas W. 
Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude,” Nebraska Law Review 77, (1998), 730-755. 
164 Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, 152. 
165 This way of delineating property rights can be traced to Hume: “There are three different species of 
goods, which we are possess’d of; the internal satisfaction of our minds, the external advantages of our 
body, and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir’d by our industry and good fortune.   We 
are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first.  The second may be ravish’d from us, but can be of no 
advantage to him who deprives us of them.  The last only are both expos’d to the violence of others, and 
may be transferr’d without suffering any loss or alternation; while at the same time, there is not a 
sufficient quantity of them to supply every one’s desires and necessities.  As the improvement, therefore, 
of these goods is the chief advantage of society, so the instability of their possession, along with their 
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person can transfer the right to do certain things to their body to another person, this is not 
biologically possible with respect to mental sensations or mental control over bodily actions.  A 
person’s relationship to their own body may be damaged (i.e. by maiming them) but cannot be 
transferred to another.  The human body might (in certain morally depraved legal systems) be 
treated as an object of property like any other physical object.166  But there is no way for another 
person to have mental access to another person’s body.  Even forced labor requires that the 
master operate through the will of the laborer using coercive threats since the master cannot 
move the laborer’s limbs directly. 
Penner’s definition is attractive in that it identifies property rights as (a) a distinctive type 
of right that differs from other sorts of legal rights (contractual rights, etc.) and (b) a distinctive 
way to manage access to valuable resources (i.e. by allowing an owner to exclude all others 
rather than specifying in a more fine grained way which persons may use a resource in what 
ways).  Competing theories of property fail to specify a sufficiently narrow domain of rights, 
either by identifying property with all economically valuable entitlements (thereby severing the 
tie with the right to exclude) or by failing to distinguish property from other sorts of rights to 
exclude (for example bodily integrity).  The “right to exclude” conception treats the decision to 
employ property rights as a substantive one: property rights are one of the various possible ways 
of regulating access to valuable resources.  By contrast, theories that treat any right with respect 
to material goods as “property” efface the distinction between using property as a strategy to 
determine the use of resources and using other techniques such as government regulation, open 
access regimes and so forth.                                                                                                                                                                                   
scarcity, is the chief impediment.”  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2, 
p. 487-488. 
166 The term “chattel slavery” is instructive here: chattel is the legal term for property that is a movable 
physical object (as opposed to land or incorporeal intellectual property). 
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Penner’s definition distinguishes full-blooded property rights from proprietary rights and 
contractual rights.  Property rights consist in a power to exclude others from use of a resource 
whereas proprietary rights permit access to a resource without a general power to exclude others.  
Property rights, therefore, give the right holder a special privileged power over an object.  This is 
very different from proprietary rights, which might be held by many persons with respect to an 
object so that each person has the same normative relation to the object.  For example, everyone 
living a village might enjoy a proprietary right (perhaps even transferable) to graze their cattle on 
the town common.  Such a right would not entitle them to exclude others from use of the 
common – this right might be retained by the village as a collective body – or to engage in some 
other activity, growing tomatoes for example, on the town common.  Contractual rights allow 
parties to transfer control over a resource in exchange for something of value.  They differ from 
property rights in several ways.  First, contractual rights are (for the most part)167 enforceable 
only against parties to a contract whereas property rights are enforceable against the world.  This 
is sometimes expressed as the distinction between in personem rights and in rem rights.  Second, 
property rights have relatively standardized legal forms.  Attempts to create legal rights that do 
not have one of the standardized forms are invalid.  Contractual rights, by contrast, can have 
almost any form whatsoever. The presumption is that one may create contractual rights that take 
any form not prohibited by law (i.e. selling oneself into slavery, creating contractual obligations 
to commit crimes, etc.) whereas property rights are usually invalid unless they take one of the 
specific forms permitted by law.  Third, contracts often take property or proprietary rights as 
their objects and in such cases the contractual rights rely on preexisting property or proprietary 
rights.                                                         
167 There are some narrow cases in which contractual rights may be enforced against third parties who 
interfere with contractual relations.  This is the tort of tortuous interference with contract. 
  80 
Penner’s work on property rights has led to responses from “bundle theorists” that 
advance more sophisticated versions of the bundle model.168  Engaging directly with the latest 
moves in this rather intricate debate would take me too far afield of my real object in this 
work.169 While I believe that the Humean theory of property most naturally supports the 
exclusionary rights view, I leave open the possibility that it is consistent with some of the more 
sophisticated versions of “bundle theory.”170 
  The Humean theory of property rights entails that property rights initially take the form 
of exclusionary rights.  Property conventions are only stable when most people can easily 
perceive that their neighbors are following them and thus form expectations of mutual 
compliance.  It is therefore crucial at early stages that property rights are not complex.  Rights of 
exclusive use are easy to respect, easy to monitor and can develop organically out of prudent 
avoidance of conflict.  They are the initial objects of Humean property conventions.  In this way, 
at least, rights of exclusive use have pride of place.  Once basic property conventions are 
established, more complex forms of property relations can be created through legal systems that 
specify rights and duties in a great deal of detail.  Exclusionary rights, however, are still 
important because more complex forms of property relations are built against this background.  
An easement, for example, relaxes the right to exclude by giving certain people (or perhaps any 
member of the public) the right to cross a particular piece of land without permission of the 
owner.  Similarly, land use regulation of various kinds restricts what a landowner may do on her 
land.  But the general presumption is that the owner may do anything consistent with generally                                                         
168 E.g., Stephen R. Munzer, “Property and Disagreement” in Philosophical Foundations of Property 
Law, Henry E. Smith & James Penner, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 289-319. 
169 E.g., James E. Penner, “Potentiality, Actuality and ‘Stick’ Theory,” Econ Journal Watch 8, no. 3 (Sept. 
2011), 274-278; Arthur Ripstein, “Possession and Use” in Philosophical Foundations of Property Law, 
Henry E. Smith & James Penner, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 156-181. 
170 It is also possible that Penner and the bundle theorists are simply working with two distinct concepts 
each of which is useful for certain purposes.   
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applicable laws (i.e. it isn’t legal for private parties to build nuclear bombs regardless of whose 
land they do it on) that is not specifically prohibited.  For non-owners, the presumption is the 
reverse: it is not legal to do anything on another’s land without their permission unless 
specifically permitted by law.  
Exclusionary rights define zones of authority for property owners.  This provides a 
default rule for determining what owners and others may and may not do.  Property rights 
regulate actions by allowing property owners to exclude others from the use of a resource and by 
creating a presumption that an owner may do what she likes with her property insofar as her 
actions are consistent with generally applicable laws and do not invade the property of others.  
For example, blasting activity creating shock waves that damage a neighbor’s buildings is 
presumptively not permissible.  Painting one’s house a particular color, however ugly, is 
presumptively permissible.  These default rules are not, of course, always appropriate.  In such 
cases they might be amended to permit or prohibit certain activities that violate the logic of 
exclusionary rights.  Zoning regulations, for instance, sometimes regulate the ways in which it is 
permissible to paint one’s own house because even though ugly houses do not violate anyone’s 
property rights, neighbors whose views might be spoiled may have a stronger interest in the color 
of a house than its owner does.  Moreover, the owner’s real interest in an ugly paint job might be 
to spite their neighbors.  A great deal of zoning, environmental and other regulation limits the 
ways in which property owners may use their property.  These regulations, however, carve out 
exceptions against the background default rule of exclusive use. 
The notion that property ownership creates a set of default rules is a somewhat 
unorthodox one.171  Christina Bicchieri’s theory of social norms provides a useful framework for                                                         
171 In particular, property theorists tend to be divided into those who think that property ownership has 
strong (non-default) normative implications and those who think that property ownership has no 
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this claim.  Bicchieri argues that many social norms are embedded in schemata.  Schemata “are 
cognitive structures that represent stored knowledge about people, events, and roles.”172  They 
represent general knowledge that may be applied in a range of concrete circumstances.  For 
example, the buying schema has variables such as buyer, seller, money, merchandise, bargaining 
and so forth that may be represented by different elements in different situations.  Schemata 
contain scripts that specify roles as well as permissible and required actions tied to these roles in 
a given situation type.  Bargaining, for example, is permissible for buyers in the buying schema 
applicable to open air markets in most countries.  Turning merchandise over to the buyer upon 
payment is a required action for sellers in this schema.  When people encounter a new situation, 
they compare it (usually subconsciously) to familiar situation types.  If the new situation seems 
similar to a prior situation that is associated with a schema, the schema and its scripts are 
activated.  Activation of a schema and its scripts triggers the norms embedded in them and thus 
influences a person’s behavior and their expectations of others.  Agreement on the applicable 
norms, therefore, requires both a shared schema and a similar interpretation of the situation at 
hand.  Both sorts of mismatches might cause normative disagreement.  People from different 
cultures may disagree on the norms applicable in a given situation even though they agree on the 
relevant non-normative facts because they possess different schemata.173  Two people might also 
disagree on the applicable norms even though the share the relevant schemata because they 
interpret a set of facts differently and so apply different schemata.  Since people are apt to be at 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
determinant content until some bundle of rights has been specified.  Henry Smith’s emphasis on the 
information cost advantages of property rights is an exception; this section is influenced by his general 
approach. 
172 Christina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 93. 
173 Not all such conflicts are necessarily hostile.  Travelers in places with especially strong guest host 
norms may be pleasantly surprised by the generosity of the locals.  Similarly, people from places without 
strong norms of honest dealing in business with strangers may be pleasantly surprised by the moral 
probity of their business associates in places with stronger norms of commercial honesty. 
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least slightly biased in favor of their own interests, this is especially likely in cases where people 
have conflicting interests.  The possibility of divergent interpretations is even greater when the 
facts themselves are somewhat hazy.   
Bicchieri argues that the contextual relativity of many norms is explained by their status 
as scripts in schemas.  If the relevant schema is activated, people apply the norm.  If not, they do 
not.  This may explain divergent behavior in situations in which there does not appear to be any 
rational explanation for applying the norm in one case but not the other.  For example, one might 
explain a range of “framing effects” in terms of the activation of different scripts based on 
different contextual cues.  Some framing effects might, therefore, not simply be irrational 
psychological quirks but instead reflect the application of a store of past experiences about the 
sorts of situational facts that make it more likely that one schema rather than other will be 
applicable.  Conversation can help both to increase agreement on the sort of norms applicable in 
a given situation and increase trust that others will act according to these norms.  Bicchieri 
believes that her theory can explain why letting people converse in laboratory experiments 
involving public goods games increases cooperative behavior even when there is no way to 
punish non-cooperators.174  Standard rational choice theory suggests, by contrast, that such so-
called “cheap talk” should have no influence on subsequent behavior. 
Property rights are elements in a great range of schemata.  These include contractual or 
trade norms, norms of gift exchange, norms governing contributions to public goods, norms 
governing fair division of gains from a common enterprise, norms concerning damage to 
property, guest-host norms, friendship norms and so on.  This has several implications.  First, 
some of these schemata require a relatively determinate answer to the question of who plays the 
role of property owner in order for a person to determine how to apply the schemata.  If property                                                         
174 Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society, 98-99. 
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is merely a bundle of rights and property ownership has no characteristic form, then it is difficult 
to see how attributions of property ownership can play the role that they do in various schemata.  
The “right to exclude” theory emphasizes that property rights are held by the party with the right 
to exclude others from use of an object.  This role is something like an office.175  Any competent 
legal person is eligible to fill it.  For some objects, the “office” may be unoccupied in which case 
the object is not owned.  The “office” can also be temporally filled by another – for example, a 
tenant – if the owner so chooses.  Alternately, operational control may be delegated to managers 
who are authorized to make decisions for the owner.  Regardless of the internal structure of 
ownership, knowledge that an object is owned by someone activates various scripts: we may 
infer that we need the owner’s (or their agent’s) permission to use the property, that we should 
pay damages if we damage the property, and so on.  The internal modularity of property 
ownership (the ability to reconfigure ownership interests) is often irrelevant to third parties once 
they have determined that someone else owns the property.  All that is necessary is to identify an 
object and a person or entity with exclusionary rights over it. 
Property schemata play an important role in allowing inferences about property rights in 
factually novel situations.  Schemata often license inferences from ownership to various rights 
and duties of the owner.  As is suggested by the “right to exclude” theory, exclusive use 
functions as a sort of default rule.  If I know that John owns a plot of land, I may infer that I may 
not walk across it without his permission, that he may build a house on it if he likes and that he 
may sell it or give it to Sally if he so chooses.  Any of these inferences could turn out to be false.  
It could be that there is a public easement that allows me to walk across John’s property.  It could 
be that John’s deed forbids him from building a house or that John holds his property through                                                         
175 See Christopher Essert, “The Office of Ownership,” University of Toronto Law Journal 63, no. 3 
(2013), 418-461. 
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some sort of an irrevocable trust that prevents him from selling it to Sally.  But the default rule 
allows someone to make the correct inference in the vast majority of cases.  In high stakes cases 
it usually makes sense to consult legal materials to determine the precise content of legal rights 
and duties.  But in low stakes cases, people often act according to inferences from the default 
rules. In practice, rights of exclusive use are often relaxed either by limiting the right to exclude 
(for example, public accommodations law or right to roam laws) or by restricting otherwise 
lawful uses (for example, zoning and other land use laws).  However, the fairly detailed set of 
default rules provided by concept of ownership facilitates cooperation by allowing people to 
coordinate their actions based on very limited information. 
In cases where schemata are applied to familiar fact patterns, proponents of the bundle 
theory can explain rights in terms of their preferred theory.  Given knowledge that someone is 
the owner of an object, we might infer that they possess any of the rights commonly found in the 
bundle – for example, the right to exclude or the right to alienate for consideration.  The “right to 
exclude” theory, however, does better in explaining shared intuitions about novel fact patterns.  
Suppose a tornado hits town, lifts a container of toxic chemicals high in the air and deposits them 
in an unsightly pool on John Dow’s front yard.  The chemicals are in no danger of leeching into 
the soil of neighboring plots but they do give rise to noxious vapors that waft around the 
neighborhood.  Although nobody in the neighborhood is likely to have encountered this situation 
before, they are likely to converge on the judgment that Dow is responsible for cleaning up this 
mess.176  Landowners are responsible for keeping their property in a condition that is not 
dangerous for the neighbors even if the danger is the result of an act of God.  In Bicchieri’s 
terms, the presence of the toxic chemical triggers a “dangerous conditions” script that licenses                                                         
176 He might ask for help from the owner of the chemicals if they can be identified and located, but that is 
up to him. 
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the inference that the owner is responsible.  This is likely to be the case even if similar situations 
in the past have involved cases in which the owner bears some responsibility for the presence of 
the dangerous condition (such as operating a business that uses toxic chemicals) and are 
therefore easily distinguishable from dangerous conditions caused by acts of God. 
Scripts containing property norms will not resolve all novel situations.  Suppose John 
Dow does nothing about the toxic chemicals.  May his neighbor, Joan DuPont, enter his property 
to remove the toxic chemicals?  This is a harder question.  On the one hand, Joan is generally not 
permitted to enter John’s property and interfere with things on it without his permission.  But 
perhaps he forfeits the right to exclude for these purposes by failing to remediate dangerous 
conditions.  In such cases, there may be no convergence of intuitions and the community will 
need to turn to some authoritative source of property rules – such as a legal system – in order to 
resolve the dispute. Property norms therefore have a somewhat open texture – some questions 
are settled by ownership attributions and default rules in the absence of a legal rule to the 
contrary, but others are indeterminate in the absence of formal laws or legal precedents.  
Philosophical debates over the normative significance of ownership illustrate the virtues 
of the default rule view.  Analyzing property rights in terms of permissible uses of resources 
wildly underdetermines the resolution of “conflicting” uses.  Although the exclusion view leaves 
a wide range of cases – those of unintended harms or accidents – to be resolved by tort law or 
some other form of regulation, exclusionary rights explain why, in cases of foreseeable harm, 
one owner’s right not to have their property harmed typically trumps another owner’s supposed 
right to use their property as they see fit.  Defenders of Lockean property rights sometimes 
attempt to derive the content of property rights by defining ownership as the broadest set of 
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rights over an object compatible with similar rights for other property owners.177  If rights are 
specified on the level of use rather than exclusion, this standard is too indeterminate.  Should I be 
permitted to use my hammer to smash your car?  Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael 
Otsuka claim that this use of a hammer is inconsistent with others’ ability to enjoy equal rights 
over their property.178  But this conclusion is too hasty.  There are at least two formally 
equivalent sets of equal maximal property rights.  Under one set of rights, I may smash your car 
with my hammer and you may run over my hammer with your car.   Under another set, I may not 
smash your car and you may not run over my hammer.  Both sets of rules treat each property 
owner symmetrically even though they have opposite implications in this case.  One set of rights 
is not “logically stronger” than the other because each includes a right that the other does not.179  
Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka claim that the latter case involves security 
rights in addition to use rights where as the former case involves only use rights.  But this 
conclusion depends on the way in which they individuate rights.  They lump all uses of an object 
into the category of “use rights” even when the “use rights” are actually more extensive in the 
case in which car smashing is permitted than when it is not.  If one chooses a way to categorize 
rights that does not elide this difference, the argument collapses.  If, instead, we call the right to 
smash your car with my hammer an “invasion right”, then our choice is between “use rights +                                                         
177 “There is nothing magical about full ownership. It is simply (roughly) the logically strongest set of 
ownership rights over a thing that a person can have compatibly with others having such rights over 
everything else.” Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, & Michael Otsuka, “Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not 
Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005), 
204. 
178 This example in drawn from an exchange between Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael 
Otsuka, who defend left-libertarianism and Barbara Fried who critiques it.  Vallentyne, Steiner, & Otsuka, 
“Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried,” 206. 
179 Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka, define “full self-ownership [as] the logically 
strongest set of ownership rights that one can have over one’s person that is compatible with someone 
else having the same kind of ownership rights over everything else in the world. Here and throughout, we 
take one set of rights to be logically stronger than another set if and only if the first contains all the rights 
of the second plus some additional ones.” Vallentyne, Steiner, & Otsuka, “Why Left-Libertarianism Is 
Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried,” 205. 
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security rights” and “use rights + invasion rights”.  Neither package of rights is logically stronger 
than the other.  There are usually very good reasons to prioritize the right of owners not to have 
their property smashed over the rights of others to use their property for smashing other people’s 
objects.  But this cannot result cannot be derived from the formal properties of “bundles of 
rights.” 
 In her critique of left-libertarianism, Barbara Fried argues that the concept of ownership 
is insufficient to resolve questions about conflicting uses.180  As far as Peter Vallentyne, Hillel 
Steiner, and Michael Otsuka’s theory goes, this seems correct.  However, Fried moves too 
quickly to the conclusion that the only alternative way to determine what belongs in the bundle 
of rights is to use some form of normative analysis (she prefers utilitarianism).  The “right to 
exclude” theory of property can explain some common intuitions about the implications of 
property ownership without sophisticated normative analysis.  The right to exclude others is the 
default rule for privately owned objects.  Furthermore, a landowner gets some latitude to 
determine what others may do with their chattels on the landowner’s property.  In the car / 
hammer case, this means that if the conflict happens on a public road, a local government sets 
the ground rules: not only is it illegal to smash cars, hammer owners must also keep their 
property off the roadway where it might be hit by a moving vehicle.  Where no rule is specified, 
the default is that one may not use one’s property to physically invade the property of others 
because this violates the other’s “right to exclude.”  The key move is to recognize that not all 
“property rights” are on a par.  The core of property is “exclusion” rather than “use” and so one 
owner’s right to exclude injurious “uses” trumps another’s supposed right to use their property as                                                         
180 Barbara Fried, “Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32, no. 1 (2004), 
66-92.  Fried diagnosis of what goes wrong is somewhat different than mine, but I agree with her 
overarching point that the left-libertarian project of deriving substantive normative conclusions from the 
concept of “self-ownership” leads down a blind allay. 
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they see fit.   This rule is sometimes relaxed when there are strong reasons to do so. And it leaves 
open to question what to do when the invasion of another’s property is not intentional (or at least 
grossly negligent) but rather the result of an accident or genuine mistake.  In both cases, Fried’s 
preferred cost-benefit analysis may play an important role.  In any event, one may be skeptical 
that conceptual analysis of “ownership” settles controversial questions in political philosophy 
without thinking that property ownership has no content until all of the rights in the “bundle” are 
determined on the basis of some extrinsic normative theory. 
This analysis is not likely to satisfy either side of the ‘left-libertarian’ debate.  Vallentyne, 
Steiner, and Otsuka wish to use the concept of full ownership in order to argue that workers have 
the right to be compensated for the full value of their labor.  The “right to exclude” theory, 
however, is inapt for theories of “self-ownership” because although one may exclude others from 
the use of material resources, objects of intellectual property or even financial instruments, 
human labor itself is not a possible object of exclusion.  Since only I have privileged control over 
my body, nobody can cause me to perform bodily actions in the same way that I can (i.e. through 
mental control).  By contrast, material objects, ideas, and financial instruments can be used by 
one person as well as another. Nor does it help to claim that self-ownership amounts to a right to 
exclude others from enjoying the benefits of one’s labor without one’s permission.  There is and 
cannot be any such general right.  Building a landmark work of modern art on my property does 
not give me the right to collect money from my neighbors even if they greatly enjoy the fruits of 
my labor (and even if they financially benefit from their land’s increased value).  And if another 
neighbor is inspired by my creation and influenced by it when they redesign their own home, I 
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am not likely to be able to collect anything from them.181  The relevant category when it comes 
to ownership over the value of one’s labor is not property, but rather contract and the appropriate 
normative claim is one of freedom of contract rather than self-ownership.  A contractual right 
may become a kind of property (for example, a transferable right to payment), but analyzing the 
concept of property will not help build a theory of freedom of contract for workers.182 
Fried, however, appears to adopt the “bundle theory” in part out of commitment to the 
realist proposition that property rights have no determinate form and thus their content must be 
filled using normative analysis.  This commitment makes her hostile to formalistic accounts of 
property rights (even only moderately formalistic ones) such as the one outlined above.  But if 
the foregoing argument is correct, viewing property rights as establishing a set of default rules is 
consistent with believing that it is relatively unproblematic to violate these defaults when there is 
a good reason for doing so.  Altering default rules raises information costs since the default rules 
are widely known and easy to apply whereas the non-default rule must be learned by all 
interested parties.183  So there is a case for erring on the side of maintaining simple exclusionary 
rights when other considerations do not provide decisive reason for changing them.  There is no 
conflict between the “right to exclude” theory, rightly understood, and sophisticated 
consequentialist analysis of the rights and duties of property owners. 
2. TWO FACES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
                                                        
181 The forms of intellectual property—patent, copyright and trademark—cover only a small subset of the 
range of ideas that may be used by others.  A legal system that gave people the right to secure all revenue 
created from their ideas would create legal gridlock. 
182 It is, perhaps, suggestive that employment law diverges from contract law in a whole host of ways that 
for the most part restrict what employers and employees may agree to.  In practice, then, the law takes 
neither property nor contract as a model for employment relations. 
183 For an influential analysis of property rights in terms of information costs, see Henry E. Smith, 
“Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights,” Journal of Legal 
Studies 31, (2002), S453-S487. 
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In this section, I will explore how property rights simultaneously divide spheres of 
control and delineate wealth entitlements.  Property rights provide an answer to two different 
questions about social organization: (A) Who is authorized to make what decisions with respect 
to which resources? and (B) How are the benefits and burdens of resource management, use, and 
consumption to be divided among people?  I will call the former the governance question.  It is a 
matter of division of spheres of authority.  One way to divide such authority is to give certain 
people (owners) exclusive rights to make certain sorts of decisions about how a resource is to be 
used (or not used) – private property.  Another way is for the state to determine how a resource is 
to be used and by whom – public property.  A third is to permit everyone to use a resource in a 
particular way and forbid anyone from excluding others – open access property.  From the 
governance perspective, property rights serve to specify who has decisional authority with 
respect to an object and the extent of this decisional authority.  The package of rights enjoyed by 
an owner of private property determines the decisional authority of the owner.  Likewise, public 
property and open access property require rules concerning who may make what decisions with 
respect to property.   
The second question, I will call the wealth question.  It concerns the share of value 
derived from external objects enjoyed by each citizen.  One might consider questions of wealth 
distribution from the perspective of the economy as a whole or with respect to a single resource.  
Wealth should be understood capaciously as the ability to realize value from objects of a type 
that could be the object of property rights184 and stores of such value (i.e. money and other 
                                                        
184 This qualification is meant to exclude sources of value that are not separable from an individual, such 
as their subjective experiences, thoughts, feelings and the like.  Although subjective experiences can be 
affected by changes in wealth distribution, they are not themselves transferable objects of value.  I cannot 
sell or give to you as a gift my enjoyment of Bach’s music.  “Human capital” also does not constitute 
property-based wealth on this account since it is not an object of property rules under political systems 
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financial assets).  It includes not only the ability to exchange property for value but also the value 
of using or consuming property.  A complete set of property and proprietary rights will 
determine for each person their share of privately held wealth – at least at a single point in time.  
Other areas of private law are concerned with the rules that license transfers of property rights – 
contracts, wills, trusts and estates.  Such rules determine permissible and impermissible ways of 
altering wealth entitlements. 
Except with respect to liquid financial assets (money, publicly traded stocks and bonds 
and other readily monetizable financial assets), property rights do not directly determine wealth 
entitlements.  Rather, property rights structure decisional authority.  Wealth is a function of the 
access to resources enabled by the property rights and the underlying value of these resources.  
One’s wealth might change for one of two reasons – either because one’s rights have changed or 
because the resources to which they give access change in value.  A full ownership interest 
exposes the owner to full upside and downside risk: the entitlement tracks the future value of the 
property perfectly.  However, it is possible to fragment wealth interests so that more than one 
person is exposed to such risk.  An owner might transfer downside risk by purchasing an option 
to sell at a certain price at a certain time in the future.  Or the owner might sell some of the 
upside by selling the right to purchase at a given price in the future. 
Governance interests and wealth interests, although distinct, are causally linked.  
Consider a plot of farmland located by an agricultural village.  One might divide the land into 
individual plots, each owned by a villager, or leave the plot as a whole to be managed 
collectively by the village.  From the perspective of wealth, one might compare the two 
alternatives in terms of the market value of each villager’s rights.  A villager’s right to participate                                                                                                                                                                                   
that forbid slavery.  Of course, the various abilities that constitute “human capital” might affect one’s 
ability to realize value from objects of property, so the value of these two kinds of assets is related. 
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in collective ownership might be more or less valuable than private property rights over a single 
plot or vice versa.  This would largely depend on the relative efficiencies of collective and 
individual management of the land and on the insurance value of collective ownership.  From the 
perspective of governance, collective and individual ownership implicate different sorts of value.  
Individual ownership might better protect individual autonomy since the owner is able to make 
unilateral decisions without permission from the rest of the village.  On the other hand, some 
people might find the ability to participate in collective governance with one’s neighbors 
intrinsically valuable.  If most would-be buyers find individual ownership intrinsically appealing 
and collective governance distasteful, this will increase the market value of private property 
rights and thus increase the wealth of private plots owners relative to holders of rights in 
collective property.185 
Wealth and governance represent two different ways of evaluating the interests protected 
by property rights.  In archetypal cases of private ownership, where an owner enjoys a complete 
right to exclude and a right of use consistent with generally applicable laws, the same property 
right protects both sorts of interests.  The right to exclude protects the owner’s governance 
interests directly by making authoritative the owner’s decisions with respect to her property and 
protects wealth interests indirectly.  The congruence of governance and wealth interests is 
characteristic of full ownership.186  But the two sorts of interests can be divided with respect to a 
                                                        
185 A right holder’s tastes might differ from those of most potential buyers.  That potential buyers would 
pay more for one’s right if one wished to sell increases one’s consumption possibilities.  However, if one 
does not want to sell, this increase in one’s wealth might not further one’s interests.   
186 It is interesting to note that governance and wealth correspond to the two categories of per se 
regulatory takings in U.S. constitutional law.  The first type of per se taking – physical invasion – 
represents a flagrant affront to governance interests.  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).  The second type of per se taking – “denial of all economically beneficial or 
productive use” – represents a near total evisceration of wealth interests.  See Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  Takings doctrine is commonly seen as, at best, a “muddle”.  E.g. 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, “The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the 
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particular object.  A trust is a particularly conspicuous example.  Property rights protecting trust 
property protect the decisional authority of the trustee from interference by third parties.187  But 
the wealth interest protected by these property rights is that of the trust beneficiary.  Property 
held in trust looks like any other property from the outside – third parties are held to the same 
duties to the trustee with respect to the trust property as they would to any other property owner.  
However, the trustee is constrained to act in the interest of the beneficiaries and may be legally 
called to account for failure to do so.  The peculiar duality of trust property is reflected in legal 
procedure.  From the perspective of common law, the trustee is the owner of trust property and 
has full rights of ownership.  Traditionally, beneficiaries could only enforce their claims in 
equity before the Court of Chancery so that the division of legal and beneficial title was reflected 
by a separate set of legal institutions.188 
Separation of ownership and control is now pervasive given the rise of corporate entities 
over the past two centuries.  Corporate executives exercise control over corporate property, but 
the wealth interests protected by these rights are those of shareholders and bondholders.  
Corporate governance is structured differently than trust management.  Corporate officers are 
agents of a legal person, the corporation, which is owned by shareholders.  But with respect to 
corporate property, the separation of governance rights and wealth interests is functionally rather 
similar.189  Although shareholders are formally entitled to supervise executives, in practice, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Takings ‘Muddle’,” Minnesota Law Review 90 (2006), 826; Jane B. Baron, “Winding Toward the Heart 
of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and Public Discourse About Private Property,” Fordham Urban 
Law Journal 34 (2007), 613-655.  My analysis of property in terms of governance and wealth suggests 
that there is some internal logic to takings law.  Takings doctrine may be a bit of a kluge, but it is not, at 
least when it comes to per se takings, a complete muddle. 
187 And in some instances even from interference by beneficiaries! 
188 See E.g., Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 149-150. 
189 As Berle and Means observed: “In this concept, corporation law becomes in substance a branch of the 
law of trusts.  The rules of application are less rigorous, since the business situation demands greater 
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executives at large publicly traded corporations are shielded by the infeasibility of day-to-day 
shareholder oversight, the ease of exit for dissatisfied shareholders by selling one’s shares, and a 
legal regime that insulates plausible business decisions from legal action by aggrieved 
shareholders.190  However, because shareholders are both residual claimants and retain ultimate 
authority over the agents of the corporation, it is proper to consider them, not the corporate 
executives, as the true owners. 
Less commonly, an owner may retain legal title and thus governance rights over property 
while alienating the right to receive income.  A securitization of future payments works in more 
or less this fashion.  An owner of some asset sells the right to future income from the asset to 
another party while retaining title to the asset.  Securitization agreements typically contain 
significant restrictions on the rights of owners so as to mitigate the principal-agent problem 
inherent in dividing governance and wealth interests in this way.  In an extreme case, however, 
the securitization scheme may achieve a division of governance and wealth interests similar to 
that of a trust or a public corporation.  The form of the arrangement is the inverse of that of the 
corporation – formal ownership is retained by the party with control rights while the party with 
the primary wealth interest is neither the residual claimant nor exercises general supervisory 
authority over those in control of the property.  Division of governance and wealth interests 
always creates the potential for a principal-agent problem and so the possessor of control rights 
over an object of property must be constrained in some way in order to protect wealth interests.  
This makes complex forms of property interests cumbersome and partially explains why the                                                                                                                                                                                   
flexibility than the trust situation.  Probably the requirements as to motive and clean-mindedness on the 
part of the persons exercising the powers are substantially similar.”  Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C. 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The MacMillan Company, rev. ed. 
1968), 242.   
190 The “business judgment rule” shields corporate executives from personal liability for any decision 
(even misguided decisions that harm corporate interests) so long as it was motivated by some plausible 
concern with corporate interests. 
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common law expresses a preference for full ownership even though it permits certain forms of 
divided ownership.191 
Although my primary aim in this chapter is to explore alternative ways of conceiving of 
the relationship between property rights and taxation, it is worth briefly exploring how the 
distinction between governance and wealth illuminates larger debates in political philosophy.  
Governance and wealth perspectives represent alternative ways of conceiving of the value of 
choice.  Governance interests concern our interest in the process of choice.  Wealth interests 
concern our interest in the objects of choice.  The dominant contemporary trend is to treat 
consumption possibilities as the central normative concern.  This approach is shared by most 
egalitarian theories of distributive justice192 and by economists who analyze institutions from the 
point of view of wealth maximizing or, more plausibly, welfare maximization.193  The key 
commonality between the two approaches is that allocations of decisional authority are taken as 
instrumental to some end specified in terms of wealth interests.  For example, scholarship in ‘law 
and economics’ (which is currently the dominant approach to private law in American legal 
academia) typically takes wealth maximization as the goal and proscribes governance structures 
according to what will maximize wealth.  A maximally efficient property rights regime is one in 
which the allocation of property rights minimizes the sum of net negative externalities and 
transaction costs.   Although Rawlsians may aim at different ends, much Rawlsian political 
philosophy is no less instrumentalist in its approach to property rights. 
                                                        
191 Common law doctrines such as the doctrine of worthier title and the rule against perpetuities serve to 
reunite fragmented ownership interests into a fee simple (the standard common law form of full 
ownership). 
192 What exactly the object of egalitarian distribution should be is, of course, a hotly debated question as 
testified to by the voluminous ‘equality of what’ literature. 
193 The more plausible versions of the former suggest that wealth is a rough proxy for welfare.  The 
empirical plausibility of this claim is difficult to assess. 
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There is, however, a venerable strand of political theory that takes governance rather than 
wealth to be of foundational normative importance.  This tradition includes those who see private 
property as a potential threat to democratic decision making194 and those who view property 
ownership as valuable as a means of self-governance.  Private property is often thought to 
facilitate autonomy or self-governance by permitting the owner to exercise control over a 
personal sphere.195  The role of private property in protecting personal autonomy is an enduring 
theme in both the Lockean and Kantian traditions of liberalism.  Neo-Lockean liberals Loren 
Lomasky and Eric Mack argue that rights in private property are justified by the role of property 
in furthering the personal projects and ends of the owner.196  The Kantian tradition also treats 
self-governance as of foundational importance in political philosophy.  Kant, Hegel, and Fichte 
argued that private property rights are necessary to provide a sphere of free choice that allows 
owners to carry out plans over time without interference from others.  The purpose of private law 
is, in large part, to define spheres of decisional authority so that individuals can be free and 
autonomous.  Defining spheres of decisional authority will also, of course, entail a particular 
division of wealth.  From this perspective, wealth has a sort of derivative importance, because if 
the objects of my choices (the resources over which I have control) are too limited to sustain me, 
my freedom is dependent on the mercy of my neighbors’.  Some amount of wealth is therefore 
necessary in order for a person to be a self-governing agent. For this reason, Kant believed that a 
                                                        
194 For a recent expression of unease with private ownership because of the ability of private owners to 
undermine democratically determined decisions see Thomas Christiano, “The Uneasy Relationship 
Between Democracy and Capital,” Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (Winter 2010), 195-217. 
195 E.g. “The importance of private property is that it enables us to control how we live.”  John Kekes, 
“The Right to Private Property: A Justification,” Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (Winter 2010), 5. 
196 Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 19-124. Mack argues that “[t]he wrong-making feature of [violations of private property rights] is 
the precluding of the holder from pursuing his own ends through the chosen disposition of his extra-
personal holdings.” Eric Mack, “The Natural Right of Property,” Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (Winter 
2010), 78. 
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system of welfare for the destitute is required in order for a system of private ownership to be 
just.  However, so long as everyone has some minimum level of access to basic necessities, 
inequalities in property holdings are morally permissible.197   
In the next two sections, I will consider two recent attempts to make sense of the 
relationship between governance and wealth in private property.  The first tries to use the 
distinction to argue that wealth entitlements and control rights can be unbundled.  The second 
goes to the other extreme in arguing that the two kinds of interests are so intimately connected 
that taxation is necessarily an infringement on private property.  Both arguments fail because 
they rely too heavily on conceptual analysis of property rights and do not adequately appreciate 
the importance of institutional constraints on the structure of a property rights.  Private 
ownership of valuable assets significantly constrains but does not fully determine possible 
allocations of wealth.198 
3. CHRISTMAN ON “CONTROL RIGHTS” AND “INCOME RIGHTS” 
 In The Myth of Property, John Christman advances a deflationary theory of private 
property that divides property rights into separate bundles of control rights and income rights.  
He aims to expose the “myth of property” by showing the best justifications for granting control 
rights over an object to a person do not entail granting that person income rights as well.  
                                                        
197 See Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
198 My discussion presupposes, without argument, that private ownership of at least some kinds of assets 
is desirable.  To a large extent, economic considerations determine the proper form of governance for an 
asset.  Farmland, is, as a general matter, best left in private hands because of informational and incentive 
problems with public or collective ownership.  By contrast, dividing a navigable river between private 
owners would be foolish because the transaction costs of negotiation with numerous private owners who 
each have the right to block a ship from traveling the length of the river will typically swamp any 
efficiency gains from private management.  It is a complicated question which assets are best managed 
privately and which publicly (i.e. state-owned) or collectively (for example, a customary property regime 
in which a number of parties manage an asset without individual rights of partition or exit).  I presuppose 
only that some valuable assets are best left in private hands. 
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Decoupling control rights from income rights permits allocation of income rights according to 
egalitarian principles of distributive justice.  According to Christman, once the error in thinking 
that income must follow control is revealed, there is no reason to think that private property 
rights stand in the way of constructing social and economic institutions “to ensure that 
individuals’ life prospects truly manifest their equal dignity and equal moral status.”199  
Christman concludes that the “liberal conception of ownership should be discarded as the 
paradigm of individual ownership in any society.”200  Christman’s strategy is defective because it 
distinguishes between what I am calling governance and wealth on the level of rights rather than 
interests.  This approach is unworkable because the same property rights typically have deep 
implications for both governance and wealth. 
According to Christman, property rights can be viewed as “two sets of rights that must be 
considered separately in any evaluation of economic policies for a society.”201  These two 
analytically distinct forms of ownership are “primary functional control” (control ownership) and 
“primary claim to income” (income ownership).202 Christman’s notion of control ownership 
corresponds closely to what I am calling governance.  Control ownership includes “the rights to 
possess, use, manage, modify, alienate, and destroy one’s property.”203  Control ownership 
essentially involves decisional authority over property: “The control-owner of the object 
maintains decision-making authority over the physical state of the item.”204  The right to dispose 
of one’s property by abandonment or gift is a control right but the right to exchange one’s 
                                                        
199 John Christman, The Myth of Property, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 184. 
200 Christman, The Myth of Property, 184. 
201 Christman, The Myth of Property, 7. 
202 Christman, The Myth of Property, 127-28. 
203 Christman, The Myth of Property, 128. 
204 Christman, The Myth of Property, 128. 
  100 
property for something of value is an income ownership right.205  Income ownership is defined as 
“the right to transfer and the right to retain goods received in trade.”206  The problems with this 
analysis are twofold.  First, it is not possible to cleanly separate control ownership from income 
ownership on the level of rights.  The same rights often protect both income and control interests 
to some degree.  Second, to the extent that it is possible to separate income and control rights, 
this separation will usually compromise control or income interests because constraints must be 
placed on the exercise of control rights in order to protect income interests or on income rights in 
order to protect control interests.   
I will consider the second problem first.  It is possible in some sense to separate control 
rights from income rights – the trust and the public corporation more or less accomplish this – 
but it does not follow that one can thereby separate the interests in control and in income that are 
protected by these rights.207  Although the trustee has the right to manage the trust property and 
to exclude others from its use, the trustee has fiduciary duties to exercise these control rights for 
the benefit of the beneficiary.  Likewise, corporate officers and executives control corporate 
property, but they are under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the corporation, 
protecting the “income rights” of shareholders and bondholders.208  This relationship between 
control rights and income rights is not an accidental feature of the situation: to the extent that                                                         
205 Christman, The Myth of Property, 129. 
206 Christman, The Myth of Property, 130. 
207 The distinction that Christman draws can be traced to Berle and Means’ classic discussion of the 
public corporation.  Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (New York: The MacMillan Company, rev. ed., 1968).  Berle and Means observe that the 
modern corporation separates control rights and income rights to an unprecedented degree and that this 
form of ownership differs greatly from the traditional logic of private property in which both sorts of 
rights were vested in a single individual or group.  Berle and Means, do not, however, follow Christman 
in arguing that the interests protected by control and income are fully separable and instead emphasize the 
extent to which corporate property differs from traditional forms of private property. 
208 Because of the need to give decision makers a free hand in business dealings, enforcement of this duty 
is reserved only for egregious breaches.  In practice, stock options and the like are used to “incentivize” 
corporate executives to pursue shareholder interests zealously. 
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beneficiaries and shareholders have “income rights,” it is precisely because those who have 
control rights have a duty to look after beneficiaries’ and shareholders’ economic interests.  The 
obligation to act in the interest of the income owner severely circumscribes the extent to which 
the control owner may realize her interests in exercising control.  If she takes her fiduciary duties 
seriously, a conscientious trustee or corporate executive is simply not free to do what she pleases 
with respect to corporate property in the same way as the owner of private property typically 
is.209  Control rights may have value for such a person in the sense that they are able to control 
their work environment, are not beholden to anyone on a day-to-day basis, and can act on their 
own judgment.  These are not insignificant considerations.  But they differ from the open-ended 
freedom of action protected by private ownership.  Private ownership is often thought to further 
the autonomy interests of the owner precisely because the owner is not accountable to others for 
her decisions with respect to her property.  Separation of ownership and control may therefore 
undermine the control interests of both parties – the trustee possesses control rights but is 
severely constrained in their exercise while the beneficiary lacks control rights altogether. 
Similarly, income rights are less secure to the extent that the party with control rights might not 
exercise these rights in a way that protects income.210  Whenever beneficial ownership and 
control are separated, the two sorts of interests are in at least partial conflict which presents some 
                                                        
209 Liberals have long viewed trusts as a potentially illiberal mode of ownership with at least a faint echo 
of the feudal system. For example, John Chipman Gray expressed exasperation at the development of 
spendthrift trusts which shield a beneficiary’s income from creditors, tort victims and others with legally 
valid claims against the beneficiary, thus protecting improvident scions of wealthy families from the 
consequences of their own folly.  John Chipman Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property (Boston: 
Boston Book Co., 1883). 
210 Although corporate ownership is now regarded more benevolently by most classical liberals, Adam 
Smith thought the joint stock corporation a recipe for mismanagement given the incentive problems 
inherent in giving one group of people great discretion in managing the investments of another group. 
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edwin Cannan ed., 
(London: Methuen, 1904), Book V, Chap. I, Part III, Art. 1; Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, 346-351. 
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danger to the party not in control.  The point is not that every fragmentation of ownership 
interests will come to grief.  Rather, it is that the principal-agent problem inherent in such a 
situation will always require some mechanism to align the interests of “income owners” with 
those who have operational control.  Such mechanisms may be costly not only in economic terms 
but also for some of the non-economic values such as autonomy that are sometimes protected by 
property rights.  
Christman does seem to acknowledge in at least one instance that the separation of 
income ownership and control may threaten the interests protected by control ownership.  After 
endorsing John Roemer’s proposal for competition using market prices between state-owned 
enterprises, Christman qualifies his endorsement by suggesting that he favors worker-managed 
cooperatives in place of Roemer’s professionally managed state owned enterprises.211  The 
problem with the latter arrangement is that it serves worker’s income interest, but not their 
interest in control over the workplace.  But the principal-agent problem inherent in the division 
of control and income is particularly acute here.  Worker-managers who have little income 
interest in their enterprise have tremendous incentive to divert “public” resources to their own 
ends: lavish office furniture, generous expense accounts, management that tolerates a culture of 
shirking and even outright theft.212  Roemer’s model is attentive to the need for managers who 
maximize profits so as to serve the economic interests of the public.  This tends to compromise 
the control interests of workers and reproduces some of the principal-agent problems inherent in 
privately owned corporations.  But Christman’s modification makes the latter problem much 
worse by doing away with the governance structures meant to discipline enterprises.  To the                                                         
211 Christman, The Myth of Property, 181-82. 
212 It is probably not accidental that the latter was a huge problem in the Soviet economy.  A Russian 
friend once commented on the worker building his parents’ house: “Kolya is good: he works hard and 
doesn’t steal.  Well, at least not too much anyway.  He worked all his life in a Soviet factory, so of course 
he’ll take something!” 
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extent that income equality is assured by state management or supervision of property (either 
directly or through state-owned enterprises), this has negative implications for workers’ control 
interests and to the extent that workers have control over public capital assets, this creates the 
possibility of managing those assets for the benefits of workers at the expense of everyone 
else.213  The natural solution would be to give worker-owners substantial income rights in their 
enterprise so that they have incentive to manage it profitably.  But this merely highlights the 
folly of thinking that one might allocate “control rights” and “income rights” according to wholly 
separate sets of principles.  Nothing I have said here rules out a system of public ownership of 
capital assets.  But arguments in favor of such a system must be made directly, not via a 
conceptual repackaging of property rights. 
The distinction between “control rights” and “income rights” is problematic for a second 
reason.  Neither “control ownership” nor “income ownership” cleanly tracks distinct types of 
normative concerns.  Instead, the same rights typically further both sorts of interests to a greater 
or lesser extent.  First consider income ownership.  From an economic point of view, one might 
accrue income either by acquiring new property rights or through the increase in value of one’s 
existing property rights.214  Economic income therefore cuts across the categories of “control 
                                                        
213 Berle and Means noted the parallel between corporate ownership and communist management and the 
contrast of both with the traditional logic of private property: “As a qualification on what has been known 
as private property in Anglo-American law, this corporate development represents a far greater approach 
toward communist modalities than appears anywhere else in our system.  It is an odd paradox that a 
corporate board of directors and a communist committee of commissars should so nearly meet in a 
common contention.  The communist thinks of the community in terms of a state; the corporation director 
thinks of it in terms of an enterprise; and though this difference between the two may well lead to a 
radical divergence in results, it still remains true that the corporation director who would subordinate the 
interests of the individual stockholder to those of the group more nearly resembles the communist in 
mode of thought than he does the protagonist of private property.” Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C. 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (New York: The MacMillan Company, rev. ed. 
1968), 278.   
214 In analysis of tax policy, it is customary to refer to Haig-Simons income.  This is defined as “the 
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value 
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ownership” and “income ownership.”  This means that Christman is committed to treating 
“income” differently based on whether it is obtained by trade or mere fluctuations in the value of 
existing property rights.  If I eat apples from my apple orchard, I am acting as a “control owner”.   
But if I trade these apples to you in exchange for pears and eat the pears, I am acting as an 
“income owner”.  This makes little sense.  The apples are a part of my wealth whether or not I 
trade them for pears.  To the extent that Christman tries to avoid this implication of his scheme 
by distinguishing between income from trade and other forms of wealth, he is not relying on a 
principled distinction: income is valuable precisely because it represents an increase in one’s net 
wealth.  There is an analogous problem with control rights.  Control ownership over an orchard 
gives me the right to decide whether to plant apple trees or pear trees depending on whether I 
wish to eat apples or pears.  And some part of the value of control is that it enables me to decide 
the form in which to consume my wealth.  But the right to trade one’s property may serve the 
same end.  Trading apples for pears and planting pears rather than apples are alternative means to 
the same end.  Christman is committed to treating these two sorts of decisions as reflecting 
different concepts of ownership.  As the example shows, this seems rather arbitrary. 
The fact that control ownership and income ownership do not track economic categories 
is a significant problem for Christman’s theory.  Efforts to protect the interests of the income 
owner almost inevitably have implications for control ownership.  If a house increases in value, 
this is income from an economic perspective.  Should the owner be permitted to retain this 
increase in value?  On Christman’s theory, insofar as the control owner has no right to income, 
perhaps not.  But it is very difficult to respect control rights without granting at least some 
interest in the income.  Suppose we tax the control owner of the house enough to eliminate the                                                                                                                                                                                   
of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question.”  Henry C. 
Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 50.  
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“income” from the appreciation of the house.  Since expenditures on the house will change its 
market value and the owner will not be able to capture this increase in value when she sells the 
house, the state should have to compensate her in some way for improvements.  If it does not, 
she is likely to make the absolute minimum in improvements.  But when the state pays for home 
improvements, there will be a significant principal-agent problem.  The owner has incentive to 
make “improvements” that she will enjoy, but are not appreciated by others.  Indulging 
idiosyncratic tastes allows her to take a deduction for “improvements” while the state takes the 
loss when the “improved” house is sold.  Conversely, she will have little incentive to make 
improvements to which she attaches little value, but which maintain the long-term value of the 
house.  There are further difficulties as well.   Suppose she makes certain improvements on the 
house herself.  How much should she be paid for her labor?  There must be some system to 
monitor quality so as not to pay too much or too little.  And when should improvements be 
made?  Does the owner or the state decide?  Inevitably, either the state will have to allow the 
owner significant scope to realize income in one way or another or adopt such invasive oversight 
as to impinge significantly on “control ownership.” 
There is an analogous problem with control ownership.  Although the right to sell one’s 
property is associated with “income ownership”, there are often significant control interests at 
stake in the ability to exchange one form of property for another.  Suppose a farmer wishes to 
become a blacksmith.  Unless the farmer is particularly wealthy, he will likely have to sell some 
of his farm equipment or farmland in order to buy a blacksmith’s tools and workshop.  Allowing 
this sort of exchange of property rights greatly expands the scope of possibilities for property 
owners.  Rather than being locked into one occupation, residence, or way of life, one can use 
one’s existing property as a means to acquire the property necessary for a different way of life.  
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Ability to reconfigure one’s property rights thus increases a person’s control over their 
circumstances.  The interests protected by “control ownership” are in this way also furthered by 
the right to transfer property rights for value.  Of course, it is possible to permit the farmer to 
exchange property entitlements without allowing the farmer to make a profit on the exchange.  
One might institute a 100% capital gains tax so that the farmer pays anything exceeding the cost 
of the farm equipment to him – in tax law, this is called basis – to the government.215  However, 
a farmer with farm equipment that has become much more valuable will be apt to hold onto such 
equipment rather than sell it for only a small fraction of its market value.  Extremely high 
marginal tax rates “lock in” owners to assets even when they value them much less than their 
monetary equivalent.  When property values have changed little, even a very high tax rate might 
not greatly deter exchanges.  But when the tax comes to represent a very large fraction of the 
purchase price, a high tax rate will significantly discourage transactions between would-be 
farmers and would-be blacksmiths.  Insofar as significant control interests are furthered by such 
exchanges, assignment of income ownership to the state has adverse consequences for these 
control interests.  There are, of course, other possible approaches besides the capital gains tax 
scheme.  For example, capital assets could be owned directly by the state and leased to citizens 
according to their declared occupations.  They will tend, however, to involve more direct state 
regulation than the tax scheme and thus greater compromise of control interests.   
Any precise specification of control and income rights will encounter the problems 
described above.  Christman argues that “any principle of distributive justice, when it assigns 
property rights to people, ought to use different arguments in the case of each kind of ownership.  
And it should not be surprising if control ownership and income ownership over the same goods                                                         
215 More realistically the tax would have to be reduced somewhat below 100% in order to give the seller 
incentive to get the best price. 
  107 
end up being vested in different individuals under those principles.”216  But this sort of 
conclusion does not adequately attend to the distinction between modes of normative 
justification and the actual content of rights in a fully specified property regime.217  Once one 
moves beyond justificatory arguments to consider actual legal rights, it is not possible to 
consider income interests and control interests in isolation.218  The lesson for theories that aim to 
unbundle liberal ownership is this: simply because one can draw an analytic distinction between 
control interests and wealth interests, this does not mean that either sort of interests will track 
particular rights in actual property regimes.  The paradigm property right – a right to exclude 
others from use of a particular resource – implicates both sorts of interests.  Unbundling of 
ownership must be done at the level of particular rights, not the more abstract interests that they 
protect and so one cannot avoid the messy work of reconciling tensions between the two types of 
interests in actual property regimes by assigning rights to control and to income separately.   
4. ATTAS AND “ABSOLUTE” PROPERTY 
 Christman’s attempt to unbundle control and income rights is not successful because the 
same rights protect both control and income interests.  However, recognizing the                                                         
216 Christman, The Myth of Property, 128. 
217 Christman concedes that “any two rights in the property bundle (indeed, any two rights whatsoever) 
may well, under a precise enough specification, not always be fully distinguishable”, but does not seem to 
fully acknowledge the difficulty of designing well-functioning property regimes that separate control and 
income. Christman, The Myth of Property, 131. 
218 Although Christman’s real concern seems to be the justification of property rights regimes, he 
persistently writes as if control and income are analyzable on the level of rights.  For example, he sums up 
his argument in the following way:  
[T]his distinction suggests that instead of asking whether private property per se can be justified, we should 
ask whether, on the one hand, control rights can be justified (and what scope they should have and what 
objects they should cover), and, on the other, whether and what sort of income rights can be defended.  The 
latter are of most concern to leftists who think that distributive considerations motivate sharp curtailment of 
individual property rights, with the state being the rightful holder or regulator of these rights.  The former 
are most stressed by liberals (and conservatives), who are concerned with the importance of individual 
liberty and autonomy.  Since these two elements of ownership are justified with reference to different 
values, and one does not entail or necessitate the other, they should be dealt with separately. 
Christman, The Myth of Property, 146. 
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interdependence of control interests and income interests should not lead one to embrace the 
opposite extreme.  Daniel Attas has recently defended a rigid conception of private ownership 
according to which any separation of wealth entitlements from control rights is a violation of 
property rights.219 Attas’ aims are somewhat convoluted, so a brief detour is in order.  Attas’ 
chief objective is to argue against a strategy he sees as common to a number of modern 
progressives who argue that taxation, even redistributive taxation, is not an infringement upon 
private property.  This approach involves identifying property with some subset of Honoré’s 
incidents of ownership so that property ownership is compatible with income or property 
taxation.220  Attas identifies Jeremy Waldron,221 Barbara Fried,222 and John Christman as 
employing some variant of this strategy.   He contends that their arguments fail because the 
concept of property has far more structural unity than these authors realize.  Honoré’s canonical 
list of incidents can be reorganized into a scheme that distinguishes between content incidents 
and form incidents.  Content incidents are those incidents that take the thing owned as their 
subject whereas form incidents are those that take the right itself as their subject.  For example, 
the right to manage is a content incident whereas immunity from expropriation and reversion to 
the owner are form incidents.  Content incidents may be further divided into primary control 
incidents and secondary income incidents.  Each control incident is matched with a 
corresponding income incident.223  There are three such pairs of control and income incidents: 
(1) the right to manage (control) and the right to rents (income), (2) the right to use (control) and 
the right to profits (income) and (3) the right to possession (control) and the right to the fruits of 
                                                        
219 Daniel Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” Law and Philosophy 25, no. 1 (Jan. 2006), 119–149. 
220 A. M. Honoré, “Ownership,” 107-47; Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” 120-21. 
221 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
222 Barbara Fried, “Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick’s ‘Justice in Transfer’ and the Problem of 
Market-Based Distribution,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24, (1995), 226-245. 
223 Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” 140-47. 
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one’s property (income).224  Rights to income are therefore secondary content incidents that 
depend on the primary control incidents.  Each control right is matched with an income right that 
represents a right to receive the economic value protected by the control right whether by use on 
one’s own or by sale to another.  Full ownership (which Attas calls ‘absolute property’) consists 
in the vesting of all incidents in a single owner.  Attempts to fragment ownership in order to 
make it consistent with taxation by treating income incidents as inessential to ownership are 
therefore conceptually confused.  Attas concludes that “a justification of redistributive taxation 
requires a restriction of property or abandoning it altogether rather than redefining it.”225   
Although Attas’ analysis is interesting in several respects, I will focus on his contention 
that taxation is incompatible with full private ownership.  Attas is ambiguous about the scope of 
his argument.  He defends the claim that “absolute property rights cannot be made compatible 
with taxation.”226  But in several places he qualifies this by stating that his argument applies to 
“involuntary taxation particularly for redistributive purposes”227 or arguing that “justification of 
redistributive taxation requires a restriction of property or abandoning it altogether rather than 
redefining it.”228  One way to interpret Attas is to read him as claiming that all taxation infringes 
on private property because all taxation is redistributive. Taxes are necessarily redistributive in 
the sense that they alter relative benefits and burdens between taxpayers.  This is true even for 
taxes in a minimal state that go only to fund public goods such as common defense, a legal 
system, and so on. Even if all pay taxes to support public goods that benefit all, it is almost 
inevitable that some will benefit relatively more from their contributions and others less.  
Measuring the exact benefits to any one person provided by a public good is difficult because                                                         
224 Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” 147. 
225 Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” 120-21. 
226 Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” 148. 
227 Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” 121. 
228 Attas, “The Fragmentation of Property,” 121. 
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their non-excludable character makes it challenging to determine willingness to pay.  Even if a 
government wished to levy taxes on citizens in strict proportion to benefits granted, it could do 
so only in a very approximate way. 
This first interpretation is entirely consistent with Attas’s claims.  If adopted, however, it 
severely undermines the import of his argument.  If “absolute property” is inconsistent with any 
form of taxation, then it is an ideal type rather than an institutional form that could be the object 
of moral claims.229  The basic problem is that support for public goods such as common defense 
through voluntary contribution is likely to be unstable.  Although all might benefit from such 
goods, everyone has an incentive to free ride on the contributions of others.  Unless the scope of 
the cooperative community is so small that each person thinks that her individual decision about 
whether to contribute to public goods has a significant impact on the choices of others, the 
system creates a sharp conflict between self-interest and the public interest.230  Even when most 
people are public spirited, they are far more likely to feel that their contributions are unfairly 
large and reduce them than they are to feel that they are unfairly small and increase them.  
Systems of voluntary contribution will therefore tend to unravel among large groups without 
some formal means of resolving disputes over distributive shares and coercive method for 
enforcing such resolutions.  Attas believes that his argument shows that supporters of 
redistribution must give up commitment to absolute private property.  But if this first 
                                                        
229 Under this interpretation, absolute property is something like sovereignty – a zone of control that is not 
subject to any outside infringement without consent of the sovereign.  Property rights, even in states that 
are more or less classically liberal, are always subject to at least minimal infringements in the form of 
taxation or in kind social obligations.  Sovereign states, by contrast, typically claim complete control over 
their territory clear of any obligations to outsiders beyond those that are voluntarily assumed. 
230 To the extent that a community is this small, it is unlikely to be large enough to defend itself against 
outsiders even if all do contribute.  Stateless societies almost everywhere have been relegated to marginal 
lands because, whatever their other advantages, they are usually unable to muster the resources necessary 
to defend valuable territory from would-be aggressors. 
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interpretation is correct, then only anarchists are committed to absolute private property for the 
very good reason that this form of ownership is inherently unstable. 
A second objection to the “all taxation is redistributive” interpretation is that it is possible 
for a tax that is redistributive in the sense that it changes the relative benefits enjoyed and 
burdens endured by different citizens to benefit all citizens relative to a baseline of no taxation.  
Taxes that pay warriors to protect crops grown by a predominantly agricultural society might 
increase the expected wealth of all property owners in the society relative to a “no taxation and 
no warriors” baseline even if the warriors benefit more than the farmers.  On the “all taxes are 
redistributive” interpretation, this would be an infringement of property rights.  Such a view is 
strongly counter-intuitive because it treats as an infringement of private property the imposition 
of a tax that increases the value of a taxpayer’s property. 
It is difficult to see how such a tax interferes with either control incidents or income 
incidents. Taxation payable in cash imposed upon an owner of a plot of land does not directly 
change the property owner’s legal right to exercise control over her property.  The property 
owner may still exclude others from use of the land, use the land as she likes, or alienate the land 
by transferring all of her rights to the property to another party.  When it comes to property rights 
considered as wealth entitlements, matters are not quite so simple.  Property rights do not entail a 
right to a particular amount of wealth as such.  Wealth is a function of the value of particular 
property rights and this value fluctuates over time based on a huge number of factors, some 
intrinsic to the owner’s relationship to her property (for example, an owner’s improvements of 
her property) and others wholly extrinsic (for example, events on the other side of the world that 
make a certain commodity more scarce).  As Attas points out, the various incidents of ownership 
typically have some monetary value.  For example, the right to use property for some term might 
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be transferred to another person in exchange for rent.  Likewise, when a person sells their 
property at a profit, the state takes some of the sale proceeds in the form of income or capital 
gains tax.  In either case, the property owner loses an amount of money equivalent to some of the 
value of their property (whether or not they realize this value directly in terms of cash receipts).  
Attas regards this as the functional equivalent of the state “expropriating” some of the owner’s 
property.  However, if the tax in question actually increases the value of the taxpayer’s property 
because the benefits of services supported by the tax outweigh the burden of the tax, it seems 
myopic to speak of the tax as a violation of property rights.  Measured in terms of wealth, the tax 
is a net benefit, rather than a net burden.231  This is particularly obvious if the tax is collected 
only upon sale of the property so that the net price received by the seller is greater when the state 
takes a slice of the sale price as tax than without any taxation.  Taxation neither adds nor 
subtracts from an owner’s formal rights to exclude others from use of her property.  So it is 
difficult to see how taxes to support public goods that raise property values can infringe upon 
property rights on any reasonable theory of property rights. 
Attas could reply to this argument in two ways.  One is to emphasize that involuntary 
taxation, even when it increases the market value of a property owner’s property violates 
property rights by forcing upon the property owner an involuntary exchange of tax payments for 
the “enjoyment” of public goods regardless of whether she values them.  A person is not 
necessarily better off simply because the market value of their property increases.  A property 
owner might not care to use roads, schools or other public amenities, but prefer to spend money 
otherwise payable as tax on some personally meaningful project that requires little in the way of                                                         
231 Of course, a property owner may prefer that she be exempt from taxes while enjoying the benefits of 
public goods supported by the taxes of others.  But such an immunity from taxation would not be a form 
of property ownership in the ordinary sense, but rather a special personal privilege of immunity from 
taxation.   
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public goods.  Public goods that raise the market value of properties in a given jurisdiction will 
not necessarily satisfy the subjective preferences of every property owner.  The imposition of a 
tax seems to deprive the property owner of the choice between public and private goods.  But 
this is merely a reductio of the insistence that absolute property is an appropriate normative 
baseline.  Even Richard Epstein, a hard line small state classical liberal, thinks it absurd to 
require matching benefits and burdens in the context of public goods: “To insist that classic 
public (nondivisible, nonexclusive) goods provide equal subjective benefits, much less benefits 
that exceed tax payments, is entirely inconsistent with our (indeed any) system of organized 
government.”232  Allowing each property owner to weigh individually the value of public goods 
against tax burdens creates the free rider problem discussed above.  Maximal freedom of choice 
for property owners to determine contributions to public goods is not a live option in polities 
with extensive private property.233   
One alternative is to appeal to a more narrow interpretation of “redistribution”.  A second 
interpretation of Attas’ position is that taxation is a violation of absolute property ownership only 
when it makes some property owners worse off in an absolute sense in order to benefit others.  
Taxes to support public goods that increase property values by an increment greater than the 
amount of the tax do not qualify as redistributive under this standard.  This avoids the awkward 
result that taxes that maximize property values violate property rights.  This second interpretation 
of Attas’ position bears great similarity to Richard Epstein’s theory of takings.234  A taking, 
according to Epstein, is a diminution of a person’s of legal rights to resources (including property 
rights, proprietary rights, contractual rights and various sorts of remedial rights defined by tort                                                         
232 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 295. 
233 States with large amounts of publicly owned property (for example, sub-soil resources) may use this as 
a substitute for taxation. 
234 Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain. 
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law) without commensurate compensation of some kind.235  Compensation might be direct, such 
as a cash payment for property taken through eminent domain, or be provided in the form of 
some other sort of benefit.  Indirect compensation might include enjoyment of public goods 
supported by tax payments or beneficial restrictions on the rights of others.  For example, a 
zoning law in a residential neighborhoods that prohibits property owners from engaging in 
manufacturing might reduce the rights of every homeowner by taking away the right to use one’s 
property for heavy industry, but compensate each homeowner by restricting the rights of their 
neighbors.  Such a rule would not be a taking if the mutual restriction tended to increase property 
values because this would be sufficient evidence that the value of being protected from 
disruption by the manufacturing operations of one’s neighbors exceeds the value of the right to 
manufacture on one’s own property.  The Epstein interpretation of redistributive taxation is far 
more attractive than the “all taxation violates absolute property” interpretation because it does 
not imply that full private ownership entails a power to block the sort of broadly win-win 
exchanges of rights that are necessary for even a minimal state.  Permitting involuntary 
exchanges provided that property owners receive adequate compensation solves the holdout 
problem inherent in allowing each property owner to block any proposed exchange of rights no 
matter how broadly beneficial.  And in doing so it provides a standard to distinguish illicit 
redistribution from other modifications of property rights. 
One virtue of Epstein’s approach is that the takings formula is plausible even if one does 
not believe that there is any natural rights justification for the present distribution of property 
rights.  One might see the takings formula as a tool to prevent the government from enacting 
                                                        
235 Epstein argues that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution mandates 
monetary compensation whenever an uncompensated taking of private rights occurs. 
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negative sum policies rather than as a means to vindicate natural rights.236  Given the awesome 
power of the state, there is always some temptation for those in power to transfer wealth to 
themselves or their friends.237  Requiring compensation for takings of property disciplines this 
tendency by requiring the state to compensate those who would otherwise lose when the rules 
change so that the costs of new policies will be spread across the population as a whole rather 
than being concentrated among those without political influence.  In theory, this should 
discourage negative sum policies without deterring positive sum policies that leave “winners” 
better off even after “losers” have been compensated.238  In other words, such a rule should select 
for policies that are Kaldor-Hicks efficient by forcing compensation of the “losers” so that the 
final result is a Pareto improvement over the previous state of the world. 
5. REDISTRIBUTION AS “TAKING,” INSURANCE, AND THE BASELINE PROBLEM 
Analyzing redistribution in terms of Epstein’s takings formula is a potentially fruitful 
way to understand how taxation might violate property rights.  It provides an account of how 
robust property rights can coexist with a state strong enough to defend them by identifying a 
principled way to prevent free riding while still constraining the government’s power to redefine 
property rights.  The “takings” interpretation, however, raises questions about the appropriate                                                         
236 Both sorts of arguments appear in Epstein’s work.  See Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the 
Power of Eminent Domain, 3-6, 336.  Epstein believes that Lockean natural rights as well as the rules of 
private law that emerge from the Roman law and common law traditions reflect principles that are 
justified on utilitarian grounds.  His theory is therefore justifiable in both Lockean and utilitarian terms.  
My own sense that by making overly generous assumptions about the utility maximizing nature of 
“natural rights,” Epstein is having his cake and eating it too.  I think that it is most charitable to 
reconstruct Epstein’s argument along the lines I suggest in the main text.  This gives the argument a 
Humean rather than a Lockean flavor and coheres better with Epstein’s consequentialist moral views. 
237 Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast argue that this is the standard means of securing 
political order in pre-modern states and is still common in many places in the world today.  See Douglass 
North, John Wallis & Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for 
Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
238 I worry that in practice Epstein’s proposal (a) relies too much upon judges to make complicated 
determinations about the benefits and burdens of various policies and (b) leads to policy gridlock since a 
great many good policies arguably impose costs on some identifiable group and fear of incurring takings 
liability will therefore excessively deter changes in policy.   
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normative baseline against which to measure changes in holdings.  If the baseline is the state of 
nature – no state and no public services – then, given the great wealth created in complex 
developed economies, an extremely high rate of taxation would still leave property owners better 
off than they would be without a police force or a legal system.  Staving off this outcome 
requires a theory of just division of gains from cooperation in the provision of public goods.   
Epstein argues in favor of a flat income tax and against both progressive income taxation 
and a per capita tax.239  This position, however, cannot be defended solely in terms of the takings 
formula.  For pure public goods, the case against the latter two taxes is not obvious.240  Services 
provided by the minimal state might suffice to leave everyone better off (or, more precisely, 
make everyone better off in the sense of giving them better ex ante prospects regardless of how 
matters turn out once some people are jailed for crimes or killed while serving as soldiers) even 
though a per capita tax is burdensome for those with little property.241  Epstein suggests that 
lump sum taxes cause redistribution from poor to rich because the rich bear a burden less than 
their proportionate share of wealth.242  But this claim depends crucially on the relative benefits of 
government to those at different levels of income.  If many of the gains from government are                                                         
239 Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 295. 
240 Epstein has a rather unconvincing argument in the first chapter of Takings that fair cooperation 
requires that all people share in the gains from government in proportion to their holdings of Lockean 
rights in the state of nature.  Governments, therefore, should seek to maintain the rough balance of 
Lockean holdings when they enact policies that expand the pie for all citizens. See Epstein, Takings: 
Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 3-6.  Even if one grants the moral principle, this 
argument faces a number of immediate difficulties.  First, there much reason to think that the sort of 
extensive cooperation made possible by government changes the value of people’s Lockean state of 
nature holdings immensely – the relative value of skill in bashing one’s neighbors’ heads declines 
immensely and the returns to skill in managing large organizations increases hugely.  Second, there is no 
good reason to think that utility gains from civilization are monotonically related to income, wealth or any 
other plausible tax base.  See Barbara H. Fried, “Proportionate Taxation as a Fair Division of the Social 
Surplus: The Strange Career of an Idea,” Economics and Philosophy 19 (2003), 211-239, for a convincing 
argument against Epstein’s view.   
241 In practice it will be burdensome to collect from the truly penniless, so the working poor might end up 
most disadvantaged by such a policy. 
242 Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 295. 
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realized in terms of goods other than greater income or wealth (such as personal security or good 
health), then regressive taxes might better approximate the gains from the minimal state.  This is 
plausible if those who earn low incomes would be least able to defend themselves from 
predatory neighbors without a government.243  At the very least, Epstein needs a better argument 
for why proportionate share of wealth or income is the right standard.  Epstein’s case against 
progressive income taxation is unconvincing for the same reason.  The wealthy in affluent 
countries are made better off by provision of basic public goods even if they bear the entire tax 
burden to pay for such services.  Very sharply progressive taxation to support the pure public 
goods necessary for a complex economy will not violate the takings principle.  Even under a 
rough proportionality test, progressive taxation might still best match benefits and burdens.  If 
the marginal utility of income is much lower for the wealthy than for middle class or poor, 
progressive tax rates might best match the benefits from public goods provision and burdens of 
taxation.  Whether this is actually the case is a very difficult question to answer empirically.244  If 
a flat tax turns out to be the best way of matching benefits from public goods and tax obligations, 
this is because considerations that support regressive taxation and those that support progressive 
taxation happen to roughly cancel each other out.  The takings formula therefore provides little 
obvious constraint on taxation to support the basic functions of government even when it is 
supplemented by a proportionality standard. 
Even if one grants that income is a good proxy for benefits received from government 
provided public goods, one might still justify some degree of progressive income taxation as a 
                                                        
243 John Stuart Mill, Principle of Political Economy, (London: Longmans Green, 1917), Book V, Chap. 2. 
244 See H. Peyton Young, Equity: In Theory and Practice, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994), pp. 102-104, for a discussion of the benefit theory of taxation. 
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form of insurance.245  Income taxes are levied not against the value of a taxpayer’s assets,246 but 
rather against the (realized) change in value of a taxpayer’s assets.  The two measures are, of 
course, closely related since property that is not consumed (or simply wasted) is generally used 
to produce income and thus the more property one owns, the more income one will tend to 
receive.  However, taxing income as measured by changes in wealth rather than taxing wealth 
directly mitigates some of the risks of private ownership.  A person’s income tax liability is tied 
to the success of their investments, so that tax obligations go up as these investments are 
successful and down as they are unsuccessful.  This reduces the variance in outcomes for each 
taxpayer by spreading some of each investment’s upside and downside risk across all 
taxpayers.247  Ex post, taxation redistributes money from “winners” to “losers”.  But ex ante it 
might be in the interest of all taxpayers for those whose property holdings increase the most to 
pay a greater share of taxes.  Whether a proportionate or progressive scheme makes sense for a 
taxpayer from a self-interested point of view depends on a variety of factors.  For a person with a 
highly diversified portfolio of assets, the risk mitigating value of progressive taxation might be 
quite low.  But for those whose assets are tied up in a single business (or in human capital), the 
insurance value of progressive taxation could be considerable even for a fairly wealthy person. 
Estimates of the insurance value of progressive taxation are quite sensitive to the point in 
time at which the risk mitigating advantages of progressive taxation are assessed.  Taxpayers 
with no knowledge of their property holdings and prospects for earning income are likely to 
                                                        
245 Similar arguments may be deployed against neo-Lockean natural rights theories.  See Allan Gibbard, 
“Natural Property Rights,” Noûs 10, no. 1 (Mar., 1976): 77-86. 
246 I will ignore the problem of taxing labor income, which raises similar issues, but also introduces a host 
of questions unrelated to my argument in this chapter.  One can make a parallel argument about the value 
of risk mitigation as a justification for progressive taxation of income from labor (treating the ability to 
work as an asset “owned” by the laborer), but I will not attempt to do so here. 
247 Taxpayers may respond by shifting into riskier investments.  If investors are risk averse and thus 
require greater returns to undertake riskier investments, this response should increase aggregate returns. 
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favor progressive schemes because of the declining marginal utility of income.  But if our 
concern is with how to measure insurance and redistribution, abstracting entirely from initial 
holdings does not make sense.248  At the other extreme, taxpayers who know their exact property 
holdings and income for a particular year no longer have any interest in risk mitigation since 
there is no uncertainty about the success of their investments.  From this prospective, progressive 
taxation (assuming that that the wealthy do not benefit from public services vastly more than the 
poor) amounts to downward redistribution.  But it is hard to see why tax policy should be 
evaluated from the fully ex post perspective.  Tax rates are set prospectively for taxpayers who 
know their initial entitlements but are uncertain about the exact amount of income they will 
produce.  For the purpose of evaluating whether a given tax on property is redistributive, it 
probably makes sense to evaluate policies from the perspective of young people who know 
roughly what they might inherit and have some sense of their personal talents and abilities but 
face all sorts of uncertainties about how they will fare over course of their lives.  The advantage 
of this perspective is that it allows evaluation of the insurance value of income taxation across a 
taxpayer’s entire life cycle without abstracting from initial entitlements.  Taxpayers from 
extremely wealthy families may prefer self-insurance through investment diversification to risk 
spreading through progressive taxation.249  But for most taxpayers, the value of such risk 
spreading is probably quite significant.250   
                                                        
248 As argued in Chapters One and Three, it is also problematic in that it tends to treat property 
entitlements as wholly unsettled. 
249 Given the uncertainties of life and the imperfections of financial markets, risk spreading through 
income taxation probably has some value even for some of those with a fair amount of inherited wealth as 
well as for those with high earning potential but little inherited wealth.  For the super wealthy, much of 
the value of insurance comes in the form of reducing the chances of political instability resulting in 
expropriation. 
250 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock endorse a similar defense of social insurance.  See James M. 
Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962), 192-199.  
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Because income taxes tend to mitigate risk for taxpayers as they become more 
progressive, it is important to disentangle the insurance function of income tax from any purely 
redistributive function.  Simply because a tax system “redistributes” income ex post does not 
mean that high earning taxpayers do not receive ex ante compensation in the form of insurance 
against low income outcomes.  Epstein might be right to think that current levels of progressive 
taxation are redistributive, but this conclusion cannot be established merely by comparing pre-
tax and post-tax levels of income.  Attas’ position is worse off in that it ignores the very 
possibility that bundling taxes with property ownership might serve to make property owners 
wealthier.  He is either committed to the implausible position that even taxation that increases 
property values is an infringement on property rights or lacks any sort of a theory to distinguish 
redistributive from non-redistributive taxation.  The larger lesson here is that there are, in most 
contexts, a range of possible tax regimes that work to everyone’s expected benefit.  This is true 
even of tax regimes that look, from the ex post perspective, to be redistributing gains from the 
wealthy to the poor. 
Attas and Christman share the methodological fault of engaging in conceptual analysis of 
the nature of property ownership that is too far removed from the institutional structure in which 
property relations are embedded.  Christman fails to adequately distinguish between property 
rights and the interests that they protect.  Dividing property rights into governance rights and 
wealth rights is not feasible because the same legal rights protect both sorts of interests.  Attas’ 
approach commits him to a normative baseline that either makes no sense given the role that 
public goods such as police services, legal systems, and military defense play in enhancing the 
value of property rights or is ill-specified.  Analysis of the relationship between taxation and 
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property rights requires consideration of the complete package of benefits and burdens under a 
particular system of government. 
6. BUNDLING AND UNBUNDLING PROPERTY AND TAXATION 
Rather than regarding taxation as an infringement on or fragmentation of private 
ownership, it is more fruitful to conceive of property rules and tax obligations as forming 
packages of rights and duties.  The foregoing discussion suggests two important motivations for 
bundling or unbundling property rights and tax obligations: the need to finance public goods and 
the desire to mitigate the risks of private ownership.  The first explains why property rights are 
often bundled with duties to support public goods either through taxes or in kind contributions.  
The second explains much of the complexity of private property arrangements and some of the 
motivation for progressive taxation.  I will discuss each in turn. 
There are a number of reasons to bundle obligations to support public goods with 
property ownership.  First, in an economy in which most productive assets are in private hands, it 
is difficult to provide public services without some form of contribution from private property 
owners.  Second, until the rise of modern bureaucracies capable of administering complex tax 
regimes and managing centrally provided public services, it was often more practical to delegate 
these functions to local property holders.  Since medieval states did not have the resources or 
institutional capacity to provide dispute resolution for the thousands of agricultural villages 
under their control, feudal lords typically provided rudimentary law courts and other forms of 
local dispute resolution.251  Third, funding public goods with contributions from local property 
holders may achieve a rough matching of benefits and burdens.  Property owners benefit from 
local public goods directly and in the form of increased property values.  It therefore makes                                                         
251 Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 325. 
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sense for them to bear the cost of these goods.252  Taxation tied to property ownership will often 
be less redistributive than forms of taxation (or services in kind such as compulsory military 
service or agricultural labor) that are not in some ways tied to property holdings.  This is a 
particular concern where redistribution is likely to be upward rather than downward as is 
probably historically typical.  Forth, local funding may facilitate local oversight.  To the extent 
that local property taxes support local public goods, people have some scope for selection of 
packages of taxes and services to their liking by choosing to live in jurisdictions that match their 
preferences for public goods.253  
The possible bundles of property entitlements and obligations to support public goods 
depend on a society’s degree of institutional sophistication and wealth.  In general, wealthier 
societies with more complex legal and political systems are able to support greater unbundling of 
property rights and public goods obligations.  This is because legal complexity is expensive and 
because weak institutions constrain the ways in which public services can be provided.  
Furthermore, centralized provision of public goods requires sources of finance that may be 
poorly or wholly undeveloped.254  Taxes, whether on property or income, are very difficult to 
collect in an economy in which there is little commerce or that is not monetized.255  
                                                        
252 Owners are also often well positioned to shift part of these costs to non-owners who benefit from these 
local public goods.  For example, property taxes to support local public schools will tend to increase rents 
(both because the cost of providing rental housing increases and because such housing becomes more 
desirable) which means that renters in effect contribute to the public services from which they benefit.   
253 The Tieboutian hypothesis suggests that people select homes in part on the basis of the differing 
packages of taxes and services offered by local governments within a metropolitan area.  See Charles M. 
Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 64 (1956): 416–424. 
254 “Before 1400, in the era of patrimonialism, no state had a national budget in the understood sense of 
the word.  Taxes existed in Europe’s more commercialized states, but rulers everywhere acquired most of 
their revenue from tribute, rents, dues, and fees.   Individual sovereigns borrowed money, but usually in 
their own names and against real collateral.”  Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 
990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), 74. 
255 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990, 88-89. 
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One salient feature of the liberal conception of property is that it focuses almost entirely 
on duties owed by others to the property owner to the exclusion of duties of the owner toward 
outsiders.  Of course, the interests of others often limit the rights and powers of property owners.  
But it is rare that ownership entails specific positive duties to do things for the benefit of others.  
This pattern is not necessarily typical of historical property regimes.  Two kinds of duties are 
particularly likely to attach to property ownership: duties of loyalty to political authorities and 
duties to contribute to public goods.  The feudal system of medieval Europe provides an example 
of illiberal property relations that bundle property rights and political duties.  Land ownership in 
medieval Europe was bound up in a system of obligations that required loyalty to one’s feudal 
superiors, accountability to provide certain sorts of public goods to those living on one’s lands 
and, often, to field armies for the king in times of war.  Many feudal lordships were originally 
granted for service to the king, so land ownership functioned both as a means to raise fighting 
forces and as a reward to particularly valued lieutenants.256  Feudal lords were responsible for 
local dispute resolution and operated courts with quite broad powers.257  Disposition of property 
rights in land, therefore, was a means both to secure loyalty to the state and to provide public 
goods.  Disloyalty to the King was grounds for forfeiture of all one’s property rights in land 
wherever one stood in the feudal hierarchy.  A similar logic governed the relations between 
peasants and feudal lords.  An individual agricultural village unconstrained by feudal obligations 
would be vulnerable to predations of bandits, warlords, or foreign adventurers.  The village 
might need the help of a warrior with a ready fighting force to defend the village.  But the 
                                                        
256 In England, the high nobility largely gained their holdings from William the Conqueror.  After the 
Norman Conquest, the land of a tenant of the King reverted to the King on the tenant’s death.  The 
principle of heritability of estates through the operation of law (rather than upon payment of “relief” to 
the King) was established only slowly.  A. W. B. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 6-7. 
257 Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 324-328. 
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warrior would require some sort of reliable revenue stream.258  The sort of feudal obligations that 
were the bane of the first generations of European liberals were, at some point in the early 
Middle Ages, an important tool for providing stable political order in a context of frequent 
warfare and weak governments.  
The history of land law since the early Middle Ages has featured a progressive 
decoupling of property entitlements and duties to contribute to public goods.  In the high Middle 
Ages, payments of money replaced feudal obligations such as knight service and common law 
courts replaced manorial courts.259  Subsequently, feudal incidents gave way to taxation (or to 
licenses of proprietary rights such as monopoly privileges) as a means to exact support for public 
goods from property owners.260  The advent of modern professional bureaucracies including 
modern systems of tax administration allows for greater provision of public goods by the state 
itself.  Decoupling property ownership from public goods provision permits the rearrangement of 
property institutions in the interest of wealth creation, personal autonomy, democratic control or 
other ends.  For example, ownership of an estate can be fragmented in new ways when there is 
no longer any need for there to be a unique lord who owes knight service.261  As long as someone                                                         
258 Harold Berman estimated that in the eleventh century, the household of a one well-trained and 
equipped knight required the support of fifteen to thirty thousand peasants.  Berman, Law and Revolution: 
The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 302-03.  
259 Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law, 7-8. 
260 In a classic paper on the subject, Joseph Schumpeter distinguished between “domain states” in which 
revenue is derived from the King’s domain and “tax states” in which revenue is raised by taxation of 
private property. Joseph A. Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State” in Joseph A. Schumpeter, the 
Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, Richard Swedberg, ed., (Princeton University Press, 1991): 99-
140. 
261 It is anachronistic to refer to a feudal lord as an owner of land. “This concept [ownership] – even when 
taken together with various qualifications of it – was inadequate to describe feudal landholding, in which 
each parcel was subject to the rights of superiors and inferiors in the feudal hierarchy.  It was hard to say 
that a lord ‘owned’ land which was granted to him on condition that services be rendered and which 
would be repossessed by his superior lord upon his death until his heir paid a ‘relief.’ It is of the essence 
of feudal law – or at least of Western feudal law – that there are divided interests in land, not absolute, 
indivisible ownership.” Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 
453-54.  
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pays taxes on a parcel of land, the modern state need not concern itself deeply with how legal 
interests in the land are divided between different parties. 
Moving from property taxation to income taxation as the main means of public finance 
represents a continuation of this trend of unbundling of duties to support public goods from 
property ownership.  Property taxes are assessed on the value of property held regardless of the 
income this property produces in any particular period.  Income taxes assess tax on the change in 
net property holdings, regardless of initial property holdings.  Income taxation has several 
advantages over property taxations.  First, taxation of income rather than property greatly 
reduces the danger that an owner will have to liquidate property to cover taxes.262  Second, it 
greatly expands the tax base by allowing direct taxation of earnings from labor.  Third, moving 
from property taxation to income taxation has some value as insurance for risk averse property 
owners since tax is only due on gains and not losses.  However, income taxes require a system of 
tax administration of greater complexity.  Taxes on real property require registration, assessment, 
and collection.  Land, the most popular object of property taxes, is immobile and impossible to 
conceal thus greatly simplifying all three tasks.   An income tax, by contrast, requires the state to 
track citizens’ income and collect taxes from persons who may not be easy to locate or have 
easily identifiable assets. This is a matter of enormous complexity that relies on a high degree of 
voluntary compliance by private individuals and businesses.  It is conceivable that in the not so 
distant future the increasing international mobility of capital and the corresponding difficulty of 
imposing tax on capital will cause greater reliance on property taxes, reversing the several 
centuries long trend toward unbundling of property rights and duties.263  But this is speculative –                                                         
262 The “realization requirement” provides that tax is only assessed upon realization of income from one’s 
property in the form of payment, rather than upon mere appreciation in value. 
263 The ability of wealthy individuals to shift assets to tax havens and for multinational corporations to 
“realize income” in low tax jurisdictions is a serious threat to the tax base of most advanced economies.  
  126 
from the Middle Ages to the present, nearly all trends have been in the direction of unbundling 
rights and duties to achieve greater flexibility for property owners. 
A second crucial function of property institutions is risk spreading.  Historically, much of 
the complexity of property rights regimes has involved mitigation of the risks inherent in full 
ownership.  For this reason, various forms of customary law do not permit full ownership of 
valuable assets by particular individuals.  Ownership is sometimes vested in a family rather than 
an individual and even when the head of a family (often an extended family rather than a nuclear 
family) is in some sense the real owner, ownership often comes with obligations to the rest of the 
family unit.264  Familial ownership, especially in societies with strong extended family 
structures, spreads risk by allowing for larger property holdings by the extended family and 
sharing between more and less fortunate family members.  Common property regimes are in 
some cases driven by narrow considerations of economic efficiency, but also have an insurance 
function in guaranteeing all community members some access to valuable resources.  
Agricultural communities operating in extremely risky environments and settler communities in 
remote or hostile territory often use group ownership despite the poor incentives inherent in this 
form of land tenure.265  The risks of individual ownership can also be mitigated through periodic 
repartition of farmland, such as found in the customary law of many pre-revolutionary Russian 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
See e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State,” Harvard Law Review 113, no. 7 (2000): 1573-1676; Edward D. Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 
Florida Tax Review 11 (2011): 699-774. 
264 Segmentary lineages and extended family land ownership are a basic form of social organization found 
in diverse societies throughout history. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From 
Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: MacMillan Press, 2011), 59-64, 101-104. 
265 Robert C. Ellickson, “Property in Land,” Yale Law Journal 102 (1993), 1341-44.  Ellickson discusses 
Jamestown, Plymouth, and Salt Lake City as settler communities that initially adopted collective 
ownership of agricultural land but moved toward individual ownership as conditions became more 
favorable. 
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peasant communities.266  Forms of customary law that fragment property entitlements so as to 
allow limited public access to privately held assets, for example allowing the poor to glean crops 
after a harvest, assure non-owners of at least some minimal level of access to valuable 
resources.267  
New means to mitigate the risks of full ownership appeared in the modern era.  Complex 
forms of property ownership found in customary law have been displaced by even more complex 
contractual instruments as the private sector has developed powerful new ways of pooling and 
spreading risks of ownership: insurance, public companies, annuities, mutual funds, and so on.  
The tendency in the private sphere, therefore, is toward greater concentration of incidents of 
ownership – a move toward full liberal ownership – coupled with greater use of contracts to 
fragment wealth interests.  In the sphere of public law, income taxation coupled with various 
social insurance and social welfare programs help to protect against misfortune and imprudence 
and mitigate some of the risks of market economies.  Social insurance can be seen as a 
replacement for the common and familial property regimes that reduced the risk of extreme 
poverty for pre-modern people.  Bundling control of productive assets into more or less full 
liberal ownership allows for more efficient use of valuable resources while tax and transfer 
regimes replace the insurance function of the old customary property regimes.  The connection 
between liberal ownership, which facilitates efficient use of resources under market relations but 
concentrates risks, and social insurance is recognized even by strident classical liberals such as 
Friedrich Hayek and Richard Epstein.268 
                                                        
266 Ellickson, “Property in Land,” 1393-94; Stephen F. Williams, Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime: 
The Creation of Private Property in Russia, 1906-1915 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2006), 39-49. 
267 Henry E. Smith, “Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields,” Journal of Legal 
Studies 29 (2000): 131-169. 
268 “The assurance of a certain minimum income for everyone, or a sort of floor below which nobody 
need fall even when he is unable to provide for himself, appears not only to be a wholly legitimate part of 
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This conception of the relationship between property ownership and taxation provides 
reason to be skeptical of claims that taxation necessarily impinges on private ownership.  
Support for public goods and risk spreading are essential social functions.  Political orders that 
cannot muster resources for collective projects, whatever their other virtues, are usually 
conquered and eliminated by polities better able to organize effective military forces.  And even 
if outsiders do not topple such governments, their subjects may fill the functional void that they 
leave with other forms of social organization.  Kinship networks, for example, serve to provide 
social insurance and organize provision of public goods in social contexts in which the state does 
not serve these functions.269  This is not surprising – if kin selection is one of the basic sources of 
altruistic impulses, social groups based on genetic relatedness might have advantages in 
organizing activities that involve some sacrifice of one’s own personal interests for the good of 
the group.  The alternative to private ownership of valuable resources combined with substantial 
taxation might, in practice, not be the minimal state, but rather kinship based forms of social 
organization.  Needless to say, social organization based on common descent does not readily 
lend itself to liberal politics nor to complex market economies.  We should be skeptical, 
therefore, of claims that anarcho-libertarian social orders of the type endorsed by Nozick will be 
conducive to high levels of personal freedom.  Weak states are more likely to be replaced by                                                                                                                                                                                   
the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the particular 
small group into which he was born.  A system which aims at tempting large numbers to leave the relative 
security which the membership in the small group has given would probably soon produce great 
discontent and violent reaction when those who have first enjoyed its benefits find themselves without 
help when, through no fault of their own, their capacity to earn a living ceases.”  Friedrich Hayek, Law, 
Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 3, The Political Order of a Free People (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979), 55. “Even before the advent of the welfare state, many social institutions developed to share 
and pool risk.  Certainly the family has this function, and the same role can be ascribed to the large clans 
of primitive society.” Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 337. 
269 In his book on clan societies, Mark Weiner makes this point explicitly: “When no person can make it 
alone, lineage provides a natural basis for relationships of mutual dependence – with the significant 
advantage that this trustworthiness grows with each successive generation.  Clans are like insurance 
companies into which one is enrolled at birth and from which one cannot unsubscribe.”  Mark S. Weiner, 
The Rule of the Clan (New York: Picador, 2014), 100. 
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illiberal forms of social organization than they are to protect freedom in the long run.270  And to 
the extent that they are not able to perform basic governmental functions, these may be displaced 
onto parties more likely to perform them in a way that is arbitrary, repressive or inequitable.271 
The bundle model of taxation – as befitting a Humean approach to property – is 
consistent with a variety of liberal views.  Classical liberalism will be more attractive to the 
extent that one favors (a) greater constraints on the extent to which governments are permitted to 
alter the basic bundles of property rights and tax duties and (b) private tools for risk spreading 
and resource management over public ones.    Classical liberals such as Richard Epstein and 
James Buchanan are centrally concerned with preventing negative sum government policies by 
severely constraining the ability of the government to shift wealth from one party to another.  
This preference tends to have quite conservative implications and increases the importance of 
existing property entitlements.272  Liberal Humeans who embrace the bundle model of property 
                                                        
270 The historical record provides models for limited government of the sort preferred by classical liberals 
(for example, northern states in the early American Republic), but very little for the anarcho-
libertarianism at least since the advent of agriculture. 
271 David Hume makes this point with respect to the Ottoman custom that forbade the Sultan from levying 
taxes on the populace: “It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the TURKISH government, that the 
Grand Signior, though absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to 
impose a new tax; and every OTTOMAN prince, who has made such an attempt, either has been obligated 
to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perseverance.  One would imagine, that this prejudice or 
established opinion were the firmest barrier in the world against oppression; yet it is certain, that its effect 
is quite contrary.  The emperor, having no regular method of encreasing his revenue, must allow all the 
bashaws and governors to oppress and abuse the subjects: And these he squeezes after their return from 
their government.  Whereas, if he could impose a new tax, like our European princes, his interest would 
so far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of these disorderly 
levies of money, and would find that a pound, raised by general imposition, would have less pernicious 
effects, than a shilling taken in so unequal and arbitrary a manner.”  David Hume, “Of taxes” in David 
Hume, Political Essays, Knud Haakonssen, ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 164 
272 When large entitlement programs are already in place, there may be a conflict between this 
conservative impulse and small government policy preferences.  For example, Epstein, who regards the 
creation of Social Security as unjust, concedes that present and some future beneficiaries have reliance 
interests that must be respected. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 
326. 
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and tax can recognize the appeal of this position while disagreeing with how it resolves the trade-
off between constraining government power and pursing important public ends. 
A very different sort of conservative position is based on preference for non-state 
alternatives to social insurance such as religious organizations, extended families and local 
communities.  This sort of position is not classically liberal, but instead is usually paired with 
conservative views on social issues and ambivalence (at best) about free market economies.  
Unlike neo-Lockean or Humean theories, this brand of conservatism views the modern 
unbundling of property rights and public duties with unease if not outright alarm.  Although this 
brand of ideology has few proponents in Anglo-American political philosophy, it has continuing 
public influence among theocratic religious conservatives in some parts of the world. 
The bundle conception can be used to recast progressive arguments as well.  Justification 
of progressive taxation as a risk-spreading device is a more modest alternative to resource 
egalitarian theories of distributive justice.  It is possible to justify a significant degree of risk 
pooling without evaluating the fairness of the initial distribution of property entitlements or 
staking out a position on principles of distributive justice that regulate post tax shares.  In 
addition to its direct insurance value to persons unsure of their future prospects, social insurance 
has a number of indirect benefits as well.  Even net contributors to a social insurance scheme 
may benefit greatly from the support it provides to close friends and relations whom they would 
otherwise feel obligated to support.  Humean moral psychology suggests that people have strong 
other regarding preferences for close associates as well as weaker sympathetic concern for other 
members of society.  When these benefits of social insurance in included (and social insurance 
schemes, like property rules, must be relatively standardized and thus reflect the preferences of 
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typical members of the public), they may tip the balance toward more extensive social insurance 
schemes.    
Social insurance is consistent with the Humean point that the costs of destabilizing 
existing property regimes usually far outweigh the benefits.  Egalitarian principles that cannot be 
implemented largely through social insurance schemes or provision of public goods threaten to 
undermine social order either by licensing expropriation of current property owners or by 
requiring frequent changes in legal rules.  In one sense, however, the risk spreading approach is 
broader than egalitarian theories, such as Ronald Dworkin’s luck egalitarianism, that distinguish 
between brute luck and option luck.273  Social insurance mitigates both the downside risk of 
voluntary choices and the effects of brute luck (albeit not nearly to the degree that most luck 
egalitarians would prefer).  To the extent that luck egalitarians draw too stark a line between 
freely assumed risks and “brute luck,”274 the social insurance perspective may be a more 
attractive approach.  Moreover, as a practical matter, there is much broader consensus about the 
value of social insurance than there is about pure redistribution – social insurance schemes are 
among the most popular government programs whereas virtually any program that smacks of 
“welfare” invites stigma. 
                                                        
273 Ronald Dworkin “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 1981): 283-345. 
274 See Elizabeth Anderson, “How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risk?” Theoretical Inquires in 
Law 9, (2008): 61-92. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, TAX OBLIGATIONS 
 
In this Chapter, I will consider how private property rights constrain tax policy.  One 
response to the insight that property rights must be evaluated within their institutional context is 
to conclude that bundles of property rights and associated obligations should be arranged to bring 
about results that are sanctioned by externally derived principles of distributive justice.  On this 
approach, the design of such bundles may be constrained by the need to give property owners 
appropriate incentives (i.e. no 100% tax rates and the like), but otherwise the bundles have no 
interesting internal normative structure.  Property entitlements and associated tax obligations are 
just insofar as they are part of a system that achieves results endorsed by principles of justice and 
unjust insofar as they are not. 
I argue that treating an initial distribution of property rights as having normative 
significance facilitates agreement on norms of contribution to public goods between persons with 
differing moral commitments.  By contrast, the resource egalitarian approach to property rights 
obscures the way in which property rights structure more complex forms of social cooperation.  
My argument is consistent, however, both with strongly redistributive tax schemes and with only 
lightly redistributive schemes.  In the first part of the chapter, I will defend using pre-tax income 
as a normative baseline in assessing tax policy.  I use Humean property theory to defend the 
principles of horizontal and vertical equity against Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy’s attack on 
“the myth of ownership” in tax policy.  The second part of the chapter will turn to Gerald Gaus’ 
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recent argument that his theory of “justificatory liberalism” provides reason to reject highly 
redistributive tax and transfer policies.  Although I am sympathetic to many aspects of his 
approach, I argue that it ultimately fails to provide a basis for favoring a classical liberal order 
over a mixed economy with a generous social welfare state.  
1.  TAX FAIRNESS AND HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
In this section, I will defend the principles of horizontal equity and vertical equity in 
taxation.275  Horizontal equity is the principle that taxpayers with equal income should pay equal 
tax.276  Vertical equity concerns the way in which tax obligations vary in proportion to income.  I 
will defend a minimalist principle of vertical equity that requires only that taxpayers with higher 
income should owe more tax in absolute terms than taxpayers with lower income.277  Although 
horizontal and vertical equity are textbook criteria of tax fairness,278 the scholarly literature is 
largely hostile and often emphatically so.279  In the years since Louis Kaplow and Richard 
                                                        
275 The terms horizontal equity and vertical equity were coined by Richard Musgrave over half a century 
ago.  Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1959), 159. 
276 I explain horizontal equity and vertical equity in the context of income taxation for ease of exposition.  
A more precise formulation would describe horizontal equity in terms of equal treatment of individuals 
who are identically positioned relative to the tax base.  The tax base might be specified in terms of wealth 
or consumption rather than income.  Horizontal equity under a consumption tax regime would require that 
taxpayers with equal levels of consumption owe equal tax and under a wealth tax would require that 
taxpayers with equal wealth holdings owe equal amounts of tax. 
277 This principle of vertical equity is quite permissive. It is compatible with progressive, proportionate or 
even regressive tax rates.  It is only violated in situations in which Taxpayer A realizes more income than 
Taxpayer B, but B owes more in taxes than A does.  More stringent principles of vertical equity are 
possible as well.  For example, one could require that wealthier taxpayers pay at least as high a percentage 
of their income in tax as poorer taxpayers do.  Because I aim to show that principles of tax fairness can 
play a useful role in structuring bargains between people with differing views about distributive justice, I 
have chosen a principle of vertical equity designed to be as innocuous as possible.  I do not mean to imply 
that more restrictive principles of vertical equity are not also justified.  I take no position on that question. 
278 E.g. Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation (New York: Foundation Press, 
2005), 27-28; Laurie L. Malman, Linda F. Sugin, Lewis D. Solomon, & Jerome M. Hesch, The Individual 
Tax Base: Cases, Problems and Policies in Federal Taxation (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 2002), 14-15.   
279 E.g. Louis Kaplow, “Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle,” National Tax Journal 42 
(1989): 139-50; Jeffrey H. Kahn, “The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelism 
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Musgrave’s debate over the significance of horizontal equity, the weight of scholarly opinion 
seems squarely against it.280  Scholars question not only its normative import, but even whether 
horizontal equity is conceptually coherent.  Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy contend that 
concern with horizontal and vertical equity is just one manifestation of what they call the “myth 
of ownership” – the view that pretax income is of independent normative significance.281  I will 
use Humean property theory to explain the moral significant of pretax income and provide a new 
defense of horizontal and vertical equity.  Rather than being an ideal principle of tax justice, 
horizontal equity is a fairness norm useful for structuring compromises between people who 
disagree about ideal principles of tax justice or about the empirical consequences of tax policy.  
The case of tax fairness shows that we are sometimes justified in treating property entitlements 
and the pre-tax income they generate as having normative significance even in the absence of 
any justification in terms of natural right or moral desert.   
2. MURPHY AND NAGEL ON “THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP” 
In The Myth of Ownership, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel aim to refute what they call 
“everyday libertarianism” – the view that people have a prima facie moral claim to their pretax 
income and that justice in taxation should therefore be evaluated according to a baseline of pre-
tax income or holdings.282  They argue that because market outcomes have no independent moral 
significance, there is no reason to evaluate taxes in relation to pretax income or wealth.  Property 
entitlements and associated tax obligations are just insofar as they are part of a system that                                                                                                                                                                                   
and Horizontal Equity,” Hastings Law Journal 57 (2006): 645-692; David Elkins, “Horizontal Equity as a 
Principle of Tax Theory,” Yale Law & Policy Review 24 (2006): 43-90. 
280 Kaplow, “Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle,” 139-50; Richard A. Musgrave, 
“Horizontal Equity, Once More,” National Tax Journal 43 (June 1990): 1113-22; Louis Kaplow, “A Note 
on Horizontal Equity,” Florida Tax Review 1, no. 3 (Dec. 1992): 191-96; Richard A. Musgrave. 
“Horizontal Equity: A Further Note,” Florida Tax Review 1, no. 6 (1993): 354-39. 
281 Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
282 Murphy & Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 38-39.  
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achieves post-tax results endorsed by principles of justice and unjust insofar as they are not.  
Since post-tax outcomes are the appropriate objects of moral evaluation, evaluation of tax 
policies against a baseline of pre-tax holdings is misconceived in that it adopts a baseline that has 
no special normative status.  For this reason, Murphy and Nagel reject the principles of 
“horizontal equity” and “vertical equity.”  And they reject claims that “tax discrimination” as 
such can be unfair unless it is done on the basis of some independently problematic ground such 
as race, sex, religion, or national origin.283  So, for example, “[t]here would be nothing unfair, for 
example, in a tax on chocolate ice cream but not on vanilla, though it would be arbitrary.”284  
Nor is there anything unfair about similarly arbitrary deductions and tax credits.  A just tax 
regime might end up satisfying horizontal and vertical equity.  But, according to Murphy and 
Nagel, this would be mere coincidence: tax regimes are just insofar as they bring about post-tax 
distributions that are just.  Whether these results bear any particular relation to pre-tax income is 
of no normative import. 
Murphy and Nagel reason as follows.  Property rights are conventional in the sense that 
they do not track pre-institutional moral rights.285  Principles of distributive justice determine 
which distributions of property are just and which are unjust.  Each citizen’s access to and 
control over social resources is determined by the concurrent effect of rules of private law, 
taxation, and government spending.  In a just political order, a citizen’s morally legitimate 
property claims are determined by the combined results of these policies.  Because taxes are a 
necessary element of the system of rules that determines legitimate property entitlements, “there 
                                                        
283 Murphy & Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 170-72. 
284 Murphy & Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 170.    
285 Murphy and Nagel seem to mean by this that they fall on the conventional side of the moral / 
conventional distinction, not that they are conventions in the more technical sense discussed in Chapter 
One. 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are no property rights antecedent to the tax structure.”286  A person’s moral entitlement to 
property under a fully specified legal regime depends both on her pre-tax holdings and on her tax 
obligations.  Because a person is only morally entitled to their post-tax income under a just 
economic system and post-tax income depends on both property conventions and tax 
conventions, nobody has any moral claim to their pre-tax income.  And because pre-tax income 
has no independent moral significance, there is no legitimate ground for complaints (outside of 
certain forms of invidious discrimination, for example, on grounds of race) that a particular tax 
improperly favors one group or another by treating those with similar pre-tax incomes 
differently.  For this reason, criteria of tax fairness, such as horizontal and vertical equity, that 
use pre-tax income as a normative baseline are entirely vacuous.   
Murphy and Nagel take an approach to distributive justice that is typical of resource 
egalitarians.  They argue that the justification of rules of taxation is systemic in that it depends on 
the entire system of property entitlements and tax obligations and teleological in that it is based 
on the resulting pattern of post-tax income and not sensitive to the ways in which pre-tax income 
translates into post-tax income.  Natural rights theories of property might suggest that systemic 
justification is not necessary either because pre-tax income reflects property rights that are 
justified by moral desert or because the state has acquired a moral obligation to defend these 
rights when the property owner entered the social contract.  I do not endorse these sorts of 
“natural rights” arguments and to this extent agree with Murphy and Nagel that taxes must be 
justified systemically.287  I will argue, however, that purely teleological justification may not be 
desirable under conditions of reasonable normative and empirical disagreement and so Murphy 
and Nagel are mistaken in their rejection of horizontal and vertical equity.                                                         
286 Murphy & Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 74. 
287 I discuss my reasons for rejecting such theories in Chapter One.  A more detailed analysis of the 
relationship between property rights and tax obligations appears in Chapter Two. 
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Murphy and Nagel are far from the only critics of horizontal equity.  Although Murphy 
and Nagel favor deontological principles of distributive justice,288 an argument of the same form 
can be made by those who believe that tax laws should be arranged so as to maximize aggregate 
welfare or utility.  From this perspective, horizontal and vertical equity are irrational metrics 
because tax rates should be set in whatever way maximizes welfare regardless of the implications 
for horizontal and vertical equity.  The legal scholar Louis Kaplow makes an argument that has 
this form.289  It is probably fair to say that skepticism about the normative significance of 
horizontal and vertical equity is now the dominant view among tax scholars.290   
Murphy and Nagel’s argument has considerable intuitive appeal.  I agree with Murphy 
and Nagel that property rights are conventional in the sense that people do not have pre-
institutional property entitlements to particular objects external to their bodies291 and that it is 
myopic to consider the justification of property rights in isolation from tax policy.  But from the 
fact that property rights are conventional and that nobody has a non-institutional right to 
particular property entitlements, it does not follow that rules governing the creation and transfer 
of property entitlements cannot be judged unfair against the conventional baseline.292  People 
care about fair procedures in a great range of cases in which nobody has any antecedent right to a                                                         
288 Although Murphy and Nagel do not commit themselves to particular principles of distributive justice 
in The Myth of Ownership – and they may not agree with each other about the particulars – they appear to 
favor a more or less Rawlsian conception of distributive justice.   
289 E.g. Kaplow, “Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle,” 139-50. 
290 Other critics include Paul McDaniel, James Repetti, Jeffrey Kahn, and David Elkins. Paul R. 
McDaniel & James R. Repetti, “Horizontal Equity and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave / Kaplow 
Exchange,” Florida Tax Review, Vol. 1, (1993): 135-55; Kahn, “The Mirage of Equivalence and the 
Ethereal Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity,” 645-692; Elkins, “Horizontal Equity as a 
Principle of Tax Theory,” 43-90.   
291 This leaves open the possibility that people have a right to acquire some form of private property that 
must be respected in any just institutional arrangement.  Eric Mack has advanced this interpretation of 
natural property rights.  See Eric Mack, “The Natural Right of Property,” Social Philosophy & Policy 27 
(Winter 2010): 53-78. 
292 It seems that Murphy and Nagel’s argument might suggest a similarly skeptical view toward questions 
of procedural fairness in private law since contract law or tort law, like tax law, are ways of specifying 
legal rights to property given a particular baseline set of entitlements.   
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particular outcome.293  For example, nepotistic hiring procedures for government bureaucracies 
might be considered procedurally unfair even when there is no uniquely justified merit based 
hiring procedure such that any particular candidate has a claim to be hired on the merits.  So 
there is nothing especially incongruous about rules of fairness that measure tax obligations in 
relation to property holdings even if nobody deserves their pre-tax property holdings as a matter 
of natural right.  The challenge for defenders of tax fairness is to develop a positive case for 
concern with horizontal and vertical equity as norms that constrain the translation of property 
holdings into tax obligations. 
3. A HUMEAN DEFENSE OF TAX FAIRNESS 
Humean property theory suggests the basic contours of such a case.294  It shows how 
common sense principles of tax equity can be vindicated in the face of Murphy and Nagel’s 
critique without appeal to natural rights or pre-institutional moral desert.  If one rejects theories 
of natural property rights, giving normative weight to pre-tax ownership may have value in 
preventing tax policy from unsettling the property entitlements fixed by private law.  Horizontal 
and vertical equity are best understood as compromise principles for people who disagree about 
the empirical and moral facts bearing on the justice of redistributive taxation in order to prevent 
conflict over tax policy from generating the sort of negative sum resource conflict that property 
                                                        
293 Perceptions of procedural fairness also play a large role in the legitimacy of governmental authorities.  
See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 161-165. 
294 The only similar critique of Murphy and Nagel’s work that I know of is Brian Galle’s.  Brian Galle, 
“Tax Fairness,” Washington and Lee Law Review 65, (2008): 1323-1379.  Galle argues that “horizontal 
equity can be reconceived as a commitment by the authors of tax legislation to honor the past and future 
policy choices of others, with whom they are jointly engaged in a project of deliberative democracy.  
Alternately, horizontal equity may be justified by welfare gains from a shared agreement to leave certain 
controversial questions of distributive justice undecided during the revenue-raising process.”  Galle, “Tax 
Fairness,” 1323.  The Humean case for tax fairness unifies Galle’s alternative justifications of horizontal 
equity by showing how treating the existing distribution of property as normatively significant leads to 
welfare gains over the long run even if one does not assume that this distribution has any other morally 
attractive characteristics. 
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rights serve to prevent.  What ideal theory in both its resource egalitarian and consequentialist 
guises obscures is the importance of principles such as horizontal and vertical equity for 
structuring agreement between people who have starkly opposing moral and empirical 
commitments.  Humean property theory, by contrast, addresses the problem of cooperation under 
conditions of moral disagreement and thus provides resources to understand fairness rules that 
seem irrational when considered from the perspective of ideal theory.  
Hume argues that observance of conventional property rights prevents negative sum free-
for-all conflicts over resources. Property rights, and indeed private law more generally, serve to 
prevent wasteful conflict by providing authoritative rules that determine who may take what 
actions with respect to which resources.  This is the case even for property conventions with 
morally neutral content such as “everyone gets enforceable property rights over whatever objects 
they possess (regardless of how they came to get them).”  Hume’s analysis of the justification of 
private property might be extended to rules of fairness for apportioning the benefits and burdens 
of cooperation between property owners.  Even when private law defines stable property rights, 
there is a danger that the equilibrium established in the private sphere will be upset by aggressive 
use of public law.  Just as property rights function to prevent wasteful resource conflict in the 
private sphere, rules of tax fairness serve to constrain self-interested parties who may wish to use 
the tax system to gain at the expense of their fellow citizens.  By requiring that similarly situated 
persons be treated similarly and that persons with more income pay more tax, principles of tax 
fairness limit the extent to which distributions of wealth that have been fixed by private law may 
be unsettled by public law.  Horizontal and vertical equity do not rule out sharply progressive 
rates of taxation and so are fully consistent with high levels of redistribution from rich to poor.  
Vertical equity is violated by extreme forms of redistribution from poor to rich, for example a tax 
  140 
that applies to wage laborers and salaried workers but not to fund managers or by allowing 
interest deductions for second homes but not for first cars.  Horizontal equity is violated by 
certain kinds of redistribution between groups that are similarly situated with respect to income, 
for example redistribution from farmers to factory workers via a tax credit for “manufacturing 
labor.”  The two principles thus rule out forms of redistribution that are prima facie suspicious 
while remaining neutral on the extent to which tax policy ought to mitigate income inequality. 
Different polities might adopt different tax bases (for example, contribution in proportion 
to wealth rather than in proportion to income) or different levels of progressivity (for example, 
different personal exemptions and different tax rates for income over a certain threshold).  Since 
there is more than one way of specifying the tax base, there is more than one plausible fairness 
norm for public goods contributions.  As long as the tax base is wide, however, observance of tax 
fairness norms will constrain the extent to which tax policy can be used to destabilize relative 
property entitlements.  Once a tax base has been fixed, the norm of horizontal equity requires 
that any difference in tax obligation for two people with the same position vis-à-vis the tax base 
must be justified in terms of some public interest other than raising revenue.  Such justifications 
might include the desirability of disincentives for socially harmful activities such as cigarette 
smoking or air pollution or subsidies for socially beneficial activities.  Taxes such as these that 
are used as a sort of regulatory policy are known as Pigouvian taxes after the English economist, 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, who showed how taxes could be used to correct externalities by altering the 
market price of an activity so as to reflect total social cost.295  The opposite policy, tax 
deductions or tax credits designed to encourage certain forms of behavior, are really a covert sort 
of public spending – “tax expenditures” – and must be justified as a worthy use of public 
resources.  Because candidates for Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are not especially hard to come                                                         
295 A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1920). 
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by, the public interest criterion is not an especially restrictive constraint.  The principle of 
horizontal equity should not, therefore, be seen as ruling out any deviation from equal treatment 
of those equally positioned relative to the tax base, but rather as requiring a particular sort of 
justification for such deviations.  Because legislators are besieged by an endless army of special 
interest lobbyists whose job it is to construct arguments that their clients’ favorite tax benefits are 
really in the public interest, principles of tax fairness exert less normative pressure in practice 
than they might if taxes were negotiated by taxpayers themselves.  But even in this dysfunctional 
context, compromise on a package that reduces deductions and credits to lower tax rates or raise 
revenue is the usual formula for comprehensive tax reform.296   
Although tax fairness norms cannot be used to deduce a unique tax regime from a set of 
property entitlements, they serve to structure tax policy in a way that may be embraced by people 
with opposing policy preferences.  Consider two people, John and Robert, who have 
fundamentally different views about distributive justice.  John favors highly egalitarian tax and 
transfer policies whereas Robert favors policies that do not greatly alter market outcomes.  The 
current tax code is somewhere between the policy preferences of John and Robert: John favors a 
more progressive code and Robert favors a less progressive code.  Given the current tax code, 
John tends to favor any tax breaks that will result in a more equitable distribution of post-tax 
income, whereas Robert tends to favor tax breaks that will counteract progressive tax rates and 
thereby result in a less equitable distribution.  John thus prefers to make food purchases at 
grocery stores deductible since this would benefit those with low income more than those with 
high income, whereas Robert would like to abolish limits on student loan and educational 
expense deductions for high income taxpayers since this will tend to favor the wealthy and bring 
effective tax rates closer to his preferred flat tax.  Achieving “tax justice” through a motley                                                         
296 The 1986 Tax Reform Act took this form. 
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assortment of tax breaks is, however, inefficient.  And it is unfair to those whose tastes are not 
favored by the resulting subsidies.  It might be better for both John and Robert if they each agree 
to abstain from supporting these sorts of tax breaks even when one of them thinks the particular 
policy desirable in light of their larger theory of distributive justice.  Adherence to norms of 
horizontal equity therefore represents a compromise position that is neutral between John’s and 
Robert’s substantive views about progressive taxation but, if adhered to scrupulously, will make 
the tax code better by each of their lights at any given level of progressivity.297  The same may be 
true if John and Robert are self-interested taxpayers rather than ideologues: lower tax rates 
without tax subsidies are, ceteris paribus, preferable to a patchwork of inefficient tax subsidies 
for both John and Robert if each prefers different subsidies and both are equally likely to get 
their preferred subsidies enacted.  And it may also be true if John and Robert are public spirited 
citizens who share a common theory of justice, but disagree about the empirical consequences of 
progressive taxation.   
As the example of John and Robert suggests, norms of fair contribution are functionally 
similar to property rules in that, if they are generally respected, they prevent wasteful 
competition over resources.  One of the virtues of private law (or at least the private law of major 
common law and civil law legal systems) is that it defines access to resources according to 
impersonal rules of a general character.  Although the resulting distribution of property might 
sometimes turn out to be substantively undesirable, the process by which property entitlements 
are created and transferred will be (at least in a well-functioning legal system) procedurally fair 
                                                        
297 Note that this is not a case of overlapping consensus but rather a sort of mutual disarmament.  John and 
Robert each have different preferences for tax policy, but each may be willing to give up some of their 
second best strategies if the other is willing to do so. 
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in the sense that it does not result from favoritism to particular individuals or groups.298  It allows 
resolution of disputes over resources without resort either to moral first principles or to 
judgments about the general moral merits or demerits of particular individuals.  For example, 
rather than asking who is most deserving of a particular plot of land, one need only to apply the 
preexisting legal rules that determine property entitlements.  Tax laws that apply to abstract 
economic categories (property, income, or consumption) rather than to particular activities or to 
identifiable groups of people are, ceteris paribus, preferable for the same reason.  By contrast, 
taxes, deductions, and credits targeted at narrow classes of readily identifiable individuals (for 
example, the tax on purchases of chocolate ice cream) are prima facie suspicious.  As Murphy 
and Nagel point out, it would be foolish to think that a taxpayer has a moral entitlement to any 
particular structure of relative prices.299  However, it does not follow from this that any way of 
determining prices is equally fair.  Chocolate ice cream lovers have no grounds for complaint if 
supply chain problems cause chocolate ice cream to become more expensive than vanilla.  But it 
does seem objectionable if prices rise because those who do not like chocolate ice cream succeed 
in shifting the tax burden to those who do.    
Such intuitions about fairness can be supported by more sophisticated policy analysis. 
There are two problems with arbitrary taxes and tax expenditures.  First, they often represent 
rent-seeking behavior.300  Laws such as a deduction for vanilla ice cream purchases do not have 
                                                        
298 The contrast here is with estate based societies in which rights and duties are determined in large part 
by one’s social group and thus the same rules are not generally applicable to all members of society but 
only to members of a particular estate.    
299 Murphy & Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, 109. 
300 Rent seeking behavior is behavior that aims to achieve profit beyond the normal risk adjusted rate of 
return by receiving special privileges from the government.  “Rents” in this sense of the term might 
include monopoly privileges, state subsidies, or regulations that provide special benefits to particular 
parties.  Unlike profits earned in competitive markets through more efficient production, “rents” do not 
represent gains in national wealth but rather wealth transfers from one party to another.  See Anne 
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an even vaguely plausibly public purpose.  Rather, the law is simply an attempt to shift the tax 
burden from one group of people to another.  It is the functional equivalent of a wealth transfer 
that distorts private consumption decisions.  For this reason, rent-seeking taxes and tax subsidies 
are likely to be negative sum policies.  Second, narrowly targeted taxes and tax expenditures 
have the effect of substituting public judgments about what is worth consuming for private 
judgments.  This effect is particularly strong at high marginal tax rates.  Substituting public 
judgment for private judgment burdens citizens with minority tastes.  This may be entirely 
appropriate when people have private preferences for socially harmful activities such as air 
pollution, alcohol use, etc.  However, since one of the purposes of private property is to provide 
a sphere of individual control in which individuals may make choices according to their own 
values and own tastes, allowing majority tastes (or the interests of a concentrated minority) to 
trump minority tastes undermines part of the rationale for private ownership.  If my neighbor 
prefers relatively larger houses than I do, then this is a good reason for him to buy a larger house 
and for me to buy a smaller one, but not a good reason for the government to tax me more than 
him.301  Although some degree of such unfairness is inevitable (in particular, it is very hard to 
treat preferences for consumption of leisure and market goods symmetrically), this does not 
mean that we should give up on the notion of tax neutrality altogether in favor of some fully 
specified theory of distributive justice. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64, no. 3, 
(1974): 291–303. 
301 Murphy and Nagel think that this question should be decided on the basis of “(a) whether it distorts the 
broader pattern of redistribution and financing of public provision that our general conception of justice 
requires, by shifting some of the costs or by surreptitiously diminishing or increasing the amount of 
redistribution; (b) whether it serves other purposes, legitimate for fiscal policy, which are important 
enough to override any such shortfall.”  Murphy & Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, 
171.  This analysis seems to identify the right trade-off.  But it is possible to bracket questions concerning 
“general conceptions of justice” and to simply ask whether the policy benefits are worth the violation of 
horizontal equity (a principle that may be shared by partisans of widely differing conceptions of justice). 
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People do not need to agree on principles of distributive justice to agree that rent seeking 
tax discrimination is an unfair allocation of burdens.  Standards of horizontal equity (people with 
the same income ought to pay the same amount of tax) and vertical equity (people with more 
income ought to pay more tax) serve to pick out normatively suspect tax provisions.  As the John 
and Robert example showed, it is advantageous for people with differing views on progressive 
taxation to agree on opposing policies that violate horizontal or vertical equity without any 
justification in terms of regulation of externalities.  Fairness judgments that track such 
hypothetical agreements play a valuable role by ruling out certain bundles of property rights and 
tax obligations even in the face of disagreement over larger questions of distributive justice or 
empirical uncertainty about the consequences of certain tax policies.  Evaluating tax policy 
exclusively from the perspective of post-tax outcomes effaces the role of fairness norms in 
allowing people with disparate views to cooperate on questions of tax policy.  If a single person 
could design and guarantee enforcement of a tax code that perfectly implements her ideal theory 
of distributive justice, one could ignore metrics such as horizontal and vertical equity that use 
pretax holdings or income as a normative baseline.  But this is not remotely like the situation 
faced by anyone living under a democratic government.302  Tax fairness is therefore a genuine 
concern for real world (as opposed to ideal theory) tax policy, and not merely a distraction from 
the real questions of distributive justice.  Although Murphy and Nagel’s substantive views on 
taxes and tax expenditures do not seem inconsistent with the policy prescriptions suggested 
here,303 their method recommends jettisoning some of the tools that allow for convergence on 
                                                        
302 Indeed, modern tax codes are sufficiently complex that they will require coordination between 
different officials even in a political regime in which decision makers are not accountable to the populace. 
303 Murphy and Nagel do not explore cases in which their policy prescriptions might conflict with 
horizontal equity.  For example, if doctors are much less sensitive to the incentive effects of high tax rates 
than lawyers are, should we tax doctors more heavily than lawyers so as to minimize economic distortions 
per unit of revenue?  For similar reasons, some versions of optimal tax theory suggest that marginal tax 
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better policy between people with different views.  Property entitlements provide a useful 
baseline against which to evaluate public goods contributions precisely so that discussion of tax 
obligations does not reduce to the question of who deserves what post-tax income.  This is not 
the sort of consideration that neo-Rousseauian tends to take seriously.  But from the Humean 
perspective, rules of justice secure a stable framework for mutually advantageous cooperation 
rather than arrange affairs to correspond to principles of justice extrinsic to our actual 
institutions.  Using pretax income as a normative baseline is instrumental to this end whether or 
not it has any other special moral status. 
The neo-Humean perspective on tax fairness can illuminate the debate over the flat tax.  
One could make an argument for proportionate taxation (i.e. the “flat tax”) analogous to the 
defense of horizontal equity outlined above.  One of the dangers of any scheme of taxation, 
particularly when combined with generous transfer payments, is that the tax system will be used 
to entirely efface the pattern of entitlements generated by the relatively impersonal rules of 
private law by redistribution in accordance with political power.  One might think that the former 
tends to be positive sum whereas the latter tends to be a negative sum game.304  In other words, 
whereas property law is supposed to define entitlements in such a way as to prevent a wasteful 
free-for-all, a regime of excessive and inequitable taxation may serve to unsettle distributive 
questions by recreating a free-for-all in the political arena. This is pathological.  Opponents and 
proponents of proportionate taxation should be able to agree that considerations of vertical equity 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
rates should decline at high levels of income.  H. Peyton Young, Equity: In Theory and Practice 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 109-111.  
304 Of course, it is hard to generalize here.  If private law is configured to give a few individuals 
monopolistic positions that allow them to accrue great rents at the expense of everyone else, private 
ordering could be quite undesirable.  Conversely, risk spreading via tax and transfer programs may be 
broadly positive sum. 
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are a good heuristic for distinguishing tax schemes (especially regressive schemes)305 designed to 
transfer wealth from the less powerful to the more powerful from tax regimes that might have a 
plausible justification in terms of risk spreading.  Taxation proportional to income or wealth 
might be best justified by analogy to vertical equity as a psychologically salient compromise rule 
that severely constrains use of the tax code for negative sum redistribution and other forms of 
wasteful rent seeking.  Barbara Fried suggests psychological salience as a deflationary 
explanation for the broad popularity of proportional taxation schemes (including among unlikely 
figures such as John Rawls).306  But if the Humean defense of fairness norms in taxation is 
correct, then the argument from psychological salience may be quite plausible under certain 
conditions.  Insofar as stable convergence of judgment among persons with disparate moral 
commitments is important, psychological salience is a normatively relevant factor.  Whether this 
is a good argument for adopting a flat tax depends on institutional context.  In affluent counties 
with stable and relatively well-functioning political systems, I do not see great value in requiring 
proportionate taxation, especially if norms of vertical equity are observed so as to prevent 
upward redistribution.307  Under conditions of poorly constrained governments, low social trust,                                                         
305 It is probably more often the case that deviations from proportionate taxation will be regressive rather 
than progressive since wealthy people are likely to have disproportionate political power for a variety of 
reasons.  Democratic government may be atypical in this respect. 
306 Fried argues, “The ‘focal point’ explanation may explain why people as divergent in their political 
commitments as Rawls, Hayek, Gauthier and Epstein have gravitated towards proportionate rates to begin 
with, as good-faith, unselfconscious participants in a Schelling-like convergence.  It may also explain 
why people like Epstein and Hayek, who are clearly predisposed against progressive taxation on 
libertarian or quasi-libertarian grounds, would fix on flat rates for strategic reasons, seeing it as an 
alternative that is both politically obtainable and politically sustainable.”  Barbara H. Fried, 
“Proportionate Taxation as a Fair Division of the Social Surplus: The Strange Career of an Idea,” 
Economics and Philosophy 19 (2003), 237. 
307 Insofar as the real problem is rent-seeking, comparison of the U.S. corporate tax code and individual 
tax code suggests that eliminating progressive tax rates would not be helpful in the U.S.  The U.S. 
corporate tax rate is 35% for all midsized or large corporations, but the effective tax rate varies from the 
single digits to almost 30% for different sectors of the economy.  See Mike Bostock, Matthew Ericson, 
David Leonhardt & Bill Marsh, “Across U.S. Companies Tax Rates Vary Greatly,” New York Times, May 
25, 2013, available at   http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/25/sunday-review/corporate-
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highly predatory elites and or class or ethnic conflicts that lend themselves to a taste for punitive 
taxation, the case for norms that sharply constrain taxation authority is stronger.308  The larger 
point here is that there may be some trade-off between institutional stability and the ability to 
achieve optimal policy.  Norms that provide greater stability and protect against governmental 
predation sometimes impede the pursuit of optimal policy.  The costs and benefits of this trade-
off will be different in every context. 
4. IS HORIZONTAL EQUITY VACUOUS OR BANAL? 
One possible objection to this defense of horizontal equity is that horizontal equity is 
empty until a tax base is defined.  One might worry that any tax scheme may be horizontally 
equitable if the tax base is defined so as to exclude all deductible and creditable items.  For 
example if one wants to impose a special tax on certain exotic animals and give tax deductions 
for tourism in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, one could define the tax base as all income from 
labor and capital, plus the value of all zebras and capybaras owned less expenditures on 
vacations in the U.P.  Although this particular example is frivolous, a large number of deductions 
including education and medical expenses can plausibly be defended as “not really income” in 
the relevant sense either because they are really a form of investment309 or because they 
represent non-discretionary spending that is categorically different from other consumption.310  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
taxes.html?ref=sunday, for a graphical representation of the disparity in effective corporate tax rates 
across sectors of the U.S. economy.  The individual tax code is significantly less distorted by credits and 
deductions despite a far more progressive rate structure. 
308 Of course, under these conditions, it is likely to be difficult to reach agreement on proportionate 
taxation or even to inculcate the necessary sense of fairness, so it may be that the flat tax is infeasible 
precisely where it is needed. 
309 Technically, this theory suggests that education should be treated as a capital asset and should give the 
taxpayer basis that might be deducted against future labor income attributable to investments in 
education.  But this scheme would probably be too hard to administer through the tax code given the 
difficulty of determining baseline income.   
310 Given the current structure of health care spending, this does not seem especially realistic.  It may have 
been more realistic in the early twentieth century.   
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The danger is that any credit, deduction or surcharge may be justified by defining the tax base so 
that it includes or excludes the relevant items.  Some limits must be placed on what can count as 
an acceptable tax base for horizontal equity to be a meaningful principle. 
At minimum, the tax base must meet three criteria.  First, it must be broad.  If a tax that is 
paid into general revenue affects only a small number of people, there is reason to worry that the 
relationship between taxpayers and non-taxpayers is inequitable even if the tax is horizontally 
equitable with respect to those who do pay it.  Second, the tax base should be psychologically 
salient.  An overly complex tax base is not likely to trigger intuitions concerning equity and if 
people have difficulty keeping track of their position relative to others, horizontally equitable tax 
rates are unlikely to have a legitimating effect.  Finally, the tax base should be economically 
meaningful.  A tax base that does not track citizen’s economic status reasonably well will not be 
perceived as fair even if tax rates are horizontally equitable relative to this base.  These criteria 
leave open a wide array of options.  Income taxes, wealth taxes, VATs, real estate taxes, 
endowment (ability to earn) taxes and consumption taxes all easily qualify.  Tariffs, luxury taxes, 
and payroll taxes, however, seem questionable at least if they are used primarily to raise general 
purpose revenue and not for some other end such as industrial policy or unemployment 
insurance. 
A somewhat different reason for thinking that horizontal equity is trivial is the concern 
that it does not rule out any sort of taxation that can be endorsed on principled grounds.  
Horizontal equity might, therefore, be a useful heuristic for identifying suspicious provisions in 
the tax code, but does not do any real normative work because all good faith observers will 
oppose horizontally inequitable policies on other grounds.  This conclusion is too strong.  First, 
as Joseph Stiglitz has shown, horizontal equity cannot be derived from utilitarian premises and 
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welfare maximizing tax policy can be proven to violate horizontal equity given certain plausible 
assumptions.311  Second, in a variety of contexts there is an efficiency case for shifting the tax 
burden onto persons unlikely to change their behavior in response to the tax even if this requires 
violation of horizontal equity.  Commitment to horizontal equity entails that these sorts of tax 
strategies are disfavored.  If revenue is raised through a consumption tax, higher taxes on 
products with relatively inelastic demand curves will be more efficient than taxes levied on 
products for which demand is elastic.  The intuitive idea behind so-called Ramsey taxation is that 
taxes are more efficient insofar as they do not change behavior. 312  Inelastic demand curves are 
ones for which changes in consumption are not very sensitive to changes in price and so when 
the price to consumers is increased by the imposition of a tax, consumer behavior changes little.  
Although Ramsey taxation might be economically efficient, it may have sharply differing effects 
on people with similar levels of consumption or income.  If one person is inclined to consume 
more of the taxed product than another person, the first person will bear more of the tax burden.  
Although the tax elasticities of labor supply are probably less than those of demand for most 
consumer items (in other words, people are less likely to change their work habits in response to 
taxation than they are to change their buying habits), it is possible to use a similar strategy with 
respect to taxation of income.  This would involve taxing people at different rates depending on 
whether they fall into groups likely to work less when faced with higher taxes.313  It is possible, 
therefore, for horizontal equity to conflict with considerations of economic efficiency (as well as 
                                                        
311 Joseph Stiglitz, “Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: the Case for Random Taxation,” Journal of 
Public Economics 18 (1982): l-33. 
312 Frank P. Ramsey, “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,” Economic Journal 37 (1927): 47-61. 
313 Arguably the tax code already does so to the extent that it allows entrepreneurs (who might be more 
tax sensitive) to realize some of their income as capital gains and thus pay a lower effective tax rate than 
salaried employees.  However, this is an artifact of the distinction between ordinary income and capital 
gains rather than a purposeful attempt to treat different types of labor differently. 
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a variety of other normative considerations).  This is not to say that horizontal equity should 
always trump other considerations: such judgments must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
5. DOES HORIZONTAL EQUITY MATTER IN PRACTICE? 
The last several sections have been devoted to a theoretical exploration of the 
significance of horizontal equity as a principle of fairness that facilitates coordination on tax law 
between persons with differing normative or empirical views.   In this section I will present 
evidence that horizontal equity actually does play this role in practice.  First, taxpayers tend to 
view more horizontally equitable policies as more legitimate.  This makes voters more willing to 
support taxes and taxpayers less likely to evade them.  Second, successful tax reform efforts in 
the past have used the goal of horizontal equity as a focal point for compromise and as a tool to 
build the support necessary to overcome opposition from those who benefit from tax inequities. 
Like many other social institutions, tax collection relies on a high degree of voluntary 
compliance, without which the sheer volume of opportunistic law-breaking would overwhelm 
the ability of authorities to detect and punish violations of the law.  For this reason, “tax morale” 
– the willingness of taxpayers to comply with the law for reasons other than fear of formal 
sanctions – is crucially important.  Tax morale is sensitive to a range of factors including 
attitudes toward the state, ethical commitments, perceptions of tax fairness, perceptions of 
procedural fairness, perceptions of tax compliance by other taxpayers, and perceptions of 
influence over government policy.314  Many if not most taxpayers comply with tax laws 
voluntarily even when tax evasion might have positive expected value given the probability of 
                                                        
314 It is likely that the general population contains three types of taxpayers” (1) those disposed to follow 
the law under almost all circumstances, (2) taxpayers who will cheat whenever they think doing so is 
worth the risk and (3) taxpayers who pay or evade taxes based on a variety of contextual factors including 
their perceptions of the behavior of other taxpayers, the benefits they receive from the government and 
their general views about the fairness and legitimacy of the tax system.  The important question, 
therefore, is whether horizontal equity has an important influence on this third type of taxpayer. 
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audits and enforcement.315  Revenue collection would be far lower if taxpayers complied only 
when the risk of punishment made it financially advantageous to do so.316 
Although the results of laboratory experiments are not uniform, most studies have found 
that tax compliance increases with perceptions of horizontal equity and decreases when 
taxpayers perceive themselves to be treated differently from others who are similarly situated 
relative to the tax base.317  Experimental subjects respond differently to tax increases and 
decreases depending on whether they violate horizontal equity.318  One experiment found that tax 
increases that fall equally on all members of a group and preserve horizontal equity do not tend 
to reduce compliance.319  However, tax increases that fall inequitably on different groups of 
                                                        
315 “[A] large number of empirical studies (see previous chapters) demonstrate that the majority of 
taxpayers are inherently honest and willing to pay their share.  If taxpayers are unable to understand the 
complex tax law and seek help from tax practitioners, they do it with the goal of preparing a correct tax 
file rather than finding aggressive strategies to reduce their taxes within the legal scope.”  Erich Kirchler, 
The Economic Psychology of Tax Behavior (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 167.  
“Clearly, not every taxpayer is a rational gamer straight out of Gary Becker's model of crime and 
punishment.  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the continuing emphasis on fines and audits has 
produced no apparent improvement in tax compliance.  Alex Raskolnikov, “Revealing Choices: Using 
Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement,” Columbia Law Review 109 (May, 2009), 696. 
316 “Application of the standard economic theory of crime to tax avoidance . . . produces an unambiguous 
prediction of behavior: throughout the 1970s no one should have paid the taxes they owed . . . .”  Michael 
J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, “The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy,” National Tax 
Journal 38, no. 3 (Sept. 1985), 358.  
317 Kirchler, The Economic Psychology of Tax Behavior, 78.  Multiple studies find that horizontal equity 
has a significant effect on tax compliance.  Michael W. Spicer, & Lee A. Becker, “Fiscal inequity and 
Tax Evasion: an Experimental Approach”, National Tax Journal 33, no. 2 (1980): 171-175; Ana de Juan, 
Miguel A. Lasheras, & Rafaela Mayo, “Voluntary Tax Compliant Behavior of Spanish Income Tax 
Payers,” Public Finance 49, no. 4 (1994): 90-105; Donald V. Moser, John H. Evan, & Chung K. Kim, 
“The Effects of Horizontal and Exchange Inequity on Tax Reporting Decisions,” The Accounting Review 
70, no. 4, (Oct. 1995): 619-634; Bernard Fortin, Guy Lacroix & Marie-Claire Villeval, “Tax Evasion and 
Social Interactions,” Journal of Public Economics 91 (2007), 2089-2112.  One study, however, found a 
contrary result.  P. Webley, H. Robben, & I. Morris, “Social Comparison, Attitudes and Tax Evasion in a 
Shop Simulation,” Social Behavior 3, no. 3 (1988), 219-228. 
318 “We also find fairness effects in term of horizontal equity: for a given gross income and a given 
personal tax rate, the individual will report less when facing a reduction in the mean tax rate of his group. 
Perceived unfair taxation may thus lead to increased tax evasion. At the policy level this means that a 
taxation system that is more horizontally equitable is likely to improve tax compliance.”  Fortin, Lacroix 
& Villeval, “Tax Evasion and Social Interactions,” 2107.  
319 “We find that, in the presence of horizontal inequity, subjects respond to an increase in exchange 
inequity (resulting from a tax- rate increase) by reporting less income. . . . In contrast, in the presence of 
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taxpayers and thus increase horizontal inequity lead to lower rates of tax compliance.  It appears 
that at least in the laboratory, people do tend to perceive horizontally equitable tax schemes as 
more fair and this makes them more willing to tolerate higher taxes.  There is some survey 
evidence for this effect outside of the laboratory as well.  Surveys of Dutch entrepreneurs found 
that perceptions of fairness, including horizontal equity, were unrelated to intensions to comply 
with tax law for entrepreneurs with strong general personal dispositions to follow laws and moral 
rules, but appeared to have a significant impact on entrepreneurs who lack this general 
disposition.320  There is reason for caution in extrapolating these results.  Effects outside the 
laboratory depend on public understanding of the tax code and this is generally quite poor.321  
Nevertheless, experience with comprehensive tax reform gives some reason to believe both that 
horizontal equity is an attractive compromise principle and that improvements in horizontal 
equity enhance the legitimacy of the tax system. 
The most important U.S. tax legislation of the past fifty years is the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act.  Passage of the 1986 Act surprised most observers (including the special interest lobbyists 
whose job it was to stop it).322  The reform reflected a very simple general policy: elimination of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
horizontal equity, subjects do not significantly change the amount of income they report as the tax rate 
increases. Subjects react less to the increase in exchange inequity associated with a tax- rate increase, 
apparently because they realize that all other taxpayers face the same tax-rate increase. Thus, in the 
presence of horizontal equity, the effect of the increased exchange inequity no longer dominates the effect 
of the economic incentives associated with a tax-rate increase.” Moser, Evan, & Kim, “The Effects of 
Horizontal and Exchange Inequity on Tax Reporting Decisions,” 620.  
320 Peter Verboon & Sjoerd Goslinga, “The Role of Fairness in Tax Compliance,” Netherlands Journal of 
Psychology 65, (2009), 143. 
321 Kirchler, The Economic Psychology of Tax Behavior, 32-37. 
322 Prior to the 1986 Act, there was widespread pessimism about the prospects for reform.   In 1984, 
Michael Graetz wrote, “Prospects for structural tax reform have been dimmed by recent ‘reforms’ in 
congressional practices; public pressure to enact income tax reforms seems nonexistent; political 
leadership on tax matters has become increasingly diffuse; committee deliberations are now open to the 
public and are well-attended by representatives of groups with a special interest in the outcome; and 
political action committees now have great influence in guiding policy decisions.  In short, for those who 
would urge massive tax reforms, there is more than ample cause for despair.” Michael J. Graetz, “Can the 
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exemptions, deductions and credits were used to expand the tax base in order to lower tax rates.  
This allowed both President Reagan and congressional Democrats to claim important victories.  
Reagan achieved a major goal in lowering tax rates in a context in which significant budget 
deficits made it very difficult to secure support for policies that would decrease tax revenue.  
Liberal reformers were able to close a large number of loopholes that mainly benefited large 
businesses and wealthy individuals.  The reform was roughly revenue neutral, which meant that 
neither conservatives nor liberals could claim victory in their ongoing battle over the size of the 
federal government.  Although elite opinion was squarely behind the reform, its improbable 
passage required overcoming opposition from the numerous interest groups that benefited from 
the pre-1986 code. 
Horizontal equity was an explicit aim of the 1986 Act.  Conlon, Wrightson and Beam 
note that “by the mid-1980s, most experts—including those within government—were in 
agreement on basic principles.  According to the consensus, an ideal income tax should be 
horizontally equitable; it should be investment-neutral; and it should be administratively 
efficient.  All three goals could be obtained by broadening the tax base and lowering rates.”323  
The reform’s key legislative architect, Sen. Bill Bradley, also appealed to horizontal equity as a 
central goal of reform.324  Horizontal equity thus played two roles in the 1986 tax reform.  First, 
it provided a focal point for compromise between a conservative White House and a more liberal 
Congress.  Second, it provided an intuitive conception of tax fairness that was used to publicly 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Income Tax Continue to be the Major Revenue Source?” in Options for Tax Reform, Joseph Pechman, ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutions, 1984): 39-69, 42. 
323 Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson & David R. Beam, Taxing Choices: the Politics of Tax 
Reform (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1990), 242-243. 
324 In a 1982 speech proposing what became the basic framework for the 1986 tax reform, Bradley stated, 
“we should have a tax code in which all citizens with equal incomes are treated essentially the same 
way.”  Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and 
the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform (New York: Random House, 1987), 23. 
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justify the reform.  Despite disagreements about the effects of the final reform package, even 
skeptics acknowledge that it did make some progress toward greater horizontal equity.325  In any 
case, the reform appears to have improved public impressions of the tax code.  Survey data from 
the late 1980’s suggests that citizens viewed the tax code as more fair after the 1986 reform and 
were more willing to comply with tax law as a result.326 
This experience is not unique.  Horizontal equity was a key goal of successful tax reform 
in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.327  Equitable treatment of different types of income was 
crucial for the successful introduction of income taxation in nineteenth century Great Britain. 
Robert Peel, who reestablished the income tax in 1841 was partially motivated by the promise of 
establishing “a sense of equity between different types of wealth and income.”328  Peel’s 
calculation appears to have been correct: the British state was able to raise more revenue with 
less political opposition in comparison both with its rivals on the continent and with its prior 
system of public finance.329    The broader lesson is that tax policies that observe horizontal and 
vertical equity build public trust in the tax system and thus can help to create the conditions 
necessary for public support of social welfare spending and public investment. 
6. THE ROLE OF TAX FAIRNESS NORMS 
                                                        
325 E.g., Michael Graetz wrote, “I would agree that the real merits of this legislation must be located in its 
improvements in tax equity, particularly in its promotion of greater ‘horizontal equity’ among taxpayers – 
the idea that people with similar incomes should pay similar amounts of tax.  Once again, however, the 
achievements of the 1986 act seem to have been exaggerated.”  Michael Graetz, “The Truth about Tax 
Reform,” Florida Law Review 40, no. 4 (1988), 629-30. 
326 Karyl A. Kinsey & Harold G. Grasmick, “Did the Tax Reform Act of 1986 Improve Tax Compliance? 
Three Studies of Pre- and Post-TRA Compliance Attitudes”, Law & Policy 15, no. 4, (Oct. 1993), 318-
320. 
327 Cedric Sandford, Successful Tax Reform: Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Reform in Six Countries 
(Bath, U.K.: Fiscal Publications, 1993), 66, 73-74, 100-101, 154, 163. 
328 Martin Dounton, “The Politics of British Taxation” in The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History 
1500-1914, Bartolome Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O’Brien & Granciso Comin, eds., (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 133. 
329 Dounton, “The Politics of British Taxation,” 141-42. 
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Concern with horizontal and vertical equity may, at first blush, appear to be irrational if 
one rejects natural rights or moral desert accounts of property rights because it accords normative 
weight to market outcomes that have no particular moral significance.  In a world with broad 
agreements on the normative and empirical questions germane to tax policy and a political 
system strong enough to implement the policies that this consensus implies, it would be sensible 
to determine taxes by considering the effects of various policies rather than their relation to 
patterns of pre-tax income.  Under conditions of pervasive disagreement about relevant moral or 
factual matters, however, norms of tax fairness can play a valuable role in preventing 
disagreements about distributive questions from unsettling relative property entitlements fixed by 
private law.  Proponents of differing ideologies can agree that it is desirable to avoid a wasteful 
patchwork of taxes and tax subsidies at any level of redistribution.  Horizontal and vertical equity 
are thus best understood as requiring a sort of procedural fairness in allocating obligations to 
contribute to public goods.  They provide a partial solution to problem of how to assign tax 
obligations in the same way that “everyone gets to keep what they possess” provides a partial 
solution to the problem of control over resources.  Like property rules, fairness norms such as 
horizontal and vertical equity appeal to the long-run interests of all parties in maintaining stable 
forms of social cooperation.  Stable fairness norms approximate a sort of hypothetical rational 
bargain in that all have an interest in maintaining the norms so long as they expect others to do 
so.  Because they appeal to long-run mutual advantage, fairness norms can enable cooperation 
between persons with conflicting interests or values. 
This defense of horizontal and vertical equity as focal points for compromise is a modest 
one.  It does not necessarily imply policy prescriptions different from those endorsed by Murphy 
and Nagel.  And I have not tried to consider alternative means of constraining systems of 
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taxation to prevent wasteful resource conflict – even if horizontal and vertical equity are useful 
principles of fairness under some circumstances, this does not necessarily mean that they are the 
only or best ways to constrain opportunistic use of the power to tax. 
7.  GAUS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY AND REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION 
In this section, I analyze a prominent alternative to my critique of Nagel and Murphy’s 
The Myth of Ownership, which, despite its Humean flavor, has quite different implications for 
the relationship between property ownership and taxation.  In his recent book, The Order of 
Public Reason, Gerald Gaus argues that his theory of “justificatory liberalism” supports both a 
political order based on private property and a “tilt” against strongly redistributive political 
institutions.330  Gaus’ theory is neo-Rousseauian in its approach to justification but neo-Humean 
in its treatment of non-natural property rights as constraints on other aspects of political order.  
Gaus’ treatment of property rights is framed as an implicit reply to Nagel and Murphy.  He 
argues that property ownership puts significant moral limits on tax policy.  However, unlike my 
critique, which is consistent both with highly progressive taxation and with a flat tax, Gaus 
believes that his theory of the moral significance of property ownership tells against taxation for 
redistributive purposes.  In this section, I will critique Gaus’ argument.  I will argue that there is 
reason to doubt that the neo-Rousseauian aspects of Gaus’ approach are well suited to analyze 
property rights and will show that Gaus’ argument for a “tilt” toward classical liberalism fails 
even if one accepts Gaus’ methodology.  Taking property rights seriously is consistent with both 
classical and modern liberalism. 
                                                        
330 Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and 
Bounded World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). An earlier version of the same 
argument appeared in Gerald Gaus, “Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory 
Liberalism’s Classical Tilt,” Social Philosophy & Policy 27, no. 1 (2010): 233-275. 
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Gaus’ larger project is to reconcile the authority of social morality—“the set of social-
moral rules that require or prohibit action, and so ground moral imperatives that we direct to 
each other to engage in, or refrain from, certain lines of conduct”—with our status as free and 
equal persons.331  Social morality is crucial for cooperative social life, but it makes demands that 
often limit individuals’ freedom of choice or restricts their pursuit of their own interests.  Gaus’ 
discussion of social morality is intriguing, but it is not my subject here.  What is crucial for 
Gaus’ theory of property rights is the conception of public justification that he derives from it.  
Gaus’ argument combines Humean and Rousseauian elements.332  It is Humean in its emphasis 
on the importance of coordination on shared norms and on the moral significance of existing 
moral practice.  Because social morality coordinates the behavior of different individuals, it must 
consist of a common moral code – the social contract – in order to perform its function.  But in 
order for its demands to be justified, its content must be justifiable to each individual.  The 
emphasis on justification to free and equal citizens is the Rousseauian aspect of his theory. 
Gaus argues that rules of social morality are binding on a person only when that person 
has sufficient reason to accept them and when the person is in a context in which others 
generally follow the rule.  Gaus’ Basic Principle of Public Justification states that:  
A moral imperative “φ” in context C, based on rule L, is an authoritative requirement of 
social morality only if each normal moral agent has sufficient reason to (a) internalize 
rule L, (b) hold that L requires φ-type acts in circumstances C and (c) moral agents 
generally conform to L.333 
                                                        
331 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 2. 
332 In calling Gaus’ approach neo-Rousseauian, I am using Jeremy Waldron’s trichotomy of property 
theories.  See Jeremy Waldron, “The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property,” 
Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994): 85–123.  In Chapter 1, I discuss “resource egalitarian” theories 
in place of neo-Rousseauian theories because the term “Rousseauian” is an awkward fit for theories 
primarily distinguished by their commitment to a conception of distributive justice that post-dates 
Rousseau.  Gaus’ theory is not ‘resource egalitarian’.  It is, however, openly indebted to Rousseau in its 
emphasis on justification to each member of the political community as a free and equal citizen.   
333 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 263. 
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According to Gaus, “normal moral agents” might be quite different from one another.  Each 
moral agent evaluates rules according to their own “evaluative standards.”  Such standards vary 
from person to person.   However, normal moral agents embrace evaluative standards that are 
mutually intelligible and are widely acknowledged to have bearing on moral issues even by those 
who disagree.334  Rational egoists who care exclusively about their own welfare are not normal 
moral agents, nor is Rawls’ blades of grass counter.  The former is entirely unconcerned with 
social morality while the latter lacks evaluative standards that are intelligible to outsiders.335  
Intelligibility in this context means more than that a person’s behavior can be interpreted in light 
of a coherent set of values.  It means that even if other moral agents do not share an agent’s 
evaluative standard, they at least can understand the appeal of doing so.  The scope for 
reasonable disagreement is nonetheless wide.  Reasonable moral agents may agree on a set of 
prima facie moral considerations but have stark disagreements about how to weigh them.  Being 
able to see how a consideration could matter to a reasonable, morally responsible person is 
consistent with thinking that the consideration is in practice simply not very important.336 
Because social morality coordinates the behavior of free and equal people, it must be a 
set of rules that people with differing evaluative standards may endorse.  Each member of the 
public ranks rules according to their own evaluative standards.  A rule is in the “eligible set” of 
rules of social morality if all reasonable members of the public think it superior to having no rule 
                                                        
334 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 276-283. 
335 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 281. 
336 For example, radical egalitarians might acknowledge that considerations cited by libertarians – 
freedom from interference by the government and compensation that tracks economic contributions – are 
intelligible moral concerns, but not of much importance relative to egalitarian standards of distributive 
fairness.  Conversely, the libertarian might find egalitarian standards of distributive fairness intelligible 
and think that at least some of them have moral significance, but believe that these are not of much 
importance relative to libertarian considerations.  
  160 
at all.337  A rule is part of the “optimal eligible set” if it is in the eligible set and is not ranked 
lower than a mutually exclusive alternative rule by all members of the public.338  In other words, 
a rule of social morality, x, is only justified if it is acceptable to all reasonable members of the 
public and it is not the case that some rule, y, is preferred to x by all members of the public.  This 
theory implies that there may be more than one justifiable social morality.  If x and y are 
mutually exclusive rules, all members of the public favor either x or y over having no rule and 
not all members of the public agree on how to rank both x and y, then both x and y will be in the 
optimal eligible set.  Because all parties agree that any given rule in the optimal eligible set is 
better than not having a rule, they will tend to converge on some rule in the set despite their 
disagreements over the ranking of the candidate rules within the set.  Gaus provides an account 
of how social evolution can select particular rules out of the eligible set.  However, since his 
argument concerning property hinges on which rules are within the optimal eligible set, rather 
than how rules are selected from those in the set, it is unnecessary to discuss the details of this 
part of his argument. 
One feature of Gaus’ argument that will be important is the notion of an “order of 
justification.”  Roughly speaking, the idea is that since trying to settle all questions at once might 
leave us hopelessly at sea with respect to which rules are justified, justification proceeds by 
settling certain more fundamental questions and then evaluating other rules against the 
background of already settled principles.  So, for example, rights to life, bodily integrity and 
political freedom are determined first whereas matters such as speed limits, property tax rates 
and jurisdictional rules for administrative agencies are determined later.  Rights determined early 
                                                        
337 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 322. 
338 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 322-323. 
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in the order of justification might be specified only at a fairly abstract level at first.339  For 
example, the right to freedom of speech and the press might be justified as an abstract right 
without any specification of how it interacts with campaign finance regulation.  Campaign 
finance regulation would be justified (or not) at a later stage of analysis when any proposed 
campaign finance regulation is evaluated against a background of basic rights that includes 
freedom of speech.  As the example implies, the order of justification gives us reason to suspect 
that highly restrictive campaign finance measures will be hard to justify.340   
The justification of laws proceeds in a similar matter to the justification of the rules of 
social morality, but is subject to an even more stringent test.  Laws backed by the coercive power 
of the state entail costs in terms of restricted freedom of choice and harmful sanctions–- 
“coercion costs”—that go beyond the costs of enforcement of rules of social morality.  Since all 
persons have a presumptive right not be coerced, any coercively imposed law stands in need of 
justification in order to overcome this presumption.  A law is justified if and only if its coercion 
costs are outweighed by its benefits (pro tanto utility) according to the standards of each 
reasonable member of the political community.  Members of the public may disagree, however, 
both about the pro tanto utility of any given law and about the coercion costs of the law.  The 
nature and normative significance of coercion is controversial in a great range of cases.  The 
laws for which coercion is justified by the standards of all reasonable citizens form an “eligible 
set” from which a just state may select laws.  Justification of laws is sequential: basic rights are 
specified first and then other laws are evaluated against the background of basic rights.  Laws 
                                                        
339 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 391. 
340 As will be discussed below, campaign finance regulation both reduces the option set of members of the 
public and uses coercive means to secure compliance.  Given a background commitment to free speech, 
both features will tend to count against campaign finance regulation, although it is entirely possible that 
these costs will be outweighed by the benefits according to the standards of all reasonable members of the 
public. 
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that might, in some context, be acceptable to all members of the public, may be rejected in a 
more fully specified political order.   
In his abstract presentation of his theory of political justification, Gaus tends to discuss 
particular laws as the objects of analysis.  But this is imprecise.  Instead, members of the public 
rank their preferences for “issues” where an issue might include more than one law if the 
justification of one law is “dependent” on another law or laws.  This move is required to avoid 
the cases in which the status of two complementary laws is indeterminate because the ranking of 
each depends on whether the other is in force.  Justificatory dependence is defined as follows: 
Justificatory Dependency: Legislation x has justificatory dependence on legislative issue y 
if and only if  
(1) there is some Member of the Public Alf, such that for Alf, if Alf makes his individual 
decision about the eligible members of {x1 . . . xn} in the absence of considering y, 
his eligible set is {x1 . . . xi} whereas if he considers his y eligible set, his x eligible 
set becomes a different set {x1 . . . xk}; 
(2) The socially eligible set differs depending on whether Alf’s set is {x1 . . . xj} or {x1 . . 
. xk}.”341 
The upshot of this is that justificatory questions are individuated on the basis of whether the 
eligible set for one issue depends on the rankings for another issue.  So, for example, spending 
programs are usually dependent on sources of public finance since there are usually members of 
the public whose views on the spending program will depend on the source of revenue.  At first 
blush, the justificatory dependence principle seems to suggest that it is proper to consider issues 
of property rights alongside redistributive taxation.  For example, the acceptability of robust 
private property rights might, for some reasonable members of the public, depend on the 
existence of social welfare programs that meet the basic needs of those who do not own 
property.342  Gaus appears ambivalent about this conclusion.  In any case, the justificatory 
                                                        
341 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 495. 
342 This is, for example, roughly Kant’s view.  See Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal 
and Political Philosophy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 267-299. 
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dependence of tax laws on property rights will ultimately undermine his argument for the 
“classical tilt.” 
Gaus advances two arguments for robust private property rights, including private 
ownership of capital assets.  The first is that private property is a useful way to respond to the 
problem of evaluative diversity.  Different members of the public evaluate moral rules and laws 
according to different standards.  This makes it difficult to find a common set of rules acceptable 
to all members of the public.  One response to this problem is to adopt an idealized model of 
reasonable members of the public.  This serves to reduce the range of evaluative standards and 
leads to greater convergence in normative judgment among the idealized members of the public.  
For example, Rawls’ original position guarantees normative consensus by making the parties in 
the original position alike in that they are ignorant of their personal characteristics and have 
identical knowledge of history, economics, sociology, etc.  Gaus rejects this type of idealization 
because it either abstracts from the problem of evaluative diversity rather than solving it (as with 
Rawls’ original position) or fails to generate convergence of judgment even under idealized 
conditions (as he believes is the case with ideal observer theories).  Instead of seeking a single 
best evaluative standard to settle all controversial questions, Gaus argues that it is often best to 
manage evaluative diversity by establishing a system of “jurisdictional rights” that determine 
whose evaluative standards hold sway in any given case so that everyone will see their standards 
prevail some of the time.  Private property rights are one form of jurisdictional rights.343  
Property rights allocate authority over external resources to particular individuals or groups.  
They allow a sort of compromise between people with different evaluative standards – each 
property owner may act according to their own standards with respect to the own property but 
must abstain from insisting that their standards determine the use of others’ property.  Property  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 164 
rights may be customized to suit the needs of individual owners: whereas some people may 
prefer a set of rights that approximates Honoré’s full liberal ownership, other people may find 
that it suits their purposes better to craft some more customized set of rights and duties.  This 
argument for private ownership, therefore, does not require any particular configuration of 
property rights, but only that the rights protect private decisional authority over external 
resources so as to remove some decisions from the domain of public justification.344  It also has 
limited implications for the distribution of property rights so long as a sufficient stock of 
property is in private hands rather than under public management and private property is not so 
concentrated in the hands of a narrow group of property owners that the same evaluative 
standards hold sway despite being controversial among the larger non-property owning public.  
The implications for tax rates are equivocal.  Using private property as a response to evaluative 
diversity provides reason to support relatively high tax rates insofar as taxes are used to support 
transfer payments to those with little property, but relatively low tax rates insofar as taxes are 
used to support public goods since the former disperses and the latter concentrates decision 
making authority. 
Gaus’ second argument for robust private property rights is that all reasonable citizens, 
whatever their particular judgments about distributive justice, have reason to support extensive 
private ownership of valuable resources, including at least some capital assets, because of the 
strong association in developed countries between capitalist economics and political freedom.  
Gaus argues that although not all capitalist political systems protect political liberties, all 
contemporary countries that effectively protect political liberties feature extensive private 
                                                        
344 To clarify, private property rights must be publicly justified.  Private property owners, however, may 
make decisions according to their own standards so long as these decisions to do not transgress the 
bounds fixed by publicly justified rights. 
  165 
ownership of both personal and capital property.345  These include the more market oriented 
Anglo-Saxon economies as well as the mixed economies of north-central Europe.  By contrast, 
polities with complex economies without private ownership of capital assets have always failed 
to respect political freedom.  Of course, this failure has been more extreme in some cases (e.g. 
China under Mao) than others (e.g. Yugoslavia under Tito).  Any reasonable member of the 
public, Gaus concludes, will favor extensive private ownership even though reasonable people 
might disagree about the appropriate scope of redistributive policies and state spending.346   
Extensive private ownership is consistent with both a libertarian minimal state and a 
Scandinavian-style mixed economy.  Therefore, normative consensus concerning private 
ownership leaves open a great range of possibilities.  However, because of the importance of 
private property in responding to the problem of diversity of evaluative standards, protecting 
political freedom, and promoting economic prosperity, the right to own private property is 
justified early in the “order of justification.”  This right is only abstract at an early stage.  It 
requires that the state permit members of the public to own private property and protect these 
property rights, but does not specify rights and duties with respect to particular objects.    
Against the background of a political order that features extensive private ownership of 
capital assets, more redistributive proposals will tend to count as relatively more coercive than 
less redistributive proposals and thus require higher ratings in terms of pro tanto utility in order 
to count as justified.  Reasonable members of the public will disagree about how to rate both the 
benefits and the coercion costs of redistributive taxation.  Gaus argues that some reasonable 
parties will find higher tax rates to be significantly more coercive than lower tax rates for two 
reasons.  First, higher rates of taxation require, on average, harsher and more intrusive                                                         
345 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 511-521. 
346 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 520-521. 
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enforcement in order to ensure payment of taxes.347  Second, as tax rates go up, the option set for 
those subject to the tax is reduced because higher marginal tax rates reduce the set of mutually 
advantageous exchanges.  Highly redistributive tax and transfer schemes will tend to be 
eliminated from the eligible set because some reasonable citizens will find that the social costs of 
coercion necessary for high tax rates outweigh the social benefits of redistribution.348  Although 
some reasonable citizens may favor high taxes to fund such redistributive transfer programs, 
these cannot be publicly justified in light of reasonable disagreements about the value of such 
programs and the coercion costs of redistributive taxation.349  Because Gaus’ justificatory 
liberalism tends to eliminate highly redistributive proposals from the eligible set, he believes that 
his account of political justification “tilts” toward classical liberalism by excluding some of the 
more redistributive mixed economies.  He concludes that “a liberalism based on a commitment 
to public justification – a justificatory liberalism – leads not to socialism, or a thoroughgoing 
egalitarian liberalism, or to libertarianism, but to the more nuanced approach to legislation we 
find in the fifth book of Mill’s Principles, allowing that there are a number of tasks that 
government justifiably performs, but having a strong overall inclination toward less rather than 
more ‘authoritative’ (i.e. coercive) government.”350 
                                                        
347 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 523-524. 
348 It should be emphasized here that reasonable members of the public are evaluating the costs and 
benefits of a proposed tax rate in terms of what they believe is normatively acceptable, not in terms of 
their personal interests.  So the fact that some may pay higher taxes in order to benefit others does not 
necessarily give them grounds to object. 
349 Both reasons for rating high tax rates as unduly coercive are rather questionable.  Although high tax 
rates reduce the scope of possible exchanges for some people, they also (assuming that the tax revenue 
isn’t entirely wasted by, e.g. fighting losing wars) increase consumption possibilities via transfer 
payments or more extensive public goods.  Although higher tax rates may require more coercive methods 
for collection ceteris paribus, there is reason to doubt that this effect is strong over most ranges of tax 
rates.  Perceptions of tax fairness (which are not necessarily related to marginal rates in any consistent 
way) and the behavior of one’s fellow taxpayers may be far more important.  In any case, Gaus’ argument 
requires only that the belief that higher taxes are more coercive is reasonable, not that it is correct. 
350 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 526. 
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Gaus’ argument fails even if one grants its methodological premises.  The fundamental 
problem is that Gaus appeals to inconsistent ways of modeling how to determine the eligible set 
when arguing for “the classical tilt.”  He equivocates on whether the benefits to be weighed 
against coercion costs include only the benefits of taxation or all of the benefits of private 
property.  In arguing for the “classical tilt,” Gaus treats taxation as a separate issue from the right 
to private property.  When the gains from private property rights are separated from the gains 
from taxation, the benefits of taxation are more modest and it is quite plausible to think that some 
reasonable members of the public will object to high (effective or marginal) tax rates.  But this 
form of argument seems open to two fairly obvious objections.  First, it seems that the views of 
the most libertarian-minded reasonable member of the public will fix tax rates.  Once taxes are 
sufficient to fund a minimal state that effectively protect civil liberties and private property, this 
“libertarian dictator” may view any further taxes as unjust because the coercion costs of 
additional taxation outweigh the benefits.351  For transfer payment programs, this result seems 
likely.  If one attaches little to no weight to distributive considerations (and nowhere does Gaus 
say that such views are unreasonable), then programs that tax A to provide a transfer payment to 
B will almost invariably come out as having negative pro tanto utility once one figures in 
administrative costs and deadweight loss.  This result is peculiar.  An eligible set of one 
determined by the views of the most libertarian member of the public hardly seems like a 
reasonable result.  Second, it seems that Gaus’ argument depends on a controversial analysis of 
coercion costs not likely to be shared by all reasonable members of the public.352  While classical 
liberals may find highly redistributive institutions unreasonably coercive, egalitarians may 
reasonably find highly non-redistributive institutions coercive.  In a state with very little  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redistribution, high levels of coercion might be required to prevent the propertyless from stealing 
from the propertied and to maintain social order more generally.353  Although high tax rates 
reduce the option set of those subject to tax, stingy social welfare programs reduce the option 
sets of those with little income.  An egalitarian might therefore rate the night-watchman state as 
more coercive than the social welfare state and do so for reasons that are structurally analogous 
to the libertarian’s reasons for considering high tax rates coercive.  Gaus concedes that such 
views are not prima facie unreasonable.354  Nor are evaluative standards that favor the minimal 
state.  This presents a serious problem.  It seems as though welfare state liberals have just the 
same grounds for rejecting low tax / low redistribution laws as classical liberals have for 
rejecting high tax / high redistribution laws.   
Gaus’ reply to both objections reflects a similar strategy: appeal to the overwhelming 
benefits of private property as evidence that reasonable members of the public, even those who 
rate coercion costs highly, will think them outweighed by the pro tanto utility of private 
ownership.  In the case of the libertarian dictator, Gaus points out that although a reasonable 
libertarian might believe that the minimal state maximizes the difference between pro tanto 
utility and coercion costs, pro tanto utility will still exceed coercion costs for a range of higher 
tax rates as well.355  Since tax rates are only excluded from the eligible set when at least one 
reasonable member of the public rates their costs as outweighing their benefits, the reasonable 
libertarian might have to settle for something other than her optimal tax rate.  And this is 
consistent with Gaus’ general theory: “free and equal persons can freely act on nonoptimal 
options (including those who employ more coercion than one thinks is optimal), so long as the                                                         
353 That such activity would be unjust is no objection to counting justified punishment as a coercion cost 
since this sort of coercion is exactly parallel to that employed against tax cheats.  See Gaus, The Order of 
Public Reason, 523. 
354 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 506-08. 
355 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 501-03. 
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gains (in terms of one’s evaluative standards) exceed the costs.”356  A similar argument is used to 
block the second objection.  Gaus concedes that private property rights and redistributive laws 
(especially redistributive tax laws) are not “even remotely independent issues.”357  So members 
of the public who believe highly inegalitarian economic orders to be unjust cannot be expected to 
evaluate private property rights until they know their distributive implications.  However, Gaus 
argues that even welfare state egalitarians must acknowledge the great benefits of small-
government political orders that protect civil liberties and private property.  Even if they believe 
that such arrangements entail high coercion costs, they will usually be in the eligible set because 
a functional legal system that regulates property rights has high pro tanto utility.358   
Both of Gaus’ responses to these objections seem very plausible.  But their form tends to 
undermine his argument for the “classical tilt.”  Gaus’ argument for the classical tilt hinges on 
treating tax laws, or at least tax laws for the purposes of funding redistributive schemes, as 
standalone proposals that must be independently justified.  If this were not the case, then 
classical liberals would be in a position structurally analogous to that of egalitarians who object 
to classically liberal states.  Although the classical liberal might find the welfare state to involve 
levels of coercion that are far from what she considers optimal, the benefits of private property 
rights protected under a stable political order would seem to provide enough pro tanto utility to 
outweigh even very substantial coercion costs.  Likewise, Gaus would not be able to avoid the 
libertarian dictator objection unless the pro tanto utility of something other than redistributive 
                                                        
356 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 502. 
357 Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 522. 
358 Gaus is careful about how far to push this point.  He seems to acknowledge that distribution of 
property rights could be so horrifically inequitable that a small-state political order would be outside the 
eligible set.  See Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 526.  I suspect that what he has in mind is something 
like a latifundia economy in which the great masses of people are trapped working for subsistence wages 
on the estates of a few great landowners.   
  170 
social welfare programs counted in the libertarian’s evaluation of redistributive taxation.  The 
libertarian does not think that redistribution is valuable at all.359  
 Gaus’ presentation of his argument appears inconsistent.  It remains to be seen if it can be 
reconstructed in some way that preserves the classical tilt.  Gaus’ argument for the classical tilt 
depends on a two-step process.360  All laws must be justifiable to all reasonable members of the 
public.  This means that each reasonable member of the public prefers the law to having no law 
at all.  The first step of the argument is that (1) all reasonable members of the public will agree 
that private property rights should be protected.  Property rights are fundamental jurisdictional 
rights and therefore these are settled early in the order of justification.  Once an abstract right to 
private property has been fixed, Gaus argues that (2) against a background of a right to private 
property, some reasonable members of the public will find high rates of taxation impermissibly 
coercive and thus the structure of public justification will “tilt” against redistributive taxation and 
toward classical liberalism.  But given Gaus’ theory of justification, there is no way to model this 
argument that establishes the classical tilt and avoids the libertarian dictator result. 
 The crucial issue is how to understand pro tanto utility in the second step of the 
argument.  One option would be to consider the first step of the argument to establish only an 
abstract right to acquire private property and the second step both to specify certain rules for 
fixing property entitlements and a tax and transfer system to mitigate wealth inequality.361  
Under this interpretation it seems that for a huge range of possible laws all reasonable members 
of the public will agree that the pro tanto benefits of establishing a concrete system of property                                                         
359 More precisely, because wealth inequality is not a normatively weighty consideration, the value of 
extra income for the poor is cancelled out by the lower income of the rich and the deadweight loss 
associated with taxation. 
360 This is most explicit in Gaus, “Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory 
Liberalism’s Classical Tilt,” 233-275. 
361 Gaus lends credence to this interpretation when he discusses the problem in terms of the justification 
of “large states” vs. “small states”.  E.g., Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 508. 
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rights swamp the coercion costs of both property rights enforcement and redistributive taxation.  
If the “no law” alternative means that there is no authoritative standard for establishing property 
rights, then even relatively objectionable property regimes will count as acceptable.  Libertarians 
will rate big government mixed economies as being better than no functional state; likewise 
egalitarians will rank an austerely classically liberal state as better than no state at all.362  This is, 
I think, a quite reasonable result.  But it obliterates the “classical tilt” since almost any set of 
laws that counts as instantiating the “abstract right” to private property will make it into the 
optimal eligible set.  The optimal eligible set would include both small-state libertarian orders as 
well as any social welfare state that does not rely on tax rates so high as to effectively convert 
private ownership into trusteeship.   
 A second possibility would be to treat the first step of the argument as establishing some 
basic rules fixing private property entitlements and the second step as fixing public finance and 
spending.  But this formulation does seem vulnerable to the libertarian dictator objection.  Once 
the benefits of private property rights are built into the background, they should not count toward 
pro tanto utility in the second step of the argument.  And this means that small government 
libertarians will believe that the coercion costs of taxation outweigh the pro tanto utility of 
anything more than the “night-watchman state.”  It does not seem to matter much how one 
individuates issues at this stage because small-government libertarians are opposed to most 
spending projects whether they are considered individually or collectively.  Bundling tax and 
transfer programs with other programs objected to by small government advocates does nothing 
to achieve public justification. 
                                                        
362 Even under Gaus’ rather permissive standards for “reasonableness” it seems fair to consider people 
who prefer anarchy to otherwise just states that violate one’s ideals of distributive justice to be 
unreasonable. 
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 A third possibility would be to treat the first step of the argument as securing the 
efficiency benefits of private ownership, but being silent as to the likely distributive 
consequences.  Thus the economic benefits of private ownership would not count toward pro 
tanto utility at the second step.  Unlike the second scenario, the small government libertarian 
could not veto any further laws modifying property rights with confidence that this would result 
in her preferred private property based distribution.  This version of the model, however, would 
result in a stalemate.  Large state redistributivists would reject all orders that do not include 
strongly redistributive social institutions.  Small state libertarians, on the other hand, would reject 
all strongly redistributive orders.  The eligible set would be empty.  So this way of modeling the 
order of justification is not plausible. 
 One final possibility is that the argument should involve three steps rather than two steps.   
At the first step, property doctrines such as trespass rules that are necessary for any form of 
ownership are justified while leaving open the question of what sort of entities (individuals, 
groups, or states) may possess such property rights.  Any complex society, including one’s based 
on public ownership of productive assets, requires trespass rules and the like.  There should be 
broad normative consensus on such rules.  The importance of these rules makes it possible that 
their justification will not depend on other questions under the Justificatory Dependence 
principle.363  At the second step, rules that allow private groups and individuals to acquire 
property are justified.  Here it may be the case that reasonable members of the public with 
egalitarian views will reject property property systems that do not provide for some degree of                                                         
363 One difficulty with Gaus’ system is that it is extremely difficult to analyze such questions.  The 
existence of one idiosyncratic but reasonable member of the public whose ratings of possible trespass 
rules depends on broader questions of distributive justice (or anything else) could be enough to make the 
justification of trespass rules dependent on broader questions of distributive justice.  It seems plausible 
that, for example, judgments about the proper scope of the private necessity exception to trespass (this is 
the doctrine that allows use of another person’s property for life-sustaining purposes) may depend on 
broader distributive questions.  But whether this actually changes the eligible set is more difficult to say.  
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social insurance.  The second step of justification will, therefore, tilt very modestly against 
classical liberalism and toward welfare state mixed economies since some of the more extreme 
free market orders may be excluded.  At the third step, laws regarding taxation and redistributive 
spending are considered.  Now that the benefits of property law and private ownership have been 
secured, libertarian minded members of the public believe that the pro tanto utility of most 
taxation (which they believe to have very modest benefits) is outweighed by coercion costs.  The 
libertarian dictator rears its head yet again.  This result is mitigated somewhat at the second step 
which may result in some form of minimal welfare rights.  But the fundamental problem 
remains: insofar as one alters Gaus’ argument by adding extra steps to the order of justification, 
libertarian dictator concerns are more and not less difficult to address because the sources of pro 
tanto utility for libertarian minded members of the public will be more limited and therefore 
there is less scope for securing justification for redistributive taxation and spending. 
These results point to several fundamental difficulties with Gaus’ approach to property 
rights.  Treating property rights and tax obligations as analytically separate while seeking public 
justification under conditions of broad normative disagreement is unworkable.  A complex 
private property regime requires a state with some source of public finance.  It seems artificial, 
therefore, to justify private property in the absence of some enforcement mechanism in much the 
same way that it is artificial to endorse some law requiring government spending without 
specifying a source of public finance.364  Given that all complex political orders require a 
mixture of property rights, public finance and government spending, there is no neutral way to 
order justification of these elements.  Gaus prefers to start with private property rights and then 
evaluate proposals against this background.  An egalitarian might prefer to start with an                                                         
364 Gaus rails against the latter error but does not address the former point.  E.g., Gaus, The Order of 
Public Reason, 496-97. 
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assumption of equal distributive shares and then alter this distribution in light of the benefits of 
private ownership.365  An intermediate position would be to begin with something like a right to 
a social minimum and then consider proposals for private property and taxation against this 
background.  Gaus argues private property rights are fundamental building blocks in the order of 
justification.  But one might accept large parts of his case for private property while maintaining 
that basic welfare rights are still more fundamental since the freedoms secured by a system of 
private property rights have little value to those who lack sufficient resources to meet their basic 
needs.  Both perspectives seem reasonable and it is hard to see how to choose between them 
without passing judgment on the substantive merits of the underlying political ideologies.  At 
this level of analysis, there do not appear to be compelling reasons to consider justificatory 
questions in one order rather than another. 
A more thoroughgoing Humean perspective on this question might help break the 
stalemate by recasting the analysis in terms of implicit bargains between free and largely (but not 
exclusively) self-interested actors rather than justification for free and equal ideologues.  Certain 
sorts of conventions are fundamental to social order. Among these are property rights, promise, 
and allegiance to the state.  It is crucial for people to coordinate their conduct in these areas if 
they wish to live harmoniously.  Questions about tax rates and the like are decided against a 
background of property rights not because property rights are more fundamental as a matter of 
moral justification, but because such questions only arise when certain fundamental conventions 
are in place.  Because some people can expect to do quite poorly under purely market 
distributions of property, stable fundamental property conventions are often only possible under 
the condition that there will be mechanisms that allow the less fortunate to derive significant 
benefits from observing property rules.  Once basic entitlements are fixed, one might evaluate                                                         
365 One way of arguing for Rawls’ position takes something like this form. 
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further policies in light of their fairness against this background.  This strategy buys stability at 
the cost of justificatory power.  The basic idea is that people are unlikely to subvert property 
institutions that benefit them even if they object to them for ideological reasons.  Neo-
Rousseauians will object that this might require enforcing property rules against those who have 
sincere moral objections to them.  But the sting of such charges might be mitigated by the 
observation that those who share in the benefits of a social practice should be expected to share 
in the burdens even if these burdens may not be justly imposed on some third party. 
Alternatively, Gaus’ framework might be revised by distinguishing the level of 
justification needed for constitutional fundamentals from that required for ordinary legislation.  
Instead of considering each law as a potentially separate issue that requires justification to all 
reasonable members of the public, it might be preferable to apply such strict standards of public 
justification to constitutional provisions and treat specific taxing and spending provisions as 
justified so long as they are enacted through procedures specified by the applicable constitutional 
provisions.  Despite the obvious influence of James Buchanan’s constitutional economics on 
Gaus’ theory,366 Gaus does not seem to consider this approach.  It seems plausible that the 
constitutional order of a free liberal society would tilt toward classical liberalism in the sense 
that it contains constitutional protection for private property.  This might serve to prevent 
democratic majorities from expropriating minorities as well as to combat various pathological 
forms of rent seeking.  Redistributive taxing and spending programs would then be left to be 
decided according to ordinary democratic procedures.  Such an arrangement might be acceptable 
to welfare state liberals on the supposition that well-functioning democratic procedures (i.e. ones 
in which the wealthy are not able to buy off legislatures) will tend to result in generous social 
insurance programs.  Limited protection of private property rights as a matter of constitutional                                                         
366 E.g., Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 540-545. 
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basics might be acceptable to reasonable members of the public so long as it prohibits only the 
sort of bare expropriations that may be condemned by people who have widely differing views 
on political economy.  Distinguishing between matters of constitutional order and ordinary 
politics has the further benefit of side stepping awkward questions about the “order of 
justification.”  Because the bounds of legislative authority are determined by constitutional 
basics, one cannot consider ordinary legislation until the constitutional background is fixed.  
Therefore, one need not appeal to any controversial theory of justification to argue that 
constitutional provisions are prior to ordinary legislation regarding public finance and spending. 
A second fundamental difficulty with Gaus’ methodology is that it makes the bounds of 
publicly justifiable rules depend on the “reasonableness” of extreme views.  This is particularly 
troubling in cases in which small “reasonable” minorities may reject rules that are endorsed by 
the vast majority of members of the public.  Gaus counts both night-watchman state 
libertarianism and radically egalitarian standards as “reasonable.”367  In and of itself, this is not 
problematic.  But his account of justification sets the parameters of the “eligible set” by 
considering which policies can be endorsed by all reasonable members of the public.  People 
whose views are highly idiosyncratic, extremely unusual or just barely reasonable are thus given 
a veto over public policy.  For example, tax and transfer schemes that have the support of the 
vast majority of the public may count as unjustified if they are rejected by reasonable libertarians 
on grounds that may be only mildly responsive to empirical facts about the consequences of such 
policies.368  This is not a mere quibble: because Gaus’ theory is not based on compromise in the 
                                                        
367 There are reasons to be skeptical that the bounds of reasonable disagreement are really as wide as Gaus 
claims. 
368 Libertarians who are wholly indifferent to distributive consequences might count as unreasonable 
because they are not responsive to whole classes of moral considerations.  But Gaus apparently believes 
that it is reasonable to weigh distributive consequences having much less significance than other 
considerations.   So small-state libertarians who believe that the Gini coefficient is far less important than 
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form of bargaining, there is no general reason to believe that actual policies will fall in the 
approximate center of the eligible set.  Democratic procedures tend to push results toward 
compromise positions.  Gausian eligible sets do not share this feature.  Instead, compromise 
positions that might emerge from bargaining between different interest groups might be excluded 
from the eligible set. If the policies with the greatest public support are excluded from the 
eligible set, normal democratic procedures are likely to settle on policies on the boundary of the 
eligible set.   When the bounds of acceptable public policy are set according to whether or not 
the views of small numbers of extremists count as reasonable, it seems that something has gone 
wrong.  In matters relating to the distribution of material resources, this is particularly 
worrisome.  One attractive feature of bargaining approaches to such questions is that their 
internal logic inclines them toward win-win arrangements.  If there are potential efficiency gains 
to be had by rearranging entitlements, there is scope for agreements that redistribute some 
resources from “winners” to “losers”.  Models based on convergence of moral views rather than 
mutual interest do not necessarily have this feature.  For example, parties that object to certain 
property regimes because they do not reflect moral desert or egalitarian distributive norms 
cannot be persuaded by offering them a greater cut of the pie.  All that matters is that a normative 
view, however idiosyncratic, is minimally reasonable.  Even if Gaus is correct that applying a 
justice as bargaining model to domains such as civil liberties is inappropriate, it is not clear that 
this generalizes to property.   
None of the reconstructions of Gaus’ argument considered above appear both to justify 
the “classical tilt” and to stave off the “libertarian dictator” objection.  If we analyze the 
justification of private ownership concurrently with tax and transfer regimes, a great range of                                                                                                                                                                                   
the individual freedom of choice afforded by extensive private ownership and low taxes may count as 
reasonable even if libertarians who believe redistributive taxation to be immoral regardless of the 
distributive consequences do not. 
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systems will end up in the eligible set given the overwhelming advantages of property rights as 
compared to a free-for-all.  Both egalitarians and libertarians can agree that the coercion costs of 
having property rules are outweighed by the advantages at most feasible levels of redistribution.  
So the eligible set is quite large.  But once we have settled on a system of private property rights 
and authorized the minimum level of taxation necessary to enforce them, it may be impossible to 
get agreement on any further rules.  If the gains from property rules are no longer included in pro 
tanto utility, there may be no level of taxation for which both egalitarians and libertarians believe 
that the pro tanto utility outweighs the coercion costs.  Libertarians are likely to consider the pro 
tanto benefits of any additional level of tax and transfer to be defeated by coercion costs.  When 
Gaus explains why libertarians will not be able to insist on a minimal state (and why large state 
egalitarians cannot insist on high taxes), he appeals to the great benefits of property rules and 
private property as factors that outweigh significant coercion costs of taxation according to any 
reasonable standard.  But when justifying the “classical tilt” of justificatory liberalism he 
suggests that the costs and benefits of higher taxes must be evaluated separately from the costs 
and benefits of the property regime as a whole.  Gaus’ argument therefore equivocates on the 
right way to evaluate property rules and tax rates.  If we do not evaluate property rights and tax 
obligations together, libertarians can veto any taxes above the minimal state.  If we do bundle 
property and taxation for the purposes of normative evaluation, the enormous benefits of having 
property rules will result in a large eligible set because the alternative (open access or state 
ownership) is so unattractive that neither reasonable classical liberals nor reasonable egalitarians 
will reject any of a great variety of possible property regimes. Within this large “optimal set” 
considerations of stability and utility, (rather than justification to reasonable members of the 
public), may dictate the precise contours of property rights and tax obligations.  It is this Humean 
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conclusion that I believe is the correct one: even for people with starkly differing moral views, 
the overwhelming gains from coordinating on property rules give sufficient reason to follow the 
rules in force even to those who think the rules in their society very far from optimal.  Gaus’ 
‘justificatory liberalism’ in its most plausible formulation radically underdetermines institutions 
of property and taxation.  And this is as it should be: respect for existing property entitlements 
constrains the form which taxation may take but permits a wide range of substantive policies. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Even if property rights do not track pre-institutional moral entitlements, treating pre-tax 
property rights as having normative weight structures bargaining over contributions to public 
goods in a useful way.  The problem with treating pre-tax ownership as “mythical” and pretax 
income as morally irrelevant is that it effaces the structure of the norms that we use to coordinate 
on fair terms of political cooperation in the face of moral and factual disagreements.  Rather than 
merely being a burdensome constraint on the pursuit of social justice (i.e. the distribution of 
income should ideally be more egalitarian, but existing property entitlements limit the feasibility 
of redistribution), property entitlements provide a baseline that facilitates compromise on rules 
governing contribution to public goods between people who may hold starkly different moral 
views.  Treating certain distributive questions as partially settled by property law facilitates 
cooperation on others matters whereas treating such questions as perpetually open to wholesale 
revision through tax policy tends to encourage wasteful conflict.  Taking this view of property 
rights does not, however, commit us to classical liberalism or another ‘small-government’ 
political order.  So long as tax obligations track income or initial property holdings, Humean 
property rights are consistent both with high and progressive tax rates and with low and flat 
rates.  The importance of property rights in structuring bargaining over contributions to public 
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goods is evidence in favor of the Humean approach to property.  There is a place for top-down 
resource egalitarian theorizing that starts with systematic high-level principles of justice and uses 
them to evaluate our institutions.  But there is also insight to be gained from bottom up non-ideal 
political philosophy that traces the development of successful cooperation from the most basic 
property conventions to highly complex political institutions. 
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